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INTRCDUCTICN
"Political thought and history are two
aspects of one process - the process
of the human spirit: they are two sides
of a single co'in."l
The inspiration for this essay has a threefold basis:
it represents, in the first place, a desire to investigate
an area of ancient political thought lying apart from the
stage so prominently, and almost exclusively, occupied by
Plato and Aristotle; secondly'', the opportunity to give expres-
sion to a growing interest in the interrelation and inter-
action of history, political thought, and literature; and,
finally, the intention to examine the political thought in a
work or works not already gleaned of every conceivable politi-
cal interpretation in hundreds of existing monographs, sur-
veys, a.nd anthologies. Circumstances have combined to suggest
the histories of Herodotus and Thucydides for this purpose;
and the investigation has proved to be rewarding on all three
counts. Although much material exists on Thucydides, only a
small percentage of it deals in any considerabi^e degree with
the element of political thought in his history, and no single
1. Ernest Barker, in the Cambridge Ancient History, 12 vols..
New York, 192? (Macmillan) ; vol. XVI, p. 5O5.
'f
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work in English treats exclusively and in detail of that ele-
ment. The field of political thought in the Kerodotean his-
tory seems, by comparison, virtually imexplored.
The history of Herodotus is designated The Persian -'ars;
that of Thucydides, The Peloponnesian War . In each case,
the title applied, not by the author, but by succeeding
copyists and translators. The translation of Herodotus' history
used throughout the present study has been that of George Raw-
linson; the translation of Thucydides, that of Benjamin Jowett.
These translations of the two histories appear together in
the first volume of The C-reek Historians
,
edited, and with an
introduction and notes, by Francis R.3. Godolohin of Princeton
1
University
.
It is not within the scope of this essay to deal with the
literary merits of the historians; and their abilities as his-
torians have been considered only as such abilities clarify
elements of political thought. No attempt has been made to
verify historical facts; the aim has been to derive the politi-
cal thought from the facts as given. Thus the speeches con-
tained in both histories are accepted for analysis even though
no single one of them v/as probably ever actually made. V/here
it seems to have been indicated, a distinction has bean made
between v/hat is obviously the historian's ovm thought and v.hat
1. Francis k.B. C-odolphin, ed., The Greek Historians , in a
variety of translations, 2 volumes, New York, 1942 (Random
House)
.

ill
is more likely to have been the thought of his time.
Pertinent ancient works have been consulted in translation
Plato and Aristotle, Aeschylus and Aristophanes. In the ab-
sence of any remotely adequate knov;led£e of Greek, there have
been no references to reproductions of original sources - such,
for instance, as to the writings of Dionysius of Halicarnassus,
and of Marcellinus, the biographer of Thucydides. In view of
the nature of the v/ork, this can be nothing more than a minor
detraction. An admitted weakness, however, is the complete
absence of German, which has mads it impossible to tap the
rich if somewhat overworked mine of German scholarship, yet
untranslated, on the subject of Herodotus and Thucydides. Any
future re-consideration and enlargement of the present subject
might include references directly to Greek and Latin sources
and must positively make use of the vast German research. The
principal references here have been to modern works, especially
to those of the mature and fruitful English investigators,
whose readability, generally speaking, is surpassed only by
the soundness of their scholarship.
This essay has as its object the extraction, analysis, and
comDarison of v/hatever political thought the histories of Hero-
dotus and Thucydides have been found to contain.
I
Chapter I
BACKGROUND: TdE KISTCRIANS AND TKEIR HISTCRIES
"So very difficult a matter it is to
trace and find out the truth of anything
by history, when, on the one hand, those
who afterwards ;\rrite it find long periods
of time intercepting their view, and, on
the other hand, the contemporary records
of any actions and lives, tartly tlirough
envy and ill-will, partly through favor and
flattery, pervert and distort truth."!
A. hekcd:tus
1. His Life
Although a considerable amount of scholarly energy has
been expended on a wide variety of reconstructions of the ife
of Herodotus, only tv.^o or three facts about him can be stated
with positive assurance. That he lived is attested to by the
existence of his history, v/hich opens with the v;ords, "These
are the researches of Herodotus of Kalicarnassus . . . ." ; by a
few direct references to him in the works of Aristotle; and by
nijjnerous implied references in Thucydides and in the v/orks of
contemporary Attic dramatists. That he was born in Kalicar-
nassus, a Dorian city on the coast of Asia Minor, appears from
1. Plutarch, Lives, translated by John Dryden and revised by
Arthur Hugh C lough. New York (Modern Library Edition)
;
from "Pericles", o . 194.
1

his ovm ',;ords (above) and is not questioned by any historian,
ancient or modern. (The date of his birth is generally placed
at about 484 B.C.) That he took part in the Athenian coloni-
zation of Thurii in southern Italy, about 443 B.C., seems also
to be unanimously agreed upon, and at least one ancient writer
1
of hi^h repute refers to him as Herodotus of Thurium.
Those historians who are willing to accept the evidence
of Suidas, research scholar of the tenth century A.D., are able
to enlarge the biographical picture. The citation of Suidas
is brief:
"...Panyasls /of Kalicarnassus/ was said to
have been cousin german of Herodotus the
historian.... Herodotus, son of Lyxes and
Dryo, a Halicarnassian, /\^a.s/of the better
class, and had a brother Theodorus. He
removed to Samos because of Lygdamis, the
tyrant of Halicarnassus third after Arte-
misia. "2
Principally from this it has been suggested that Herodotus
took part in an abortive campaign to oust the tyrant, Lygdamis;
that he was himself forced to leave Halicarnassus for his part
in the attempt; and that from this experience stemmed his ob-
1. Aristotle, Rhejboric, 111,9. J. Enoch Powell, The History of
Herodotus
,
Cambridge (England), 1939 (Cambridge University
Press)
,
says: "That Herodotus participated in the Athen-
ian colonization of Thurii... is the only trustworthy state-
ment which can be made about him on external evidence...."
p. 63.
2. Suidas, Lexicon , as translated bv T.R. G-lover in his book,
Herodotus
, Berkeley (California), 1924 (Univ. of Calif .Press);
D. 20.
t
31
vious dislike of tyranny. Although v/arning that this theory
might well be mere inference based on the historian's dislike
of tyrants, Kow and 77ells, in their standard Commentary on Hero-
dotus , maintain that the evidence of inscriDtions and quota-
* 2
lists support the probability of banishment. The surviving
archaeological evidence comprises (1) a marble stele at Eali-
carnassus, " . . .vrhich tells of a svrom agreement between Lygda-
mis...and his citizens," and (2) a monument showing that in
454 B.C. Halicarnassus paid phoros (tribute) to the Confederacy
3
of Delos - and hence was no longer under a tyrant. It is
difficult to find proof of Herodotus' banishment in this; and
in the absence of more convincing evidence it is perhaps wisest
to conclude, v/ith Rawlinson, that the theory has been contrived
to explain V7hy Herodotus "sDoke so strongly on the advantages
of constitutional over despotic government."
From the evidence of the history itself it is apparent
that Herodotus travelled over a large part of the Mediterran-
1. To the theory of banishment by the tyrant J.B. Bury sub-
scribes ( The Ancient 3-reek Historians , New York, ISO9
(Macmillan) ; pp. 36-37). In some decree also, Joseph "ells,
Studies in Herodotus
,
Cxford, 1923 (Basil Blackwell, pub-
lisher), p. 202.
2. W.V7. How and J. Wells, A Commentary on Herodotus , 2 vols.,
Oxford, 1912 (Clarendon Press); vol. I, pp. 3-4.
3. Glover, op . cit
.
, p. 29.
'"^ 4. George Rawlinson, History of Herodotus , 4. vols., London,
1862 (John Murray, publisher); vol, I, p. 12.

ean world - especially in Egypt, as the detailed and fascinating
second Book amply testifies. He seems also to have had first-
hand knovrledge of the city of Babylon, of the road to Susa, of
the great works on the island of Samos, of the topography of
Marathon and Thermopylae, and of statuary (at least) in Athens.
It seems fairly certain from the internal evidence of the his-
tory that Herodotus spent some time at Athens; and the epic,
story-telling Quality of the history suggests that Darts of
1
it may have been recited there. There is in fact a prevalent
idea, based on the evidence of a later chronicler, that the
historian was awarded an honorarium of ten talents (about elev-
2
en thousand dollars) for his recitations. Sometime after this
he is believed to have left Athens vjith a grou^ of colonists to
Thurii. "'-Jhen he put his history into its present form, whether
he later returned to Athens, when and v/here he died - these are
among the mysteries of history. Presumably hs lived beyond 431
B.C., since the expulsion of the Aeginetans from their island,
which he mentions (VI,9l)i took place in that year.
1. How and ••fells, among others, support the theory of the Athen
ian recitations, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 7. Opposed to it are
Powell, op
. cit
.
, p. 31; and Gilbert Murray, A History of
Ancient Greek Literature , New York, 1897 (D. ApDleton and
Co.), p. 135.
2. Powell, op . cit
.
, pp. 33-34, is opposed to the view.

2. Pro-Athenian Views
It may fairly be maintained that Herodotus, in his history,
did not adopt an ant i-Athenian, certainly not an anti-G-reek,
position. But there inevitably remains a question of the de-
gree of his favorable feeling toward Athens, her citizens and
her culture. Was he merely an admirer of her institutions, or
did he actively espouse the cause of the Athenian Empire - and,
if so, was that the reason for the vnriting of a historj'-? These
are important questions, since upon the answers to them depend
our :"udgment of the historian's general impartiality - or lack
of it - and specifically our eventual interpretation of his
political opinions.
In a significant and well-reasoned passage on v;ar strategy,
in the seventh Book, Herodotus begins with these words, "And here
I feel constrained to deliver an opinion...." (VII, 139) - thus
establishing the fact that he is rendering a personal judgment.
Then, following a criticism of the Peloponnesians, he says:
" If then a man should now say that the Athen-
ians v/ere the saviours of Greece, he would
not exceed the truth. For they truly held
the scales, and v/hichever side they espoused
must have cai-ried the day. They too it was
who, when they had determined to maintain the
freedom of Greece, roused up that portion of
the Greek nation which had not gone over to
the Medes, and so, next to the gods, they re-
pulsed the invader...." (VII, 139)
This is no casual matter, placing the Athenians second only to
the gods, for Herodotus seems to have been a religious man.
In his account of the battle of Marathon, too, the histor-
ian seems to take especial pains to make it clear that the

Spartans did not participate (VI, 106) and that the whole credit
for the battle is due the Athenians. He represents Miltiades
as promising that victory will make Athens "the very first city
in Greece." (VI,109) In the doubtful period which preceded the
decisive battle of Plataea, he tells us that the Athenians re-
fused all offers to make terms with the Persians and rebuked
the Spartans for their lack of confidence in their Attic allies.
(VI II, 143, 144) Elsewhere we are told that the Athenians excell-
ed all other 3-reeks in cleverness, (1,60) and that ^.-^en they
had got rid of their tyrants they became foremost amonc the
Greek states. (V,78)
This and similar evidence in the text leads some authori-
1
ties to impute an active pro-Athenianism to Herodotus, which
however is frequently explained on the basis of the necessity
for the story-teller in Athens to apoeal to the -orejudices of
2
an Athenian audience. The more moderate view is that the his-
1. For example, G. Glotz, The Greek C ity and Its Institutions
,
New York, 1930 (Alfred A. Knopf) ; p .353. Also Bury, 02_. cit .
pp. 62, 65ff ; Lenton J. Snider, The Father of History: An
Account of Herodotus , St. Louis (Mo.), 190? (Sigma Pub-
lishing Co .), Introduction, p.xxxviii; T.B.L. Webster, Poli-
tical Interpretations of Greek Literature , Manchester (Eng-
land), 1948 (Manchester Univ. Press), p. 49; and M. Rost-
ovtzeff, A History of the Ancient VJorld , translated by J.D.
Duff, 2 vols., Oxford, 1926 (Clarendon Press) , vol . I ,p .301
.
2. Thus in Bury, op
.
cit_.,p. 41; and Powell, op . cit
.
,p . 36.
Powell says: " It is not difficult to discover for what pub-
lic the 'Persian history' v;as written. .Cut of seven sig-
nificant comiDarisons . .
.
, five iDOint to Athens /l,98; 1,192;
11,7; 11,170"; IV, 99/."

torian did not allow his admiration for Athenian institutions,
ideas, and accomplishments to diminish his honest impartiality.
This view characteristically holds that admiration did not be-
come partisanship, that preference for freedom over tyranny in
one generation did not require a defense of the Athenian ^^mpire
in the next. "To say that Herodotus uses much Athenian evi-
dence... is not the same as saj^ing that he gives an Athenian
1
version of the history."
There is, in fact, sufficient evidence in the history and
in present-day opinion to warrant the at-sertion that Herodotus'
admiration for Athens may have been limited to the warm grati-
tude he felt for her part in the fight for freedom - and per-
h8>ps also for her hospitality. It needs to be recalled, for
instance, that the purpose of publishing the history was that
of "preventing the great and wonderful actions of the Greeks
2
and the Barbarians from losing, their due meed of glory...." (I)
The nations of the Sast were to share equally with Kellas in
the narrative that followed; and the evidence of Book II may be
adduced as strong proof that Herodotus lacked any initial pro-
1. Joseph Wells, op . cit
.
. p. 157 • See also Rawlinson, op .cit
.
^
p. 67; William ilure. Language and Literature of Antient
Greece, 5 vols ., London, 1859 (Longman and etc
.,
publishers )
,
vol.rv, p. 441; Edith Hamilton, The Greek ¥ay to \"e stern
Civilization
. New York, 1948 (Mentor Books), p. 92; and
George C. Swayne, Herodotus
.
Edinburgh, 1870 (William
Blackv;ood and Sons), p. 178.
2. The underlining is m.ine.
r
8Greek bias. But more positively it may "be pointed out that he
censures as v/ell as praises the Athenians:
"
. . .he represents the Athenian people as
suffering tyranny gladly, and as gulled
by the childish fraud of Pi si stratus
(I. 60-3), or the glib tongue of Aris-
tagoras (V. 97-2); he condemns their
cruelty to the Persian heralds (VII. 133-2),
and implicitly their retention of the
Aeginetan hostages (VI. 86); he tells us
that Athens set the example of appealing
to Persia (V. 73 )> and admits that up to
the day of Marathon there were waverers
in her army and traitors within her
walls (VI. 109-5 ) ."1
The Ineradicable Impression which the history imparts is
that its author vras more a man of the world than of the Greek
peninsula. Kis sympathies were more with mankind than v/ith the
men of a particular city. Thus he can make the Persian Darius
a more honorable and likeable man than the Athenian Themisto-
cles. Werner Jaeger may have hit upon the truth of the matter
when he vrrote that the history of Herodotus "was typical of
the rich, ancient, and highly complex civilization of the
2
Asiatic Greeks...." In any event, it seems unfair to ascribe
to Herodotus any vigorous proselytizing on behalf of the Athen-
1. Kov; and Wells, op . clt
.
, vol. I, pp. 41-42.
2. '.ferner Jaeger, Paldelaithe Ideals of Greek Culture
, 3 vols.
translated from the second German edition, by Gilbert High
et, Nev- York, 1939 (Oxford University Press), vol. I, p.^
380. See also Joseph Wells, op . clt
.
, p. 184; and J. P.
::ahaffy, A History of Classical Greek Literature « New York
1880 (Harpers and Brothers), p. 19.
t
9ian democratic ideals or any conscious apology for Athenian
imperialism. On the other hand, he assuredly is not guilty
of the deliberate malice toward all Greeks v;hich Plutarch sav/
1
in his work. The most that can fairly be said is that he
expressed a clearly favorable attitude to;\rard all Greeks v/ho
preferred freedom over tyranny.
3 . Anti-Ionian Viev:s
There seems to be sufficient ^:ustification for the claim
that Herodotus harbored a viev;- which was "...demonstrably hos-
2
tile to the Ionian Greek...." This view may have stemmed, as
3
Grundy suggests, from a conviction that these Asia Minor Greeks
v;ere originally responsible for the Persian invasion of Euro-
pean Hellas, or from the fact that he himself was a Dorian
Greek and perhaps nourished a species of inter-tribal Jealousy.
The latter possibility seems to be considerably diminished by
the fact that the Athenians were also lonians; and we have Just
examined the principal evidence vrhich proves that, whatever
1. Plutarch, "Of Herodotus' s Malice", translated by A.G. Gent,
in vol. IV of Plutarch's Morals
, 5 vols., corrected and re-
vised bv ?,'illiam ¥. Goodv^in, Boston, 1874 ( Little, Brov;n &
Company;
.
2. G.3. Gmindy. The Great Persian War
,
London, 1901 (John Mur-
ray, publ
. ) ; p , 45 . The author adds, "...and not merely
that, but demonstrably unfair."
3. Ibid. , loc . cit
.
4. Ibid. , p. 574, by implication. See also Plutarch, op
.
cit.,
p. 358.

limits must be placed UDOn the depth of his feeling, he was
certainly not hostile toward Athens. But the former possibil-
ity is clearly borne out by the text. After recounting the
plot of the Milesian Aristagoras to stir up a revolt of the
Asiatic lonians against Persia, and his success in persuading
the Athenians to contribute twenty ships to the venture, Hero-
dotus says: "These ships v:ere the beginning of mischief both
to the Greeks and to the barbarians." (V,97) Here, briefly
and plainly, he states his opinion of the immediate cause of
the Persian war. An Ionian was the cause of it all.
Elsewhere the historian seems to express a personal opin-
ion when he repeats the Scythian estimate of the lonians. On
his expedition into Scythia, Darius of Persia had left a de-
tachment of subject lonians to guard a key bridge. Given an
opportunity to leave Darius to his fate and win freedom for
themselves, all but one of them chose instead to remain faith-
ful to the Persian king; and this leads the Scythians to say
of them,
"...that, if they be looked upon as free-men,
they are the basest and most dastardly of all
mankind - but if they be considered as under
servitude, they are the faithfullest of slaves,
and the most fondly attached to their lords."
(IV, 142)
Later, following the collapse of the Ionian revolt, Herodotus
comments briefly: "Thus were the lonians for the third time re-
duced to slavery; once by the Lydians, and a second, and now a
third time, by the Persians." (VI, 32) He seems to agree that
slavery is the proper status of the lonians. This would follow.
\
11
in part, frcm his earlier description of the v/eakness of the
lonians among other Hellenes, a description which alone pro-
vides support for the sugsestion of a specifically Dorian
anti-Ionianism in his attitude. In Book I, speaking of the
time of Cirrus, he says:
"
. . .feeble as the power of the entire Hellenic
race v-as at that time, of all its tribes the
Ionic was far the feeblest and least es-
teemed, not possessing a single city of any
mark except Athens. The Athenians and most
of the other Ionic states over the vrorld,
went so far in their dislike of the name as
actually to lay it aside; and even at the
present day the greater number of them seem
"to me to be ashamed of it." ( 1,143)
The element of tribal Jealousy predominates here; but the pass-
age was written - along with the rest of the history - long
after the Persian war; and hindsight in the matter of the causes
of the war may well have colored this passage. The safest
assumption seems to be that Herodotus had little patience with
G-reeks who stayed too long or too v.dllingly under the rule of
tyrant s
.
4. Pleas for Greek Unity
The description of the v/eakness of the lonians ^ust quoted
is embodied in a "background" section of the history which points
up a far greater problem among Greeks: that of their lack of
unity. This crippling factor in the Greek political and social
personality seems almost unanimously to be admitted as the chief
cause of the collapse of a civilization v:hich promised more, in
many respects, than any other in history. It is here submitted
that Herodotus was aware of this great weakness and that he
ff
12
urged the need for mutual cooperation and understanding among
Greeks, even though., admittedly, he did not rise above most
of the limitations of the city-state concept.
In the pertinent passage of Book I (142-151), v:e are given
a -Dicture of that lack of unity among Asiatic Greeks v/hich was
1
to "become the fatal weakness of a whole civilization. Among
the twelve cities of the lonians alone there were four dialects
spoken; besides these there were at least six Dorian cities
and eleven Aeolian cities. The city of Miletus had broken
away from the lonians because of their weakness (supra);
citizens of Dorian Halicamassus vrere denied use of the Dorian
temple after a dispute over a brass tripod; and the Ionian
Ephesians and Colophonians were barred from the common Ionian
temple. It is not certain that Herodotus v^as criticizing dis-
unity here; yet the implication is inescapable that he vms.
V/hen Aristagoras seeks aid of the Spartans in the pro-
posed revolt against Persia, he uses these v/ords: "7Je beseech
you...by the common gods of the G-recians, deliver the lonians,
who are your kinsmen, from slavery." (V,49) Here an Ionian
pleads with a Dorian on the grounds of something v/hich all
Greeks had in common: their gods. And the issue is that of
slavery versus Greek freedom. Of precisely'- the sanie nature
is the subsequent plea of the Corinthians to the Spartans:
1. See Snider, op cit
.
, pp. 32-33.
f(
"We adjure you, by the common gods of Greece, plant not despots
in her cities." (V,92) Cther things vrhich Greeks have in com-
mon are eniimerated by the Athenians when they reassure the
Spartans that nothing can turn them from the path of resistance
to the Persian invader: "...there is our common brotherhood
with the Greeks: our cO'iirnon language, the altars and sacrifices
of vvhich we all partake, the common character v/hich v;e bear...."
(VIII, 144)
There is unquestionably a direct criticism of Greek dis-
unity in the speech of Mardonius to Xerxes, advising in favor
of an all-out expedition against Greece:
" '
. . .1 am told. . .the Greeks are wont to vrage
v/ars against one another in the most foolish
way, through sheer perversity and doltishness.
For no sooner is war proclaimed than they
search out the smoothest and fairest plain...
and there assemble and fight; v/hence it comes
to pass that even the conquerors depart with
great loss: I say nothing of the conquered,
for they are destroyed altogether. Now surely,
as they are all of one speech, they ought to
interchange heralds and messengers, and make
UD their differences by any means rather than
battle...'." (VII, 9)
That the unparalleled menace of the Persian invasion had
demonstrated the value of unity among the Greeks, in the esti-
mation of Herodotus, is demonstrated in the words which he
attributes to certain Thebans: "If the Greeks, who had held
together hitherto, still continued united among themselves, it
would be difficult for the v/hole world to overcome them by
force of arms." (IX, 9) It was fortunate that they did hold
together long enough to win the decisive victory at Plataea.
4t
t
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Thereafter they could achieve only the limited and involuntary
unity of the Athenian Empire. That the weaknesses of disunion
were evident imder the Empire is suggested by the fact that
Herodotus was most certainly writing parts of his history while
the Empire was at its height.
5. The Conflict of East and VJest
Mention must be made here of that contrasting of Oriental
and C-reek, of slavery and liberty, of East and '-lest, v/hich
is a major identifying theme of the history of Herodotus, and
which will be more fully developed, along the lines of political
thought, in the next chapter. It is a contrast v/hich has its
basis in "...the contact and collision of two different types
of civilisation, of peoples of two different characters and
1
different political institutions." One of the earliest exam-
ples of it is that of Solon the statesman explaining- to Croesus,
the fabulously wealthy king of Lydia, vihj wealth does not mean
happiness.
"'For assuredly he who possesses great store
of riches is no nearer happiness than he who
has what suffices for his daily needs, unless
luck attend upon him, and so he continue in
the enjoyment of all his good thincs to the
end of life'." (1,32)
The story in its entirety strongly suggests the opposition of
1. Bury, op
. cit
.
, p. 44. See also Hamilton, op . cit
.
, pr).95-
97; Rawlinson, op cit
.
, px). 103-104; amd Mure, op . cit
.
,
p. 489.

15.
a dynamic (Greek) and a static (Oriental) conception of life;
in another aspect, it is a contrast of "the free citizen and
1
the absolute monarch."
The conflict of the two conceptions is most clearly empha-
sized in the last three Books, which together comprise a thun-
derous final act to the great drama which has taken six Books
to develop. Here begins the invasion of Xerxes, which is
"...ushered in with an unusual solemnity of religious and poet-
ical accompaniment, so that the seventh Book .. .reminds us in
2
many points of ths second Book of the Iliad...." Henceforth
the specific contrasts of East and '-fest are frequent. Xerxes
doubts that the C-reeks could be as courageous as Demaratus
says they are, except under the lash. (VII, 103) Later he finds
that there is a difference, in action, between combatants and
vmrriors; (VII, 210) and he is astonished that Greeks contend
in the games for nothing more than an olive wreath:
"'Good Heavens, Mardonius, what manner of
men are these against whom you have brought
us to fight - men who contend v/ith one
another, not for money, but for honour'. '" (VII 1, 26)
Elsewhere a Persian noble confides to his Theban host hov: frus-
trating it is, in the Oriental system, to have knowledge of
danger and yet to have no pow^r over action. (IX, 16) And we
1. Snider, op
. cit
.
, p. 37.
2. George Grote, A History of Greece , 12 voliames, London,
1869 (John Murray, publisher); vol. IV, p. 3^9.
rc
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ars given a clear picture of Persian Justice in the story of
Xerxes ordering the decapitation of the ship's captain vfho
had saved his life. (VIII, 118)
But further multiplication of examples may be reserved
for the succeeding chapter. Here it is necessary to insert a
word of caution: we must not conclude from the abundance of
contrasts favorable to the Greeks that Herodotus was therefore
anti-Persian. The material which lies between examples of
contrast is conclusive evidence of the humanity and tolerance
of the historian - of his catholic interests and of the fascin
ation which the East had for him. Xerxes does not weep over
the brevity of human life because he is a Persian but because
he is a man - a human being. The favor which Herodotus accord
the cause of Hellenic freedom must be understood as it applies
this is the story of the Persian war; and in this war Persia
is wrong, in the eyes of the gods and of the historian, for
an unjust invasion - for trying to enslave a free people. If
the tables were reversed, Greece would be just as clearly in
the wrong; and we would expect to find the contrasts favoring
the Persian cause.
I
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B. THUGYD IDES
1. His Life
The facts concerning, the life of Thucydidee are only
slightly more numerous than those on the life of Herodotus,
V7hile the legends and inferential reconstructions are of com-
parable extent.
¥e may take as factual the biographical material contained
In the history itself. In the opening paragraph, Thucydldes
describes himself as an Athenian and adds that he began to
vn?ite his history when the opposing sides in the Peloponnesian
¥ar "first took up arms." (1,1) Later, in the second Book, in
his description of the ravages of the plague at Athens, he
says:
"...I shall describe its actual course,
and the symptoms by v/hich anyone v^ho knows
them beforehand may recognise the disorder
should it ever reappear. For I was myself
attacked, and witnessed the sufferings of
others." (11,48)
The next biographical reference occurs in connection with the
campaign of Brasidas, the Spartan, in Thrace. ¥e are told that
the Athenian commander at Amphipolis, threatened by conspira-
tors within the city and by the forces of Brasidas without,
"sent for help to the other general in CBialcidice, Thucydldes
the son of Olorus, who wrote this history " (IV, 104) The
historian was then half a day's sail from Amphipolis, and he
went at once to aid the city, taking with him seven ships.
But he arrived too late. Brasidas, "fearing the arrival of the
4
ships from Thasos, and hearing that Thucydides had the right
of working gold mines in the neighbouring district of Thrace,
and was consequently one of the leading men of the country
(IV, 105)," had already taken the city. Al^ that Thucydides
could do was to put the adjacent city of Eion in a state of
defence. (IV, 106) For his late arrival at Amphipolis he v;as
exiled by the Athenians; and he refers to it briefly in Book V:
"I lived through the whole... war, and was
of mature years and Judgment, and I took
great pains to aiake out the exact tmth.
For tv/enty years I was banished from my
country after I held the command at Amphi-
polis, and associating v/ith both sides,
with the Peloponnesians quite as much as
V7ith the Athenians, because of my exile, I
was thus enabled to watch quietly the
course of events." (V,26)
These are the pertinent facts from the text of the history
Plutarch, in his life of Cimon, tells us that Thucydides was
related to Gimon on his mother's side, by virtue of a common
ancestor, Olorus, a king of the Thracians. He says that the
historian "v:as the owner of the gold mines in Thrace, and met
1
his death...by violence, in a district in Thrace...," His
remains, says Plutarch, v/ere transported to Attica, and "a
monument is shov.rn as his among those of the family of Cimon....
Marcellinus, biographer of Thucydides, mentions a blood connec-
1. Plutarch, "Cimon", op . cit
.
, p. 579.
2. Ibid. , loc . cit
.

tlon between the historian and the Plsistratids, "the influence
of which has been supposed to manifest itself in a tone of
partiality to^^^ards the 'tyrants*, and of disfavor to...Karmo-
1
dius and Aristogeiton. . . ." The mediaeval scholar Suidas
briefly refers to a story about the boy Thucydides having, been
present v.-hen Herodotus gave a public reading of his history
and about his weeding in admiration and resolvino- to follov/
2
in the steps of the older man. This is an attractive and cer-
tainly a convenient fable; but v:e can hardly accept it as
factual material. Nor can we credit the companion tales that
Thucydides took lessons in rhetoric from the same Antiphon to
v.iiom he accords a Machiavellian accolade in the eighth Book,
and that he "sat with Pericles at the feet of the great philo-
3
sopher Anaxagoras, the boldest free-thinker of the day...."
There is nothing fantastic about these stories, and they are
readily adaptable to standard interpretations of the history;
hov;ever, their very convenience makes them subject to doubt.
Since the "^eloponnesian War began in 431/430 B.C., and
Thucydides was at that time of "mature years," v/e may assume
that he was thirty to thirty-five years of age when he began to
1. William Mure, op . cit
.
, vol. V, p. 7, - both the quotation
and the reference to Marcellinus.
2. Described by W. Lucas Collins, Thucydides
,
Edinburgh, 1878
(William Blackwood and Sons); p. 10,
3. Ibid.
, pp. 6-7.
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write the history of the war; and that would place the year of
1
his birth around 460 B.C. or slightly earlier. In the first
year of the war he contracted the plague at Athens but survived
it. In 424 B.C., he commanded the shios summoned to AmphiiDolis
2
and was exiled because he arrived too late to save the city.
His exile lasted twenty years - i.e., until 404 B.C.; and he
lived to see the end of the vrar: 404/403 B.C. That he vras an
Athenian is attested to by the fact that he was a stratesros
,
3
or general, in 424; but he operated gold mines in Thrace and
was a leading man in that area. He probably did not live many
years after the conclusion of the Peloponnesian V7ar. Bury says
4
that he did not die before 399 B.C.; C-rundy says that he did
5
not live beyond that year; v/hile Henderson says flatly that
1. Thus oohn H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides
,
Cambridge, Mass.,
1942 (Harvard University Press), p. 17, e.g.
2. Bernard ¥. Henderson, The Great War Between Athens and
Sparta
,
London, 192? (Macmillan), pp. 274-275, says:
"ViTiether Thucydides condemnation for
military failure v;as just or unjust, at
least it was, at Athens, anything but
extraordinary. His is but one of many
examples - far too many examples - of the
' over-re s-oonsibility of the Athenian execu-
tive.' It is the one utterly fatal blemish
on the Athenian democracy."
3. See C-.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Ap;e , 2
vols., vol.1 published in London, 1911, by John :-:urray,
vol.11 at Oxford, 1948, by Basil Blackwell; vol.1, p. 17.
4. J.B. Bury, The Ancient Greek Historians
, p. 77.
5. Girundy, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 47.

1
he died in 396 B.C. The history, in any event, is not carried
beyond the year 411, leaving seven or eight dreary years for
Athens unaccounted for.
2 . Views on War
Since this essay is to be confined as closely as possible
to considerations of political thought, questions may arise
concerning aspects of the history of Thucydides vhich are
either non-political or only semi-political in nature. Such
a question might well be raised about the attitude of the his-
torian tov/ard war, since a particular war is the subject of his
history. War as an instrument of empire will be considered in
the third chapter, along with its sanctions and, as an expres-
sion of empire, its philosophy. Here we may glance briefly
at the very fev/ general references to it which the history
provides
.
Cf the Pelo-oonnesian war, Thucydides tells us that he be-
lieved at the outset "it would be great and memorable above
any previous war" (1,1) and that the ca-use of it v/as Sparta's
fear of the growing power of Athens (1,23,88). His advance
estimate of the importance of the war is rightly considered
by some scholars to be quite unjustified by the small scale of
most of the operations v/hich constituted the war itself. The
assertion has been v/ell made that, in Thucydides' opinion.
1. Henderson, op . cit
.
, p. 402
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"
. . .any vrar, hov^ever petty, among 3^reeks was vastly more im-
1
portant than the momentous struggle with barbarians." But
allov/ing for the moment the prejudice of over-estimate in re-
gard to the war, we have yet to inquire in what light the his-
torian presented it in his history. The answer must be, that
he presented it analytically, for the most part impartially,
and without any demonstrable trace of moral Judgment. The result
is a narrative which often shocks one with the ujivarnished
brutality of its incidents. But warfare v.-as as merciless a
thir-g in his time as in any other time; "...and his is a mili-
2
tary history, and not a moral discourse." Werner Jaeger is
right in asserting that Thucydides' account of the war effect-
3
ively demonstrates that war and justice cannot coexist.
Having set forth what he believes to be the real cause
of the "^eloponnesian '.''ar, the historian puts in the mouth of
one of his characters, Hermocrates of Syracuse, the opinion
that war is entered into rationally. After paying lip service
to "'the misery of war,'" Hermocrates says:
" 'Nobody is com.pelled to go to war by
ignorance, and no one who thinks that he
will gain anything from it is deterred by
fear. The truth is that the aggressor
1. J.P. Mahaffy, op . cit
, p. 104.
2. Collins, op
.
cit.
, p. 18?.
^ 3. '''erner Jaeger, oo. cit
.
,
vol.1, pp. 395-3S6.

deems the advantage to be greater than
the suffering; and the side v/hich is
attacked v^ould sooner run any risk than
suffer the smallest immediate loss.'" (IV, 59)
Thus the Peloponnesian V7ar can be explained in terras of speci-
fic conscious purposes and of general rules about war. And the
account of it, as the historian is at pains to tell us, v/ill
set an example for guidance in the future. (1,22) In what res-
pect it ma.y provide guidance is a matter of variable interpre-
tation. Thus Sdith Hamilton takes the history literally as
1
"...a treatise on war, its causes and its effects;'* while
Jaeger gets the impression of "...primarily a war of ideas and
2
only secondarily a v;ar of military forces."
There is a significant exception to the viev/ of war as a
rational, predictable, and precedental enterprise in a speech
of the Athenians at Sparta. They mention the "inscrutable
nature of war; and how v/hen protracted it generally ends in
becoming a mere matter of chance..., the event being equally
unknown and equally hazardous to both /sides/." (1,78) There
is a strong element of caution against hurrying into v^ar in
the ne?:t statement of the Athenians:
"'The misfortune is that in their hurry
to go to war, men begin with blov.'-s, and
v/hen a reverse comes upon them, then have
recourse "feo xvords.'" (1,78)
1. C2_:_ cit.
, p. 103.
2. Op . clt
.
, vol. I, p. 388.
rr
The only other specific and critical reference to the na-
ture of v;ar generally concerns its effect on men's characters.
It apoears in an excursus on the evils of revolutions, whose
incidence has been enlarged by the war:
"In peace and prosperity both states and
individuals are actuated by higher motives,
because thej do not fall under the dominion
of imperious necessities; but vmr which
takes away the comfortable provision of
daily life is a hard master, and tends to
assimilate men' s characters to their con-
ditions." (111,82)
Neither this nor the preceding citation constitute evi-
dence sufficient for a conclusion that Thucydides was opposed
to the war which he described - certainly not that he v/as a
pacifist. In each of them he is observing the reaction of men
to particular circumstances. His observations are not criti-
cal judgments.
3. Athens vs. Sparta
Thucydides has not the great master plan of opposing two
cultures which played so large a part in Herodotus' account of
the Persian wars. The Peloponnesian VJar is a war among Greeks,
who have their gods, their games, and their language in common.
They have in common also their individualism, v.^hich leads
them into internecine wars, and their individuality, which
Thucydides thinks of sufficient importance to be empha,sized in
the case of Athens and Sparta. It would be interesting to
pursue the question, whether he intends criticism or praise in
4
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either when he points up differences in their natures; but the
pertinent evidence of the history is too scanty to warrant such
an enterprise. We must accept his recognition of differences
in national character; we may not fairly impute a value judg-
ment to that recognition.
The Corinthians, in Book I, are presented as setting forth
to the Spartans the numerous respects in which they fall short
of the Athenians:
"*They are revolutionary ,.. .while you are
conservative.... They are bold beyond their
strength; they run risks which prudence
would condemn; and in the midst of mis-
fortune they are full of hope. V/hereas it
is your nature, though strong, to act
feebly; v;hen your plans are most prudent,
to distrust them; and when calamities come
upon you, to think that you will never be
delivered from them. They are impetuous,
and you are dilatory; they are always a-
broad, and you are alv/ays at home. For
they hope to gain something by leaving
their homes; but you are afraid that any
new enterprise may imperil what you have
already.'" (1,70)
The speech then continues to describe how completely the Athen-
ians devote mind and body to the service of the state, hov/
they never stop to enjoy what they have already v.'on but always
seek after more, and hov/ it is their nature neither to have
peace themselves nor to allow it to others. This is the opinion
of a third party, enemies of Athens, attempting to rouse the
Spartans to action.
The opinion of the leading Athenian is presented in the
Funeral Cration by Pericles, who describes the men of his city
in terms of an implied contrast with the men of Sparta. The
i
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Athenians, he says, do not require subjection to a harsh mili-
tary regime in order to become good soldiers. They believe in
relaxation - games and sacrifices. They are not suspicious of
foreigners; they rely, not upon management or trickery, but
upon their own hearts and hands. Lovers of beauty, they are
still able to meet danger courageously; and theirs is the cour^
age of intelligent men. Unashamed and uncritical of poverty,
they condemn only failure to take part in public affairs.
(11,39-40)
Archidamus, the foremost of the Spartans, is made to pro-
vide the reader with a catalog of Sparta's commendable quali-
ties. Kis aim is to counteract the emotional character of the
preceding Corinthian speech and to counsel caution. Spartans,
he says, are not lured by flattery into unwise action. Their
habits of discipline make them both brave and v/ise; and they
are proud not to have been educated to that "useless over-in-
telligence" '.-'hich makes a man e.n excellent critic of action
but incapable of action himself. They believe that one man is
much the same as another, "'and he is best who is trained in
1
the severest school.'" (1,84)
1. A.W. Gomme makes the point that Thucydides fully appreciat-
ed the value of the Spartan characteristic of slovmess.
Thus the speech of Archidamus illustrates "...a refusal to
allow the emotions to dominate the judgment...." A.V7.
Gomme, A Historical Commentary on Thucydides
.
Oxford, 1945
( C larendon Press); vol. I, p. 248.
c
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Lest the monumental and oratorically beautiful picture
of the Athenians painted by Pericles be taken for a prejudice
on his own part, the historian has g-iven us in his ovm words -
that is, in the narrative proper - his high estimate of the
Spartan system. Early in the first Book, he tells us that
Sparta obtained good laws at an earlier period than any other
Greek state and had never been subject to tyrants. She had
preserved the same form of government for 40C years.
"It was the excellence of her constitution
which gave her power, and thus enabled her
to regulate the affairs of other states." (I, 18)
The nature of this government is indicated later by the Spartan
general, Brasidas, who says that among his people, "'not the
many govern the few, but the few govern the many, and have
acquired their supremacy simply by successful fighting.'" (IV,
126)
Near the end of his tragic history, Thucydides expresses
the opinion that the Spartans were the most "convenient" enemies
the Athenians could have had. The Athenians v/ere quick, the
Spartans slow; the Athenians were adventurous, the Spartans
timorous. This was especially advantageous to Athens, since
the empire v/hich she was fighting to defend was a maritime em-
pire. Thucydides felt that his view was confirmed by the de-
feat of the Athenians at Syracuse; "for the Syracusans, vho
were most like them, fought best against them." (VIII, 96)
V.Tiether it follows that he believed Athens might have v;on the
war had she not embarked on the Sicilian expedition, is a
r
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question which has occupied a number of subsequent historians.
It is enough for our purpose in this section to conclude that
he believed the national differences between the two princioal
contestants in the war to be of sufficient importance to Justify
pointing them up on several occasions.
4. Economic Factors
There can be no reasonable doubt concerning Thucydides'
understanding of the economic factors in history. If he had
no acquaintance v/-ith the economics of modem industrial civili-
zation, if he lacked the davantage of being steeped in the
dictates of modern Marxism, still he manifested everywhere in
his history an xmderstanding of the causal importance of eco-
nomic factors. It is necessary to note, ho-.vever, that al-
though many modern scholars have held that the principal cause
of the Peloponnesian Vfar vias an economic one, the history of
Thucydides does not suggest that he thought so; he was empha-
tically not an economic determinist. For him, "a plurality
of causes related to problems of economic wants and oolitical
1
pov/er .. .replace the Herodotean Nemesis."
1. Francis R.B .G-odolphtn, editor, oo . cit
.
, Introduction, vol.1,
pp .xxiii-xxiv. See also Gomme, op
.
cit_.,p. 9. Giving
greater stress to the economic factor, Finley, op . cit
.
,
p. 317, says that one of the greatest triumphs of Thucydi-
des was "to have depicted with the utmost clarity the conn-
ection betv;een social distress, political violence, and
military adventure, all of which alike went back to eco-
nomic causes."
\
One principal evidence of the Thucydidean economic aware-
ness is the expressed belief that accumulations of wealth are
essential to the growth of cities and that inter-state commerce
is one of the first sisns of a settled life and of higher stan-
1
dards of living. It will be worth x^hile, as the fullest
illustration of this, to quote from the second chapter of the
history:
"The country which is now called Hellas
was not regularly settled in ancient times.
The people were migratory, and readily
left their homes whenever they v/ere over-
powered by numbers. There was no commerce,
and they could not safely hold intercourse
with one another by land or sea. The sever-
al tribes cultivated their o-<m soil just
enough to obtain a maintenance from it
.
But they had no accumulations of wealth,
and did not plant the ground; for being
without walls, they were never sure that
an invader might not come and despoil
them. Living in this manner and knowing
that they could obtain a bare subsistence,
they were always ready to migrate; so that
they had neither great cities nor any con-
siderable resources...." (1,2)
The importance of wealth as the chief instrument of power
is the chief element in the economics of Thucydides. Having
asserted that the Peloponnesian Vfar will be great and memor-
able above all others, he states that "poverty was the real
reason why the achievements of former ages v/sre insignificant...
(1,11) Specifically he belittles the Trojan War, asserting
that "the cause of the inferiority was not so much the want of
1. See Gomme, op . cit
,
, p. 92.
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men as the want of money." (1,11) In a description of the
growth of Corinth, he sets forth that development which v;as to
form the foiindation of the material greatness of Athens: a
favorable location for commerce, a navy to protect it, the
riches derived from it, and the pov/er v;hich increases with the
increase of wealth. (1,13) Kermocrates is made to tell the
Syracusans that gold and silver make war, "'like other things,
go smoothly.'" (VI, 34)
Thucydides frequently sets forth the cost of a particular
expedition; and in the second Book he itemizes the financial
resources available to Athens for the conduct of the war. (II,
13) In one place, he enlarges upon the impoverishing effect
of maintaining the costly Sicilian expedition and tells us
that the Athenians were forced to replace the requirement of
a specific amount of tribute from each of their allies with a
five percent duty on all things exported and imported by them,
as a maans of increasing revenue. (VI I, 28)
On occasion, the economic motive is introduced in a some-
what different way. Thus the historian tells us that the Acan-
thians surrendered to the will of Brasidas, the Spartan general,
"partly under the attraction of his words, and partly because
they were afraid of losing their vintage...." (TV, 88) They
might favor the ideal of Athens, but their livelihood depended
upon the Tiroduction and sale of wine; the prospect of the Spar-
tans destroying their grapes, still on the vines, was enough
to convince them to capitulate. A similar economic aaotive,
though hardly so excusable (if excuse be necessary), led the
Athenians to vote for the Sicilian expedition against the ad-
r
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vice of Nicias. "...The main body of the troops expected to
receive present pay, and to conquer a country vrhich would be
an inexhaustible mine of pay for the future." (VI, 24)
These few examples will suffice to re-inforce the belief
in Thucydides' full awareness of the economic element in his-
tory. He did not see his segment of Greek history exclusively
in terms of economic factors, he did give to economics its
proper place among other principal elements.
5. Thucydides the Historian
It is significant of the superiority of Thucydides as an
historian that one very recent compiler of other men' s opinions
having listed nine shortcomings of Herodotus under a major
heading, subsequently lists only the methods, merits, and
1
thoughts of Thucydides, This obvious discrimination arises
from the plain fact that the later historian v;as more careful
with his material and applied to it a more discerning analysis.
If Herodotus was, as Cicero said, the Father of History, Thu-
cydides was the first Scientific Historian. It Is for this rea
son that the modern scholar in history, trained in the research
methods of a scientific age, prefers the accuracy of Thucydides
to the entertainment of Herodotus.
1. Meyer i-ieinhold. Essentials of the Greek and Roman Classics
,
New York, 1946 (Barron's Educational Series); t30.119, 132-
133.
r
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Thucydides would be the first to insist that the reader
of his account of the Peloponnesian War recognize the limita-
tions v.'hich he consciously imposed upon its scope. It vas to
be the history of a war, and what did not apply directly to
the war the historian excluded.
"He not only omitted the cultural and
economic history v.hich would be proper
to a History of Athens or of Greece
,
but also political history where it
did not seem to him to have a direct
bearing on the war...."l
If Herodotus be criticized for his lack of interest in the
details of political institutions, may v/e not also criticize
Thucydides for his failure to say anything of the internal
political history of either Athens or Sparta during the period
immediately preceding the outbreak of the war? He says little
enough about it after the war has begun. However, Thucydides
is anything but orolix; and it is generally conceded that the
2
defect is a "consistency of art", a consequence of his self-
imposed initial limitation. The speeches are generally held
to set forth the prevailing political situation and the motives
of the conflicting sides. The point needs to be made, however,
that the speeches do not indicate the specific parties and their
developing activity - in Athens, especially - which led the
1. Gomme, Commentary
, p. 25.
^ 2. Collins, 02_i cit
.
, pp. 185-186.
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state to one decision rather than another; and there is some
Justice in Mahaffy's suggestion that Thucydides' reiDutation
1
for impartiality is limited by his reticence.
There is another criticism of the history's scope which
is probably much more warranted, since it involves what Thucy-
dides said rather than what he did not say. It arises from
his expressed belief the^t the past history of Athens s-nd of
Greece generally v/as unimportant; thus he belittles the Trojan
T'^ar and the Persian I'Irts and all that transpired before 431
B.C.: "...former ages v;ere not great either in their wars or
in anything else." (1,1) Cn the basis of this point of viev/,
founded admittedly on obscure and uncertain evidence, he pro-
ceeds to narrate the calamities of the protracted Peloponnesian
War. In vain does the reader look for operations of sufficient
magnitude to justify the initial boast. Cnly in the Sicilian
expedition do the forces approximate the scale of action v/hich
the opening sentences seem to promise; and even there the com-
bined totals of men and ships, and the area involved, are
dwarfed by the comparative proportions of Xerxes' expedition
into Greece. Granting the prolonged nature of the Peloponnesian
War, there is hardly a battle in it, excepting those of the
Sicilian campaign, which can be described as anything more than
a skirmish. '/Tiere is the modem military historian who v^ould
elevate any one of them to the level of Marathon or Plataea
1. Op
. cit
.
, p. 119.

or Salamis? The history of Thucydidss is probably "...the
most sicnal instance on record of the falsification of the
1
proper perspective of history by individual literary genius."
Concerning the purpose of the history, Thucydides expressly
states that it is to be a true picture of events which have
hapTDoned, "and of the like events which may be expected to
happen hereafter in the order of human things." (1,22) He
hopes that it v/ill be useful to future generations of readers.
It seems to follov/ from this that he believed other men in
other times might apply the lessons of the Peloponnesian War
to their own problems. The classic and universal quality of
most of the speeches v/ill bear out such an inteirpretation -
vfhich makes of Thucydides, with necessary modifications, the
Machiavelli of his age.
"...Thucydides is more the political ad-
viser of statesmen than the disinterested
seeker after truth and righteousness in
social relations that we find in Socrates
and Plato. "2
1. J.P. Msliaffy, Problems in Greek History
,
London, 1892 (Mac
millan) ; o. 100. See also pp. Q2-100. The author says
(p. 100):"
"That the little rs,ids and battles, the
capture of a couple of hundred Spartens,
or the defeat of tv;enty ships should
still be studied with minuteness, and
produce libraries of modern criticism,
is due solely to the povrer of the histor-
ian and the Just preeminence of the famous
language in v/hich he wrote his book."
2. V/illiara Chase G-reene, The Achievement of Greece , Cambridge
(Mass.), 1923 (Harvard Univ. Press) ; p . 161
.
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In this viev/, he apiDears as a teacher of the politics rather
1
than of the military strategy of the Peloponnesian 7'ar; and if
similar political problems are to arise in the future, then a
cyclical viev; of history is implied.
Either as purpose or as accidental result, additional
meanings are read into the Thucydidean narrative. Benn has
the historian laying bare the moral corruption of the time,
not as a consequence of intellectual or religious decay but
rather of the protracted war, the factional conflict, and the
2
plague. Both Murray and Cornford have Thucydides starting
out to write a record of the war, or a textbook of strategy,
and then changing direction to serve a -ohilosophical or moral-
istic purpose. G-odolphin sees the military history as simply
a means to an end - the end being "the analysis and interpre-
tation of the antagonistic economic and political patterns of
Athens and Sparta;" while Finley describes it as "...a treat-
ise on the nature of freedom and authority, of material -oro-
5
gress and social decay...."
It has already been remarked in passing that gods and
1. See Grundy, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 8.
2. Alfred W. Eenn, The Greek Philosophers, 2nd edition, London,
1914 (Smith, Elder and Co. ) ; p. 76.
3. Murray, on . cit
.
, p. 189; Cornford, op . cit
.
, p. 12?.
4. Godolphin, ed., op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. xxiv.
5 - Cp . cit
.
, p . 7
.
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women are almost non-existent in Thucydidean history. Rarely
does a woman appear, and then only for the space of a v;ord or
a phrase. Oracle s are mentioned, but they play no part in the
main action; and the gods are conspicuous only by their com-
plete inactivity. The world of Thucydides is male, secular,
and eminently rational. It is a world in v.hich the decline of
Athens from her eminence at mid-century to her nadir in the
quarries of Syracuse may be described along with all its atten-
dant greed, ferocity, and degradation of character.
(4
Chapter II
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF HERODOTUS
"Herodotus is the historian of the glori-
ous fight for liberty in which the Greeks
conquered the overwhelming powers of Persia.
They v^on the victory because they were free
men defending their freedom against a tyrant
and his army of slaves. So Herodotus sav/
the contest."!
A. ON TYRANNY
The word tyranny
,
denoting a form of political society in
which one man rules without limitation of law, has changed in
meaning and import, and being variously employed, requires an
attempt at definition. In its earliest meaning, the Greek
^WL^ had no moralistic connotation. It was not a "bad"
form of government. It simply applied to the political society
in which one man ruled v/ith the sanction of physical force, as
opposed to the sanction of hereditary right. The hereditary
ruler was designated by the term^^^^jX.i.s/j , or king.
"The name 'tyrant' was perhaps derived
from Lydia, and first used by Greeks in
designating the Lydian monarchs; Archilochus,
in whose fragments we first meet 'tyrannis',
applied it to the sovereignty of Gyges. The
word was in itself morally neutral and did
not imply that the monarch was bad or cruel;
there v/as nothing self-contradictory in a 2
good tyrant, and many tyrants v.-ere beneficent."
3y the time of Socrates, however, tyranny had come to be in
bad odor as a form of government; and in the writings of his pu-
pils, "tyranny is defined in contradistinction to kingship:
1. Edith Hamilton, op . cit
.
, p. 88.
2. J. 3. Bury, A History of Greece , i:odern Library Edition, New
York, p. 139. See also pp. 140-149 for examples and elab-
oration.
((
"kingship Is such rule as is exercised
over willing subjects and is in accord-
ance with the lav/s of the cities; tyranny
is such rule as is excercised over unwill-
ing subjects and accords, not with laws,
but with the will of the ruler."
For the purposes of this study, the distinction v;hich needs
to be made is simDly this: "Tyranny is essentially rule without
2
lav7S, or, more precisely, monarchic rule without laws."
From the point of view of political thou^t, there is
no clear distinction in Herodotus between the methods and
morality of Greek tyrant and Asiatic king, although his recogni
tion of the nominal difference between the two is clearly in-
dicated by his use of the word "king" in referring to Persian
and Median rulers. Thus Darius is throughout the "Great King".
But his is the absolute and arbitrary power of the tyrant; and
1. Leo Strauss, On Tyranny: An Interpretation of Xenophon's
Hiero , Political Science Classics, New York, 1S48; pp.
52-53. Later the author says:
"Being a tyrant, being called a ty-
rant and not a king, means having been
unable to transform tyranny into king-
ship, or to transform a title v/hich is
generally considered defective into a
title v/hich is generally considered
valid." (p. 61)
Aristotle, Politics
,
1295a, says of monarchies that they
are "royal, in so far as the monarch rules according to
lav; over willing subjects; but .. .tyrannical in so far as
he is despotic and rules according to his oi-m. fancy."
2. Strauss, op . cit
.
, p. 53.
rr
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in the judgment of Herodotus he is in that respect linked in
spirit to those Greek tyrants v;hom the historian specifically
condemns.
1. The Six !-Ia.1or G-reek Tyrants in Herodotus
There are assuredly more than six tyrants v/ithin the
pages of Herodotus' history. Yet for the purpose of this sec-
tion \-re may eliminate all of those despots who were non-Greeks,
since their tyranny is taken for granted in the master plan
of contrasting Hellas and non-Hellas. Although Herodotus was
eminently fair in his treatment of non-Greeks, he may viell
have been very much under the influence of the view of Athen-
ian democrats, who could be lukewarm about the tyranny of Per-
sians over their oi-ni subjects, but who opposed vehemently the
tyranny of Greek over Greek. "The barbarian knew no better,
because he was a barbarian; the Greek ought to know, because
1
he was a Greek." Of the Greek tyrants v/hose careers provide
subjects for major digressions in Herodotus, six illustrate
amply the historian's treatment of tyrants. These are Pisistra-
tus, Polycrates, Periander, Cypselus, Ililtiades, and Kisti-
aeus.
(1) Pisistratus . '..'hen Croesus, the Lydian king, began to
look for a Greek ally in support of his proposed attack on the
infant Persian empire, he found the Athenians, according to
1. G.B. Grundy, The Great Persian War
, p. 24?.
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Herodotus, "...in a state of grievous oppression and distrac-
tion under Pisistratus, . . .v/ho vras at that time tyrant of Athens."
(1,59) The description is interesting because very little that
follows seems to justify it; in fact, Herodotus admits that
after Pi si stratus had acquired the sovereignty of Athens, he
governed
"...without disturbing the previously exist-
ing offices or altering any of the laws. He
adininistered the state according to the es-
tablished usages, and his ©arrangements were
v/ise and salutary." (1,59)
The point is that Herodotus is opposed to tyranny in principle.
Having in effect said so, he then proceeds to trace the pro-
gress of Pisistratus' successive periods of rule and of exile,
characteristically in the manner of the story-teller, never
in the manner of the interpreter of political institutions and
events. We are told nothing of the successful foreign policy
of Pisistratus and "nothing of the part tyranny played in pro-
moting the social and economic v^j-elfare of Attica, and little
1
of its great services to art, literature, and religion."
The impression which Herodotus gives of the mildness of
the tyranny of Pisistratus is verified, and the political basis
enlarged, in Aristotle's account of it - which depends con-
siderably upon the historian's earlier version. In the Consti-
tution of Athens , Aristotle affirms that in matters in general
1. How and ^-fells, Commentary
.
Appendix XVI, vol. II, p. 342.
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Pisistratus "burdened the people as little as possible with
his government, but always cultivated loeace and kept them in
1
all quietness." And he re-emphasizes what Herodotus acknow-
ledged, that the tyrant was accustomed in all thinps to observe
2
the laws, "without giving himself any exceDtional Drivileges."
3
Both here and in the Politics , Aristotle says that Pisistratus
on one occasion even allowed himgelf to be summoned and tried
before the Areopa£;us.
(2) Polycrates . Treated mainly as an exa.iiple of divine
jealousy of prolonged human good fortune, Polycrates, tyrant
of Samos, also reveals in the Kerodotean account certain of
the characteristics of tyrants generally.
In the first place, his manner of becoming tyrant inclu-
ded the leading of a minority insurrection, the Tiurder of one
of his brothers, and the banishjnent of the other. Secondly,
he strengthened his position by picking out "from among the
citizens such as he thought most li--:ely to stir revolt against
him" (111,44) and sending them off to ^gjrpt. It •••ill be noted
that the removal of DOssible leaders of revolt accords v/ell
4
with the description of Plato and v^ith the advice of Aristotle.
1. The Constitution of Athens , ch. 16.
2. Ibid
.
, loc . cit
.
3. Politics, 1315^.
4. Republic, VIII, 567; Politics , 1313a.
c
Thirdly.'', the solicitation of aid by the exiled Samians at
Sparta, and the granting of that aid, point up a significant
aspect of the Spartan (if not the general Greek) attitude
toward tvranny, namely, the willingness to assist another
1
G-reek in getting rid of his tyrant. It may or may not en-
hance Sparta's reoutation as the outstanding enemy of tyrants,
2
a position which Plutarch so fiercely maintained. Finally,
Herodotus makes it plain that the Samians were much employed
in public works (111,60); and Aristotle, referring to "the
great Polycratean monuments at Samos" suggests the reason:
"all these v;orks were .. .intended to occupy the peoole and keexD
3
them DOor."
4
(3) Cypselus . Only briefly dealt v/ith as an adult, this
tyrant of Corinth needs to be mentioned as the father and pre-
decessor of Periander, and because the impression v/nich Herodo-
tus gives of him differs from that of Aristotle, vrnat Herodo-
tus says of him is as significant as it is brief:
"Having. . .got the tyranny, he shov/ed him-
self a harsh ruler - many of the Corinthians
1. See Denton J. Snider, op . cit
.
, pp. 202-203,
2. Plutarch, " Of Herodotus' s Malice ", op. cit. , vol. IV, p. 340.
3. Politics , 1313b.
4. There is a typical Herodotus story of the infant Cypselus,
vrhose charming smile beguiled no less than ten would-be
murderers. He got his name from the corn-bin in which
his mother, apprised of the return of the murderers, con-
cealed him. (V,92).
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he drove into banishment, mam'" he de-
prived of their fortunes, and a still
greater nmiber of their lives. Kis
rei£;n lasted thirty years, and was pros-
perous to its close; insomuch that he
left the government to Periander, his
son." (V,92)
There is an apparent contradiction between the harshness depict-
ed in the first sentence and the mention of Corinthian pros-
perity in the second; and Herodotus may here be "clearly in-
1
spired with oligarchic hate of the Cypselids." It is necess-
ary, however, to set forth Herodotus' treatment of Periander
before considering the differing impression of Aristotle.
(4) Periander. Herodotus tells us that at the beginning
of his reign Periander was of a milder temper than his father;
but after he had begun to communicate with Thrasybulus, the
tyrant of Miletus, he soon came to exceed his father in cruelty.
Cn one occasion he sent a messenger to Thrasybulus to inquire
what was the safest way to rule. The answer has become a classi-
cal illustration of the methods of tyranny.
"Thrasybulus led the messenger v/ithout the
city, and took him into a field of corn,
through which he began to walk..., ever as
he went breaking off and throvjing away all
such ears of corn as over-topped the rest.
In this way he v;ent through the whole field,
and destroyed all the best and richest part
of the crop; then without a word, he sent
the messenger back." (V,92)
Periander, upon hearing the messenger's report, immediately
1. How and \fells, op , cit
.
, vol. II, p. 340
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perceived its meaning and set about removing all persons in the
1
state v/ho might seriousl3r threaten his position. He also
murdered his own wife and then, believing her ghost to be in-
adequately clothed, assembled the vromen of Corinth at a relig-
ious shrine and stripped them all naked, free and slave alike,
in order to make an offering of their clothing to his dead
wife. These are excesses of the tyrant which Herodotus abhors
and which Aristotle enumerates in his advice. To the histor-
ian they undoubtedly contribute much toward justifying the
punishment which elsevv'here befell the tyrant - the murder of
his son by the Gorcyraes-ns. (111,53)
Aristotle does little to relieve the blackness of the
portrait of Periander, presenting him in fact as the great
master of that brand of tyranny v-hich compares v.'ith the Persian
2
and contrasts v;ith the earlier Pisistratid. He says only,
t>y /'a.y of com lendation, that although Periander was a tyrant,
he was a great soldier. In respect to Gypselus, however,
Aristotle differs widely from Herodotus. He asserts that
"...Gypselus was a popular man, '.vho durine: the whole time of
his rule /thirty years/ never had a body-guard...." A tyrant
1. It is curious to note that Aristotle in telling the story,
reverses the oarts; thus Periander advises Thrasybulus.
( Politics , 1284a; also 1311a).
2. Politics
,
1313a.
3. Ibid.
.
1315b.
4
who felt free to move about without a body-guard could hardly
have incurred the smouldering hatreds which the brief descrip-
tion of Herodotus suggests, '-'e may, in fact, attribute to
Aristotle the more dispassionate estimate of the Cypselid ty-
rants, since the account of Herodotus is " . . .professedly C.e-
1
signed to illustrate the horrors of tyranny...." The Cor-
inthian envoy begins his speech against the Sps^rtan proposal
to restore Miopias to Athens by saying that the Spartans are
unacquainted v/ith the rule of tyrants; and he concludes his
account of the unhappy experiences of Corinth with the vrords,
"Such, Lacedaemonians, is tyranny, and such are the deeds which
spring from it." (V,92) 've have actually had a lecture from
the historian himself, a lecture inserted at a convenient
point in his narrative.
(5) Miltiades. On his unsuccessful expedition against
the Scythians, larius, the Persian emperor, left his contingent
of lonians (Asiatic Greek subjects) to guard the bridge which
2
^
had been constructed across the Ister. ^^'hile he pursued the
elusive Scythians back and forth across their land, a group
of them appeared to the lonians at the bridge, urging them to
1. J. Enoch Powell, op . cit
.
, p. 4?. I do not agree, how-
ever, with the author' s contention that the digression
on the Cypselid tyranny is a "clumsy device." ( Loc . cit
.
)
.
2. The present-day Danube.
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destroy the "bridge and leave Darius to his fate. The response
of the lonians, or of tv/o of their leaders, sets the political
problem of freedom versus tyranny, as Herodotus sees it.
"Miltiades the Athenian, who was king of
the Ghersonesites upon the Hellespont, . .
.
recommended the other generals do as the
Scythians wished, and restore freedom to
Ionia. But Histiaeus the Milesian, opposed
this advice. 'It is through Darius,' he
said, 'that we enjoy our thrones in our
several states. If his pov/er be overturned,
I cannot continue lord of Miletus, nor you
of your cities. For there is not one of
them V7hich V7ill not prefer democracy to
kingly rule.'" (IV, 137)
As political realists, all of the leaders except Miltiades
voted to remain loyal to I-arius; but Herodotus ap-oends a virtual
blacklist of their names and later repeats the contemptuous
Scythian estimate of them as "the faithfullest of slaves."
(IV, 138, 142)
!^?hether the debate at the bridge ever took place is, of
course, questionable; the whole Scythian expedition seems cloud-
ed v/ith legend and fancy. But the point is that for Herodotus
the discussion served to set the stage for the development of
two of his principal tyrants. Miltiades had to be placed in
a favorable light because he v/as to become, later, military
leader of the Athenians and the hero of the Battle of Marathon.
Yet Herodotus does not conceal the fact that, in Asia, Miltiades
was a tyrant. He tells us how Miltiades lured the chief people
of the Chersonese into a convenient position, had them seized
and thrown into prison, and ruled thereafter v/ith the aid of
a body of five hundred mercenaries. (VI, 39) Upon bis return,
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ultimately, to Athens, he was tried for oppression alleged
during his tyrannt in the Chersonese. Herodotus does not
provide the details of his acquittal. As the champion of
freedom at Marathon, Miltiades amply justified the position
which he was said to have taken at the Ister bridge; but it
',:as a position so miich at variance with the career of a tyrant
that rlerodotus may v/ell have wondered whether the misfortune
which later befell the man (VI, 132-137) was to be considered
a punishment for his earlier transgressions as a desDOt or as
a manifestation of the jealousy of the gods over his good for-
tune at Marathon.
(6) Histiaeus . After the affair of the Ister bridce,
Histiaeus, tyrant-king of Miletus, had little opportunity to
rule over his ov.tl city, which v;as left in the hands of that
Aristagoras vrho instigated the Ionian revolt. But he provides
a prime example of the subject tyrant ana of the problem of
his reliability which the Persian master faced. First revrarded
with a city in Thrace for his loyalty at the bridge, Histiaeus
vras soon recalled to the Persian capital when it was suspected
that he might gather a Greek follc-jing about him, in so dis-
tant a territory, and rebel against Persia. That he entertained
1. Bury attributes it in part to Miltiades' kno^m enmity against
the Pisistratids, in part to the fact that Miltiades had
recently detached the islands of Lemnos and Imbros from
Persian control and had presented them to the Athenians.
J.B. Bury, op . cit
.
, p. 236.

such an idea became evident when, from his house arrest at
Susa he urged Aristagoras to revolt against Darius. (V,35)
It was undoubtedly the fact of the untrustv/orthiness of sub-
iect tyrants which led Mardonius, the chief officer of Darius,
to put do'..-n all the despots throughout Ionia and to establish
democracies in their stead, just prior to embarking on the
expedition to 3-reece vhich culminated in Marathon. (VI, 43).
It is doubtful if the action v:as taken because certain of the
chief Persian nobles preferred democracy to tyranny - which
1
Herodotus clearly implies. The historian is perhaps nearer
the tru.th when he reports the reaction of a G-reek population
to the return of a tyrant. I'.Tien Histiaeus had talked his vray
out of the Persian capital, he attempted eventually to re-
instate himself at Miletus;
"...but the "ilesians were too well pleased
at having got quit of Aristagoras to be anx-
ious to receive another tyrant into their
country; besides -..-hich they had nov7 tasted
liberty. They therefore opposed his return;
and when he endeavoured to force an entrance
during the night, one of the inhabitants
even woujided him in the thigh." (VI, 5)
Here Herodotus seems to register once again his preference
for liberty over t;'-ranny; but his account suggests, as did
that of Aristagoras turning out the Ionian tyrants earlier
1. This is also the opinion
II, p. 80; of Denton J.
William Mure, op » cit
.
,
of Hov.f and 7,'ells, op . cit
.
.
vol.
Snider, op
.
cit., p. 3^5 ; and of
vol. IV, p. 429.
I
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(V, 37-38), that the Asiatic Greeks v/ere not so opposed to their
tj'-rants as to deal with them severely and conclusively v^hen
the opportunity offered. Either these tyrants were not in fact
oppressive or their subjects had acquired an un-G-reek attribute
of servility which would justify the apparent anti-Ionianism
of Herodotus.
2 . The Characteristics of Tyranny
The case of Deiocss has been reserved for a consideration
of the general characteristics of tyranny because it reflects
£0 clearly Herodotus' familiarity with the political concept
of the tyrant's progress. It is unlikely that Deioces, fore-
runner of the kings of the Medes, came to povrer in the manner
which Herodotus describes; the background and the reasoning
are much more of fifth-century Athens than of eighth-century
Media. The important point is that the historian traces the
career of a successful would-be tyrant in terms of political
theory.
The first pertinent fact is that Deioces had "the desire
of obtaining to himself the sovereign pov/er." (1,96) The
second is his method of getting that pov.-er. He began by acquir-
ing a v/ide reputation for justice and by getting himself chosen
as the arbiter in all disputes among his fellows. So fair and
upright v;ere his decisions, so unrelenting his zeal, that soon
his people vrould place their confidence in no one else. Then,
with cold calculation, he withdrew from his accustomed chair
f:
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of ^Justice and announced that hsnceforth he v/ould be concerned
only with his ovm affairs. "Hereupon robbery and lawlessness
broke out afresh," and the responsible Medes assembled to see
what might be done. The friends of Celoces argued for the
appointment of a king; the suggestion was accepted; and of
course Deioces was chosen.
The third phase in the tyrant's pro.;^:ress follov/ed his
bare v;inning of povjer and consisted in strengthening his posi-
tion against reaction. Deioces demanded and got a personal
body-^uard; he also had the populace build for him a palace
and a capital city, compartmented by seven ccncentric walls.
(1,98) Ke then established an involved ceremonial, among ether
things allowing no one direct access to his person. This
ceremonial he established for his ot.ti security,
"fearing that his compeers, 77ho were brougjit
up together with him, and were of as good
family as he . .
.
, if they sav him frequently
v;ould be pained at the si^ht, and would
therefore be likely to conspire against
him " (1,99)
The fourth step in this typical development was the con-
centration of the administration of justice in his o\m hands
and the distribution of "...spies and eavesdroppers in all
parts of his dominions...." (1,99) It mattered little that
he vras called king; that Oriental kings were as despotic as
any tyrant is amply illustrated, though not specifically assert-
ed, throughout the history of Herodotus.
^ In a later discussion, clearly out of place in its Persian

setting but just as clearly based on a knowledge of Greek
political theory, Herodotus sets forth, in Darius' defense of
monarchy, a similar concept of the rise to despotic pov;er. In
a democracy, says the soon-to-be monarch of the Persian empire,
m.alpractice s are organized on a group basis; and this lawless
situation goes on
"
'until a man stands forth as champion of
the commonalty, and puts doiv-n the evil-
doers. Straightway the author of so great
a service is admired by all, and from, being
adm.ired soon comes to be appointed king....'" (111,82)
One advantage of monarchy, according to Darius, is that the
king's "'measures against evil-doers are l-iept more secret than
in other states.'" (111,82) This is the Oriental tyrant-king,
who administers justice as an exclusive prerogative.
We get a more directly applicable view into the methods
of the tyrant in the devices for gaining and regaining povzer
v/hich Pisistratus employed. Prior to his first seizure of the
sovereign pov/er, being already allied v/ith one of the partisan
groups of Attica, he feigned having been wounded by enemies
on his v/ay into Athens and induced the citizens to provide him
with an arm.ed body-guard. "Thus strengthened, Pisistratus
broke into revolt and seized the citadel." (1,59) The armed
body-guard is important; it is a classical acquisition of ty-
rants. Deioces had demanded one. Plato wrote that tyrants
alv/ays "...ask the public for a guard for their person, that

1
the people's champion may be preserved to them."
Having been shortly ousted, Pi si stratus returned to power
for a second time upon the invitation of one of the disputing
factions at Athens. To smooth the way v^ith the people, how-
ever, the ruse was hit upon of parading a false Athena through
the streets in support of the tyrant's reinstatement. And
the people, "...fully persuaded that the v/oman was the veritable
goddess, worshipped her, and received Pisistratus back." (1,60)
It would be difficult to say whether this is more an example
of demagoguery or of the gullibility of an intelligent people;
perhaps it is necessarily both. In any event it illustrates
the fact that the tyrant plays upon the beliefs and supersti-
tions of the people; he enlists the support of those beliefs
and sur) erst itions to maintain himself. Pisistratus alone is
only a usurper; with the support of Athena, he becomes the
approved guardian of the people. The statement of Aristotle,
2
that "...almost all tyrants have been demagogues...," would
seem to apply here.
Following his second banishment, Pisistratus resorted to
the more direct - and probably more reliable - m.ethod of assem-
bling an army of mercenaries to crush the Athenian defense
frankly and conclusively. Joined by partisans from the city
1. The Republic , Bk. VIII, 566
2- Politics
, 1310b.
-<
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"and by numbers from the country districts, v/ho loved tyranny
better than freedom" (1,62), he succeeded easily in regaining
the government.
"Upon this he set himself to root his pov/er
more firmly, by the aid of a nujnerous body
of mercenaries, and by keeping up a full ex-
chequer. ... He also demanded hostages from
many of the Athenians who had remained at
home; and these he sent to Naxos, v/hich he
had conquered by force of arms, and given
over into the charge of Lygdamis." (1,64)
The resort to mercenaries in the third seizure of power and
the maintenance of a body of them thereafter is another m.ark
of the tyrant. Miltiades later depended on them in the Cherson-
ese. Plato said tha.t the tyrant, hated by his own people, must
be guarded by foreigners, and so he has resort to "...a kind
of drone imported from abroad, and most miscellaneous in
1
character." Aristotle asserted that "the guards of a king are
2
citizens, but of a tyrant mercenaries," In a later age, the
perspicacious Machiavelli was to enlarge on the subject of
mercenaries, observing that " . . .an armed republic submits less
easily to the rule of one of its citizens than a republic armed
3
by foreign forces;" and he postulated that mercenaries are not
likely to form a body against the Prince, that they present
1. Republic , Bk. VIII, 567.
2. Politics
,
1311a.
3. Niccolo Machiavelli, The Princ? , Modem library Edition
(including also The Discourses ) , New York, 1?40, p. 46.
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only the danger of "their cov/ardice and reluctance to figh.t."
The point to be made is the-t mercenary troops a.re a part of
the accoutrement of the classical tyrant. In fact, their re-
lations w"^ th foreigners generally would sesm to be essential
to their retention of pov;er. They seem ty-oically to pursue a
2
far-re achins-- foreign policy, as Pisistratus did; they seem
3
to cultivate foreigners rather than citizens; and frequently
they are directly dependent on a foreign ruler to \vhom they
are actually subjects - as Histiaeus and his fellov^ tyrants
at the Ister bridge. (IV, 137) Concerning this la^t it has been
suggested that
"The identity of interest between tyrant
and foreign ruler was undoubtedly true of
Herodotus O'^tl day.../s.nd would make him/ 4
as a patriot more bitter against tyrants...."
The tyrant's employment of foreigners proceeded of course
from the fact that he could not trust his ovm subjects. The
milder tyrant might walk unarmed among the people, but he -.-ould
keep them dispersed and v/atched and have hostages from among
6
them held as guarantors of his o\-m safety. Herodotus puts
1. Ibid.
, p. 50.
2. See e.g.. How and V.'ells, op . cit
.
, vol. II, pp. 344-345.
3. Aristotle, Politics , 1314a.
4. How and Wells, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 344.
5. As Pisistratus (Arist., Constitution of Athens, ch. 16) or
Cypselus (Arist., Politics
,
1316b).
6. E.G., Pisistratus (Herodotus, 1,64).
r-<
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the problem briefly when he observes that Gelo, t^'-rant of Syra-
cuse, sent many of the common people off into slavery because
he felt " . . .that a 'people' /Demos/ was a most unpleasant com-
panion." (VII, 156)
In fact, concerning most of the characteristics of tyrants
it is fair to assert that "the rationale of the C-reek tyrannis
may be recovered as clearly from stories in Herodotus as from
1
the pages of Plato and Aristotle." ¥e have seen that, albeit
without interpretation or even adequate description, the first
of the historians has provided examples in which vie may observe
clearly the devices which tyrants employ to gain power; the
body-guard which each inevitanly acquires; the removal of promi
nent citizens or the exaction of hostages; the emuloyment and
dispersion of the people to keep them from forming combinations
the use of demagoguery v;hen necessary; the em.plo.ym.ent of mer-
cenaries; ana an affinity for foreigners, and an active foreign
policy. Their excesses and their absolutism will emerge from
a consideration of Herodotus' specific statements about tyranny
3. The Attitude of Herodotus
As Gilbert Murray has so capably pointed out, Herodotus,
in spite of his dislike of tyrants, makes no visible differ-
1. R.Vf. Macan, Herodotus and Thucydides," in the G am.bridge
Ancient History , 12 vols., Nev- York (Macmillan Co.), 1927,
vol. V, ch. :av, p. 408.

1
ence in treatment between despotic and democratic states.
Thus, although the historian makes it amply clear in a number
of places vrhat were his feelings about tyranny, it is quite
impossible to accept the blanket assertion of Ho-.-; and ^-ells
that ''the Dicture of tyranny and tj'^rants given by Herodotus
2
is one of almost unrelieved blackness." Mure, for example,
in writing of Herodotus' presentation of Pisistratus, notes
a-n outstanding exception to any rule of blackness. Cf Pisis-
tratus he writes:
"The many fine qualities v/hich he combines
with his political failings ... cause him to
stand forth among his fel ow despots, ^eri-
ander, Thrasybulus, and Polycrates . . . ."
3
The treatment of Miltiades is assuredly another such exception;
and if these two be excused on the grounds of Herodotus' alleg-
ed pro-Athenian tendency, then v;e may call up two very opposite
examples: those of the Oriental tyrant-kings, Darius and Croes-
us. The latter emerges from the Herodotean treatment as so
much a victim of divine jealousy that we cannot help feeling
warmly to-.-.-ard him; vmile of the former Herodotus says much
more about kindness and munificence thsin about cruelty and
oppression. In the normal course of his narrative, the his-
1. G-ilbert Murray, A Hi story of Ancient Greek Literature , d.
147.
2' Pp_^ cit , vol. II, p. 338.
3. '-'William Mure, op . cit
.
, vol. IV, p. 492.
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torian does not allov; his dislike of tyranny to "...prevent
his having a very human interest in the men themselves v;ho held
1
tyrannies ."
It is principally in the fev/ set speeches v;hich seem to
be dravrti almost bodily from contemporary political theorizing
that v/e get clear expressions of Herodotus' attitude t07/ard
tyranny generally. Cf these the principal one is the famous
debate of the Persian nobles on the fundamental forms of govern
ment in the Third Book (80-82), v;hich is important if for no
other reason than that it was v/ritten more than fifty years
before Plato's Republic and nearly a century before Aristotle's
Politics . The s-rgument for democracy, put in the mouth of the
Persian Otanes, is largely the negative one of opposition to
monarchy
:
"'...the rule of one is neither good nor
pleasant. You cannot have forgotten to
v/hat lengths Camber ses vrent in his haughty
tyranny.... HoT\r indeed is it possible
that monarchy should be a v;ell-adjusted
thing, when it allows a man to do as he
likes v/ithout being answerable? Such
license is enough to stir strange and un-
wonted thoughts in the heart of the worthi-
est of men. Give a person this power and
straightxiray his manifold good things puff
him up with pride, while envy is so natural
to hujnan kind that it cannot but arise in
him. But pride and envy together include
all wickedness; both leading on to deeds
of savage violence. True it is that kings,
possessing as they do all that heart can
desire, ought to be void of envy, but the
contrary is seen in their conduct tov/ards
1. T.K. Glover, op . cit
.
, p. 205
r
the citizens. They are jealous of the
most virtuous among their subjects, and
wish their death; while they take delight
in the meanest and basest, being ever
reader to listen to the tales of slander-
ers. A liing, besides, is beyond all other
men inconsistent with himself. Pay him
court and admiration, and he is angry be-
cause you do not show him more profoimd
respect - shov.^ him profound respect, and
he is offended again, because (as he says)
you fav/n on him. 3ut the worst of all is,
that he sets aside the lav;s of the land,
Duts men to death without trial, and rapes
women (111,80)
It is necessary to repeat here that Oriental "mona,rchy" and
"tyranny" are regarded in much the same light by Herodotus,
and that most of the characteristics of monarchy in his treat-
ment /e.g., Deioces in Book l/ are also those of tyranny.
Ctanes' speech for democracy (or against monarchy), and the
succeeding speeches defending oligarchy and monarchy, make it
tempting to assert that this passage "is the beginning of
l"
Greek political philosophy." However, proba.bly the most tha-
can be maintained is that Herodotus here repeats, perhaps
summarizes, the trend of debates and discussions which he had
heard at Athens. The passage is obviously misplaced, but it
is within itself well-argued and suggests strongly that -"ero-
dotus had considered closely the relative merits of the diffei
2
ent forms of government. The principal point for our consid^
1. How and ',-rells, op . cit
.
.
vol. I, p. 273.
2. Mure, op . cit
.
, p. 455. Murray follows Maass in tracing
the dialogue to Protagoras ( or) . cit
.
, p. 150).
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at ion is that the v/eight of the dialogue is against tyranny.
;"e feel that Herodotus intended it so, and that he regrets to
acknowledge that Darius' argument for monarchy v;on the votes
of the majority.
Concerning the abolition of tyranny at Athens, Eerodotus
does not bother to speak through another. He lectures us
directly, in order to explain the growing successes of the Athen-
ians :
vfhit more valiant than any of their neigh-
bours, /but/ no sooner shock off the yoke
than they became decidedly first of all.
These things shov/ that, while undergoing
oppression, they let themselves be beaten,
since then they worked for a master; but
so soon as they got their freedom, each
man was eager to do the best he could for
Here admiration for Athens is combined v/ith a further demon-
stration of the reasons for Herodotus' opposition to tj'-ranny.
This point needs to be made: that Herodotus knew why he disliked
tyranny, and his reasons are scattered through the history.
The whole long account of the Gypselid tyrannies in Corinth
has perhaps no other purpose than a display of some of these
reasons. The Corinthian envoy is made to "exclaim" against the
Spartan proposal to restore Hippias to Athens:
"'Surely the heavens will soon be belov.^,
and the earth above, and men v/ill hence-
forth live in the sea, and fish take their
place uoon the dry land, since you, Lacedae-
monians, propose to put dovm free governments
in the cities of Greece, and to set up tyran-
nies in their stead. There is nothing in the
world so \m.1ust, nothinp; so bloody, as a
himself." (V,78)
ri
1
tyranny « If, hov/ever, it seems to you
a desirable thing to have the cities
under a despotic tule, begin by putting
a tyrant over yourselves.... If you
knew v;hat tyranny ivas as .-.ell as our-
selves, you v.rould be better advised
than you nov.- are in regard to it.'" (V,92)
There follows the extended narrative about the infant Cypselus,
the brief mention of his later tyranny, and the account of the
despotism of Periander, who succeeded him. The envoy concludes
his speech, as we have previously noted, by warning the Spar-
tans that such is tyranny and such the deeds which spring from
it.
"
' . . .¥e Corinthians marvelled greatly
when we first knew of your having sent
for Kippias, and now it suirprises us
still more to hear you speak as you do.
We adjure you, by the common gods of
Greece, plant not despots in her cities.
If however, you are determined, if you
persist, against all justice, in seek-
ing to restore Hippias, know... that the
Corinthians vfill not aoDrove your con-
duct."' (V,92)
Although this speech obviously springs full-blov.m from
the head of Herodotus, it seems quite unfair to label it "in-
2
credibly inapt to the occasion." It is o^uite consistent vrith
1. The underlining is mine.
2. How and '.-.'ells, op . cit , vol. II, p. 51. These authors do
much to vjeaken their assertion by admitting that "the one
good point is the inconsistency of Sparta's hostility to
tyranny at home and support of a tyrant abroad." ( Loc
.
cit
.
) . The very nature of the subject-matter - tyranny
among the foremost of the European Greek states, v'ith
Athens in danger of being victimized - almost demands an
outburst from the righteous Herodotus.
f
the development of events and with the attitude of the histor-
ian (1) toward tyranny generally, (2) toward tyranny among
Greeks specifically, and (3) tov;ard any tyranny especially
which threatens Athens. There is much justification for the
belief that Herodotus entertained a particular dislike for
Hippias, the son of Pisistratus. He speaks of the harshness
of his rule over the Athenians prior to his expulsion (V,62);
he takes the occasion of his attempted restoration by the Spar-
tans to introduce the Corinthian speech (V,92); he observes
that Hippias conducted the Persians to I^Iarathon (VI, 102, IC?)
and there sneezed out a tooth on the sand (VI, 107 - a tjrpical
and delightful Herodotean obseirvation) ; ana he doubts that the
Alcmeoniaae, a noble Athenian family charged with signalling
the Persians at Marathon, could have wished Athens "to be
brought under the yoke of the barbarians and of Hippias...."
(VI, 121) In connection with Marathon, and with Hippias, Hero-
dotus in effect synthesizes his view of the great battle, as
betvreen tyranny and freedom, in the opening words of Miltiades'
speech to the polemarch. The historian's choice of words alone
would convey his opinion adequately:
"'With you it rests, Gallimachus, either
to bring Athens to slavery, or by securing
her freedom, to leave behind to all future
generations a memory beyond even Harmodius
and Aristogeiton.-^ For never since the time
1. The slayers of Hipparchus, tyrant brother of Hippias. ""'il
tiades, in this speech obviously created by Herodotus,
makes of the murder of a tyrant a great landmark in the
growth of Athenian liberty.
'4-
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that the Athenians became a people vjere
they in so great a danger as now. If
they bov/ their necks beneath the yoke
of the Medes, the v/oes v/hich they v;ill
have to suffer vjhen given into the power
of I-IipDias are already determined on; if,
on the other hand, they fight and over-
come, Athens may rise to be the very
first city in C-reece . * " (VI,109)
If, in vnriting this, Herodotus had the advantage of hav-
1
ing seen Athens at the height of her Golden Age, the student
of political thought may excuse him for employing that advan-
tage to symbolize, in the prelude to a battle vrhich he other-
wise quite inadequately describes, the struggle of Athens
against Persia as the struggle of freedom, which he preferred,
against tyranny, which he plainly disliked. He may have pre-
ferred freedom only because it was the opposite of tyranny,
or because he had been bom a G-reek, or because he admired
the intellectual achievements of Athens. But he disliked
tyranny on more positive grounds: it subjected the individual
to the license of one man; it led to deeds of savage violence;
it allowed one man to set aside the laws of the land, to put
men to death without trial, and to rape women; it keDt even the
noble Athenians in a state of oppression such that they would
let themselves be beaten; it removed the best men from the state
it was unjust and bloody; it was little better than slavery.
1. He is generally believed to have written this part of his
history at least half a century after Marathon (490 B.C.).
See, e.g., Powell, op . cit
.
, p. 63 ff.
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Appearing in the age of the emergence of the concept of
freedom, well in advance of the writings of Plato and Aris-
totle, Herodotus' presentation of tyranny is a significant,
though largely unintentional, contribution to the development
of Western political thought.
B. CN FREEDOM AND EEI-iCCRACY
We may now proceed to a consideration of Herodotus' atti-
tude toward freedom and after that, since the twc are not synon-
ymous, to his comments on democracy. It is necessary to insert
here a reminder that Herodotus vms obviously not a trained polit
ical analyst and probably not even consciously a political theor
ist; his judgments, usually to be inferred, are those of the
moralist and righteous man. But he clearly states preferences
in political matters, - princioally on the issue of tyranny
versus freedom, - and xvhether those preferences spring from his
own subconscious self, or from discussionE overheard 8-t Athens,
or from any other source, they represent political thought and
they are in the history of Herodotus.
There can be no reasonable doubt concerning Herodotus'
preference for freedom. His demonstrated opposition to tyranny
is the principal proof of it; and he frequently holds the two
up for contrast. Speaking of the period after the expulsion
of the Pisistratids, he says, "The pov/er of Athens had been
great before, but now that the tyrants v/ere gone it became
greater than ever." (V,66) In another place he prefaces his
4r-
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contrast of the Athenians before and after tyranny vfith the
assertion "that freedom is an excellent thing"; and the con-
trast is the reason why. Of Histiaeus' attempted resiamption
of tyrannical power at Miletus, the historian comments that the
Milesians had had quite enough of the intervening despot -
"besides which they had now tasted liberty." (VI, 5) Elsewhere
we are told that during the abortive Ionian revolt, the Greek
commander at sea, Dionysius, presented the situation thus to
the men of the fleet: "Cur affairs hang on the razor's edge,
men of Ionia, either to be free or to be slaves...." (VI, 11)
Later, at Marathon, Hiltiades is presented as offering a similar
alternative to Gallimachus:
"
'You have only to add your vote to my
side and your country will be free, and
not free only, but the first state in
Greece. Or if you prefer to give 3rour
vote to them who would decline the com-
bat, then the reverse will follow.'" (VI,109)
One of the strongest contrasts of freedom and tyranny which
Herodotus presents, and one which even more graphically con-
tains that setting off of Persian East against Greek VJest which
is the great background theme 'of the v/hole history, is mani-
fest in the brief speech of the tvio Spartans sent by their gov-
ernment to Xerxes as atonement for the two heralds of Darius
slain by the Spartans. Going into Persia for the sole purpose
of being killed, they are told by the Persian noble, Hydarnes,
that they have but to submit to Xemxes to v:in great favor at
his hands.
"'Hydarnes,' they answered, 'you are a one-
sided counsellor. You have experience of

half the matter, but the other half is
beyond your kno;fledge . A slave's life
you understand, but never having tasted
liberty, you cannot tell /.whether it is
sweet or no. Had you known v.hat free-
dom is, you would have bidden us fight
for it, not with the sioear only, but
with the battle-axe.'" (¥11,135)
Herodotus frequently points out that the Persians find it im-
possible to understand the effect of freedom on the fighting
ability of the Greeks. Thus Xerxes mocks the Spartan exile
Demaratus, saying that if the Greeks had a single me.ster,
"'their fear of him might make them courageous beyond their
natural bent,'" and they might be able to defeat an enemy
which outnumbered them. But he scornfully doubts that, "'...
left to their ov^-n free choice,'" they could do as much. (VI,
103) At least once, however, a Persian leader admits a great
limitation of his own. system, in a speech vrhich herodotus
claims to have heard directly from the man to vrhom it was made.
At a banquet given to fifty of fre noblest Persians before the
battle of Plataea, one of them says privately to- his Theban
host
:
" 'Many of us Persians knov/ our danger, but
we are constrained by necessity to do as
our leader bids us. Verily it is the sor-
est of all hujnan ills, to abound in know-
ledge and yet have no pov^er over action.'" (IX, 16)
There can be no doubt from the context that Herodotus here
again deliberately opposes characteristics of tyranny and of
freedom - the latter by obvious implication. l\Tien the Athen-
ians reply to an offer of settlement with the Persian force in
Greece that they know they are outnumbered, but nevertheless
1J
"...cling so to freedom" that they will continue to offer re-
sistance, the same opposition is being made. (VIII, 143) And
so it is when Leotychides shouts from his ship to the lonians
among the Persian enemy, "...remember Freedom." (IX, 98)
But it is not enough to demonstrate Herodotus' proclivity
tov;ard freedom, since freedom is, after all, only the absence
of something - the absence of restraint or compulsion or con-
vention. It is necessary to inquire what political and insti-
tutional system Herodotus seemed to prefer as the embodiment
of freedom and the ODposite of tyranny. Here the evidence is
admittedly too scanty to warrant any broader assumption than
that he a-oDroved of governments which were not despotic in na-
ture. There seem to be two allowable assertions, however, on
the basis of specific statements in the history.
Cne is that Herodotus believed in a government of laws,
in which justice would be practised. The only praise vrhlch he
could accord to Pi si stratus was that he had not disturbed
existing laws and had respected established usages. (1,59)
He makes Ctanes say, in his speech in favor of democracy that
the rule of the many
"'...has, in the first place, the fairest
of names, equality before the law; and fur-
ther it is free from all those outrages
vfhich a king is wont to commit. There...
the map:istrate is answerable for what he
does..T'" (111,80)
Ana he feels constrained to remark that although Ctanes and his
descendants were allov/ed to be the only free family in Persia
thereafter, "they are bound, however, to observe the laws of
cV
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the land like the other Persians." (111,83) The absence of
law is plainly a horrible thing to Herodotus; and he brands as
"savage" a tribe of the Scythians who "neither observe justice,
nor are governed by any lav;s." (IV, 106) Kis admiration of
the Greeks in respect to law he expresses through the exiled
king, Demaratus, v7ho explains to Xerxes the nature of the free-
dom of the Greeks:
"'For though they be free men, they are
not in all respects free; Lav; is the mast-
er whom they o\7n, and this master they fear
more than your subjects fear you. 'ATiatever
it commands they do; and its comxandment is
always the same...'" (VII, 104)1
The second assertion which may be made is that Herodotus
freely recognized the shortcomings of democracy; whether it
follows that he therefore did not favor democracy in practice
is a conclusion v/hich may be suggested, if at all, only after
an examination of the evidence.
It is perhaps significant of the fertile (even if ficti-
tious) political debate of the Persian nobles that the speech
for democracy is - as we have noted elsev^here - more accurate-
ly a speech against monarchy. It is a negative defense of
democracy, except in the closing lines. The other two speeches
1. Ernest Barker observes, concerning law: "To Pindar it is
'the King': to Herodotus it is 'the Master': to Plato the
citizens are 'the Slaves' of the law." Greek Political
Theory: Plato and His Predecessors
,
Londop., 1925 (2nd
ed.), Methuen and Company, Limited, publishers; p. 38.
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in the debate present a similar approach, one supporting oli-
garchy by attacking democracy, the other supporting monarchy
by attacking both oligarchy and democracy. Of these other
two speeches, the first provides us with Herodotus' most posi-
tive and direct criticisms of democracy. Megabyzus is present-
ed as saying:
"'...there is nothing so void of understand-
ing, nothing so full of vjantonness as the un-
v;ieldy rabble. It v/ere folly not to be borne
for men, while seeking to escape the wanton-
ness of a tyrant, to give themselves up to
the wantonness of a rude unbridled mob. The
tyrant, in all his doings, at least knows what
he is about, but a mob is altogether devoid of
knov;ledge ; for how should there be any know-
ledge in a rabble, untaught, and with no
natural sense of what is right and fit? It
rushes v/ildly into state affairs with all the
fury of a stream swollen in the winter, and
confuses everything. Let the enemies of the
Persians be ruled by democracies; but let us
cBioose out from the citizens a certain number
of the vjorthiest, and Dut the government into
their hands.'" (I II, 81")
In the third and decisive speech, Darius is made to offer
this criticism:
"'...in a democracy, it is impossible but
that there v^ill be malpractices: these mal-
practices, hov;ever, do not lead to enmities,
but to close friendships, which are formed
among those engaged in them, who must hold
well together to carry on their villainies.'"
(111,82)
And Darius concludes, as we have noted previously, that this
undesirable situation v/ill continue until there arises from
the confusion a "champion of the commonalty," who will necess-
arily become king
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Criticism of the mob aspect of democracy appears else-
v^iere in the history. For instance, -.hen Arista£:oras, v;ho has
failed to talk ths Spartans into providing troops for the immin-
ent Ionian revolt, succeeds in getting the Athenians to dis-
patch tv/enty ships for the purpose, Herodotus comments:
"it seems indeed to be easier to deceive
a multitude than one man - for Aristagoras,
though he failed to impose on Cleomenes,
the Lacedaemonian, succeeded v/ith the Athen-
ians, who were 30,000." (V,97)
The same criticism is plainly inherent in the speech of Miltia-
des before the battle of Marathon. He stresses the necessity
of conmencing the battle at once, "'...before any unsoundness
show itself among our citizens....'" (VI,109) This part of
his speech clearly emphasizes the need for forceful and single
leadership in times of emergency ano. therefore strongly implies
the undesirability of entrusting a battle decision to the people
at large. An unwillingness to trust the people at any time is
of course the essence of the attitude of the tyrant Gelo, who
considered a people "a most unpleasant companion." (VII, 156)
','.'0 may not in fairness assume any approval of Gelo on the part
of Herodotus; the whole tenor of his history is against such
an assumption. But there seems to be the suggestion of another
criticism of "mobocracy" in the words which he attributes to
the tyrant; and the position could be defended that the historian
felt a qualified approval of the establishment of the wealthy
Sicilian Megareans as citizens.
The idea that people may lach either the intelligence or

70.
V
the will to exercise democracy emerges from Herodotus' story
about the attempt of the successor of Polycrates to relinquish
ths tyranny and establish a democracy. Speaking to the assem-
bled Samians, he says:
"'I never approved the ambition of Polycra-
tes to lord it over men as good as himself,
nor looked with favour on si.nj of those who
have done the like, Nov/ therefore, since
he has fulfilled his destiny, I lay dom
my office, and proclaim equal rights....'"
(111,142)
Although this man had "conceived the wish to act like the just-
est of men," the people would not allov7 him to do so. One
of them immediately seized upon this moment of weakness to call
him "base-born" and a "rascal", and referred to money vrhich
he had "fingered." Perceiving that if he did not retain the
tyrant's power, some one else would seize it, Polycrates'
successor jailed the leading citizens and continued as tyrant.
And ""erodotus has to com.T;ent, "It seemed that the Samians did
not choose to be a frea people." (Ill, 143)
A final instance of Herodotus' recognition of the short-
comings of democracy seems to be contained in a comment of Xer-
xes, in reference to advice he has received during his cam-
paign against the Greeks:
"'...A citizen does indeed envy any fellov;-
citizen v;ho is more lucky than himself, and
often hates him secretly; if such a man be
called on for counsel, he will not give his
best thoughts, ujiless indeed he be a man of
very exalted virtue; and such are but rarely
found.'" (VII, 237)
It is a simple matter to dismiss this as the observation of a

Persian who has dealt too much with Persians. But Herodotus,
admirer of Athenians and champion of freedom, vras not there-
fore anti-Persian; and this passage sesms to reflect a convic-
tion '.'hich is as much the historian's as it is that of Xerxes.
This being so, it plainly questions the wisdom of relying on
the virtue of majorities and appears also to reflect doubt as
to the reliability of the people generally in rendering fair
decisions
.
Does it follow that Herodotus v:as opposed to democracy?
The weight of opinion sejms to indicate that he v;as at least
highly skeptical of it. Rav/linson put it this v/ay, nearly a
century a»cO •
"
. . .Though decidedly preferring democratic
institutions to any other..., he is fully
aware that they are not without their ovm
peculiar evils..., v/hile every for»m of gov-
ernment he recognizes to have certain advan-
tages."-^
A later scholar asserted that the debate of the Persian nobles
in Book III Droves that the historian's sympathies v;ere ""olain-
2
ly with democracy;" and a more recent one has stated that
3
Herodotus "sticks to the faith that you can trust the people."
There seems to be a shading av^ay from the suggestion that
1. George Rawlinson, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 69.
2. C-eorge C. Sv/ayne, op . cit
, p. 77.
3. Glover, op . cit
.
, p. 221.

Herodotus positively favored democracy in the statement of
Mure that he simply had a "... strong attachment to free con-
stitutional government, as ooDOsed to every kind of pure mon-
1
archy or despotism." And this is the position of Hov: and
"ells, '.'iho maintain only that Herodotus " . . . chamDions freedom
2
and constitutional ccovernment acainst tyranny...." G-lotz
5
emphasizes the historian's "searching criticism" of democracy;
while Ernest Barker goes to the extreme of suggesting that
4
Herodotus "...condemns all constitutions."
The conclusion which emerges from a careful study of the
history, and from the general inapplicability of most of the
fevr political opinions which have been written about it, is
indicated in the words of Joseph Wells:
"...The is- sue in Herodotus everywhere is
not between the 'Many' and the 'Few', but
b©tv;een 'Freedom' in the general sense (a
'Freedom' which has for its champions Cleis-
thenes and Aristeides as much as Themistocles
and Pericles) and Tyranny; To speak of the
'democratic sympatiiies of Herodotus' .. .is
to be guilty of a most misleading anachron-
ism." 5
1. Mure, op . cit
.
, p. 455.
2. Ho A' and Wells, op . cit
.
, vol. II, p. 44.
3. Glotz, op . cit
.
, p. 144.
4. Barker, op . cit
.
, p. 288.
5. Joseph I'fells, Studies in Herodotus , Oxford, 1923 (Basil
Blackv^ell, publisher), p. 156. T'This is the Joseph 'A'ells
of Hov7 and Wells).
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C. ON VARICUS ASPECTS OF POLITICAL TKlUG-HT
Here it is necessary to assemble those various references
in the history of Herodotus v^hich lie within the realm of poli-
tical thought and which reflect the opinions either of the his-
torian or of the Greeks of his time. It v^ill be observed that
to a fev; of these references attaches the special significance
of material later developed by the classical theorists; some
of them emphasize the underrated philosophical propensity of
the historian; at least one DOints up his lack of interest in
actual political Institutions; and a few may rest on no firmer
ground than present-day scholarly fancy.
The first item in this category which needs to be observ-
ed is the concept of the lav;-giver » i^arly in Book I, Herodo-
tus tells of Lycurgus, the legendary law-giver of the Spartans:
"...he altered the v.hole of the existing
customs, substituting new ones, v/hich he
took care should be observed by all. Af-
ter this he arranged whatever appertained
to v/ar, establishing the companies of thir-
ty, messmates, and sv/orn botherhoods, be-
sides which he instituted the senate, and
the ephoralty. Such v^as the way in vvhich
the Lacedaemonians became a well-governed
people." (1,65)
In this concluding sentence, Herodotus places the stamp of
approval both on the governTient of the Spartans and on the
law-giver concept. How and Wells comment on the passage that
all Greek institutions were traditionally ascribed to some
it
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law-giver; and Jaeger asserts that "Plato believed that a
severe education on the pattern set by Lycurgus was the only
way to restore .. .the old code of custom which should bind the
2
state together once more." The example of Solon, who reform-
ed the government of Athens and then left the city for ten
years, is very much in point. Aristotle tells us that Solon
departed after instituting his reforms because " . . .he v/ished
neither to alter what he had decided on nor yet to be an ob-
3
Ject of ill will to everyone by remaining in Athens;" and he
describes him as "the saviour of his country and the ideal lav/-
4
giver." This actual example of the statesman who invents the
machine of government and then leaves it for others to operate
has besn set forth in modern times in Rou&seau' s conceut of
5
the "le£;islator."
It is significant concerning Solon that Herodotus shows
no interest in his reforms as such. In order to explain his
presence in Lydia, the historian tells us only that Solon v/as
on his travels, " . . .to avoid being forced to repeal any of the
lav;s v'hich, at the request of the Athenians, he had made for
1. Hov; and T=/ells, oo . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 86.
2. Werner Jaeger, op . cit , vol. II, p. 239.
3. Aristotle, Constitution of Athens , ch. 11.
4. Ibid
.
, loc . cit
.
5. Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract (Everyman's
Library Edition) , London, 1946, p. 32ff.
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them." (1,29) Later Herodotus does elaborate somewhat upon
the reforms of Cleisthenes; but he provides no hint of analy-
sis, attributes the idea of tribal reform to Cleisthenes' grand-
father, and concludes that the changes were made " . . .from con-
tempt... of the Tonians...." (V, 66-69) Clearly his admiration
for the freedom of Athens was not reinforced by an understand-
ing of the institutions through which that freedom had been
progressively realized.
It may or may not follov/ from this that the classifica-
tion of governments in Book III, in the Persian nobles' debate,
v;as largely an expression of current political theorizing -.-.-hose
subtleties the historian v/as not trained to ap reciate. In
any event, it will be interesting to compare the classifica-
tions of Plato and Aristotle with the one v/hich Herodotus pre-
sents.
1 2
Herodotus Plato Aristotle
Monarchy Aristocracy
Timocracy Aristocracy >Cligarchy
Oligarchy
Democracy^—Oligarchy Democracy |
Tyranny v
Monarchy >Tyranny
Constitut n 1 Govt. >uemocracy
For Plato, the ideal state is an aristocracy; and the results
of increasing degeneracy of the ideal follow the direction of
1. ReiDublic, Ek. VIII, 5^5. The later classification in the
Lav;s is not used here.
2. Politics
.
Bk. Ill, 1279 a and b.
A.
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the arrows downward. For Aristotle, there are three good forms,
and the arrors indicate the additional three which are oerver-
1
sions of these. Herodotus presents only three forms and attacks
each in turn, as we have obsejrved elsewhere. It is interesting
to note, although no valid inference can be draxvn from it, that
while democracy is attacked twice in ths debate, monarchy and
oligarchy each escape with a single attack - although the one
levelled against monarchy is clearly the most withering of the
v.hiOle debate.
The moralizing factor in Herodotus appears in v/hat may be
called his theory of unjust conquest.
"He draws no distinction between public and
private morality, f-lioever makes x^/ar on his
neighbour without provocation, or rules with-
out the consent of the -governed, is, accord-
ing to him, in the wrong, although he is v/ell
av;are that such vrrongs are constantly commit-
ted. "2
The theory could be derived by inference from numerous examples
in the history; but it seems to be stated specifically in at
least two places. The king of the Ethiops in one place in-
forms the spies of Cambyses: "'...your king is not a just man -
for were he so, he had not coveted a land wkich is not his ov/n.
1. J. 3. Bury says, in this connection: "The distinction of
three fundamental types of constitution is older than the
period of the Sophists; it is recognized in an ode of Pin-
dar not later than 473 B.C., and it was then probably a
commonplace." The Ancient Greek Historians
, pp. 55-56.
2. Alfred W. Benn, The Greek Philosophers, 2nd edition, London,
1914 (Smith, Elder & Co., publishers); p. 64.
4
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nor brought slavery on a people who never did him any wrong.'"
(111,21) Elsewhere some of the allies of the Scythians make
this reply to the Scythian request for support against the
Persians:
"'If you had not been the first to wrong
the Persians, and begin the war, we should
have thought the request you make just....
Nov;, however, the case stands thus - vou...
invaded the land of the Persians, .. ./and
now they are coming/ to punish those v:ho
are guilty of first injuring them.'" (IV, 11$)
Cf quite another nature, and without the same moralistic
coloring, is the realistic theory of quick action v/hich Herodo-
tus seems to endorse. It is quick action, before time a.nd use-
less discussion can v/eaken the resolve of the Athenians, which
Miltiades urges at Marathon. (VI,109) And Xerxes tells his
timorous lieutenant that "success for the most part attends
those v.'ho act boldly, not those v/ho v;eigh everything, and are
slack to venture." (¥11,50) In this respect, Herodotus, Mil-
tiades, and Xerxes were one v-ith Machiavelli, who wrote many
centuries later:
"I certainly think that it is better to be
impetuous than cautious, for fortune ie a
v/oman, and it is necessary, if you wish to
master her, to conquer her by force; and it
can be seen that she lets herself be over-
come by the bold rather than by those -vho
proceed coldly."
1
Herodotus' respect for established customs and his keen
awareness of the importance of custom in political and social
1. The Prince
, p. 94.
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matters is evident throughout the history. Thus he can indi-
cate praise of Pi si stratus only on the grounds of" his ha.ving
respected existing customs. The conclusive demonstration of
the historian's attitude on this subject occurs in his condem-
nation of Cambyses, vhom he calls "raving mad" for making "a
mock of holy rites and long-established usages.
"For if one v.-ere to offer men to choose
out of all the customs in the v/orld such
as seemed to them best, they v:ould examine
the v7hole number, and end by preferring
their ovm; so convinced are they that their
07.71 usages far surpass those of all others.
Unless, therefore, a man was mad, it is
not likely that he v:ould make SDort of such
matters." (111,38)
Following this is the classic illustration of Darius proposing
to certain C-reeks that they eat the bodies of their deceased
fathers and to certain Indians that they burn the bodies of
their fathers. Each group was utterly horrified; yet in each
case the cation proposed was the custom of the other.
In Book II, Herodotus inquires whether the Greeks learned
their attitude toward artisans and tradesmen from the Egyptians,
observing that
"
. . .almost all. . .barbarians hold the citizens
\'iho practise trades, and their children, in
less repute than the rest, while they esteem
as noble those who keep aloof from handi-
crafts.... These ideas prevail throughout
the whole of Greece, pa.rticularly among the
Lacedaemonians. Corinth is the place where
mechanics are least despised." (11,16?)
The historian does not express his Cati opinion of tradespeople;
but his inc_uiry does much toward explaining the place of this

group in the v/orks of Plato and Aristotle. Relegated to the
class in vhose veins flow iron and copper, the mechanic or
storekeeper in Plato's ideal state has no part in the govern-
ment and requires none but a technical education. His parti-
cular skill may be necessary to the wellbeing of the state,
but he must not aspire beyond his lov: station. "For there is
an oracle that the city shall perish v/hen it is s;uarded by
1
iron or copper." Aristotle is even more conclusive on this
point. He places "mechanics and labourers" on a par v/ith
slaves as "the servants of the community," and assarts that
"the best form of state 'vill not admit them to citizenship...
In four places, Herodotus describes nations '-h-o practise
the holding of --ives in common. (1,216; IV, 104,172, and 180)
His descriptions in tv:o of these passages comprise v/hat Godol
ohin aptly terms a "curious" anticioation of Plato's theory
3
of a community of --rives. Concerning a tribal ally of the
Scythians, he tells us:
"They have intercourse promiscuously, that
so they may be all brothers, and, as members
of one family, may neither envy nor hate one
another." (IV, 104)
1. Republic
.
Book III, 415.
2- Politics
.
Bock III, 1278a.
3. Francis R.B. Godolphin, editor. The Greek Historians , vol
I, footnote, TD
. 263. The reference is to the Republic
,
Bk. V, 458 ff
.
f1
Of a tribe in Libya, the historian provides this information:
"These people do not marry or live in
families, but copulate promiscuously like
cattle, /ihien their children are well-
gro'-m, they are brought before the assem-
bly of men, which is held every third
month, and assigned to those whom they
most resemble." (TV, 180)
It is interesting to note that Aristoohsjies also refers to the
1
idea of a community of wives; and it has been suggested that
Herodotus, AristODhanes, and Plato all derived their explana-
tions or elaborations of the idea from a common source which
2
is unknov.Ti to us. Further, the suggestion is made of a doc-
trinal intent on the part of Herodotus in these passages, and
also in his description of the education of Persian boys (I,
136) and of the manner in v/hich the Babylonians solved the
3
problem of marrying off their less attractive women. (1,196)
Interesting as it is, this opinion is sustains/ole only on the
groujids of the considerable space devoted to the latter two
descriptions and of the fact that in each instance the histor-
ian cites the wisdom of the custom. If the opinion could be
mors convincingly demonstrated, it would then be profitable
to pursue the idea that the history of Herodotus is a fruitful
source of Utopias - intent ions.lly so - and that the descrip-
1. Ecclesiazusae
,
641-43
•
2. Moses Hadas, "Utopian Sources in Herodotus", in Classical
Philology
.
Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press), Vol. XXX, No.
2, April, 1935, p. 121.
3. Ibid.
, p. 120.
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tions of remote nations are used "as a vehicle for iniDlied criti-
1
cism of current usages...."
But we must be careful not to read more into the history
than is there. That Herodotus had a pedagogic intent beyond
the contrasting of East and West, of tyranny and freedom, can
only be surmised; that he was little interested in actual poli-
tical institutions and lacked the faculty for political analy-
sis generally can be safely maintained. There remain, however,
tv^o factors so strongly coloring his political thought as to
require consideration here. Cne is his adherence to the doc-
trine of Nemesis ; the other is his view of history generally.
D. THE JEALOUSY OF THE GODS
"Nemesis .. .is the great divine stev;ardess,
who assigns to man hie quota of good or of
evil.... /The/ Sovereign of the gods can-
not endure the luxury and pride of the
earthly despot. It becomes the business
of Nemesis to compass his destruction.
She invokes aj ainst him Ate, or Infatu-
ation. Ate blindfolds his m.ind...."2
There seem to be two aspects of the Neme si
s
doctrine in
Herodotus. Cne involves simply the jealousy of the gods over
the continued good fortune of any one man. Thus Solon tells
Croesus that "the power above us is full of jealousy, and fond
1. Ibid
.
. p. 115.
2. Sv-ayne, 00 . cit
.
, p. 8.
*c
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of troubling our lot;" and he concludes his exposition on the
nature of happiness with a reminder that "oftentimes God gives
men a gleam of happiness, and then plunges them into ruin."
(1,32) And so with Polycrates, tyrant of Samos, whose "exceeding
good fortune" prompted his ally, Amasls, to •rite to him a
warning that "the gods are envious" and that he 'A^ould do well
to throw away his most valuable treasure. V/hen the ring v.-hich
Polycrates threv; into the sea v/as returned to him in the stomach
of a fish, Amasis perceived that the gods were already at vrork,
and EO severed their alliance. (111,40-43) So it vras likewise
with Ameinocles, who became wealthy from treasure washed up
on the shore but lost his son to the jealousy of the gods.
(VI 1, 190) This aspect of Nemesis v.^as reflected again in the
speech of the envoys sent out by the Greeks at Thermopylae to
seek additional aid against Xerxes. There was no need, they
said, to fear the Persian,
"
' . . .for after all the invader was not a
god but a man; and there never had been,
and never would be, a man v;ho v-as not
liable to misfortunes from the very day
of his birth, and those greater in pro-
portion to his o\m greatners.'" (VII, 2C3)
The second aspect of Nemesis may be described as retribu-
tion for Dride and over-ambition. This is the ;;-reater aspect
of the concept and is the great moral behind the failure of
Xerxes. The Persian king's counsellor, Artabanus, advises against
the invasion on the grounds that the gods, in their jealousy,
m.ay well allovr a small army to defeat their great host. "'For

god allows no one to have high thoughts but himself.'" (VII, 10)
Later Themistocles tells the Athenians after their victory at
Salamis that Xerxes has been defeated because the gods "'were
jealous that one man should be king at once of Europe and of
Asia - more especially a man like this, unholy and presumptuous
(VIII, 109) It is interesting to observe the close comparison
here betv;een the Kerodotean explanation of the Persian defeat
and the explanation of the Athenian tragic dramatist, Aeschylus
In The Persians - v;hich, incidentally, verifies some of the
statistics of Herodotus on Salamis - Aeschylus presents the
ghost of Darius saying:
"... when rashness drives
Impetuous on, the scourge of Heaven upraised
Lashes the Fury forv^ard . . . ."
Prophecying further losses and defeat at Plataea, Darius'
ghost then holds up the v;hole invasion as proof
"That Droud aspiring thoughts but ill beseem
?/eak mortals: for oppression, when it springs.
Puts forth the blade of vengeance, and its fruit
Yields a ripe harvest of repentant wo."^
It was "proud aspiring thought" v;hich also caused the
downfall of the proud Egyptian, Apries (11,169) > cruelty and
sacrilege v;hich brought death to the mad Cambyses (111,65) s,nd
to Pheretima (IV,205). "Thus do men... draw do^Ti upon them-
1. Aeschylus, The Persians , translated by PLObert Potter, in
The Complete G-reek Drama , edited by Gates and C'Neill, 2
vols., New York, 1938 (Random House); pp. 73, 75.
(
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selves the anger of the gods." (IV,205)
Once a3;ain it is necessary to observe that any doctrine
indulged by Herodotus was not confined in its application to
the Persians alone. Nemesis applied to anyone, on either side,
who was guilty of excessive good fortune or of overweening
pride. It is significant of the epic, moralistic, and relig-
ious implications of the doctrine that
"
. . .of the various protagonists in the
great Persian v/ar, not a single one suc-
ceeds in evading ultimate disaster. This 1
is true of Greeks as well as barbarians...."
E. TnE HERODOTEM VIEW OF HISTORY
A final consideration involves the phllosoohical beliefs
J
and general convictions which seem most prevalent in the his-
tory of Herodotus. \'Je have m.entioned, in the preceding chapter,
the repeated contrasting of East and West, which probably should
not be considered as philosophy, but rather as illustrative
convenience. The all-pervading doctrine of Nemesis is much
more to the point; it seems, in fact, to dom,inate the Herodo-
tean view of history. That the doctrine has an ethical compon-
ent sesms generally evident, since the punishment inflicted by
the gods is usually'- for vrrong-doing
.
The interesting suggestion is made by Charles Cochrane
^ 1. Charles N. Cochrane, Christianity and Classical Culture ,
Oxford, 1940 (Clarendon Press) ;p . 466
.
4r
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that Herodotus believed in a law of balance or compensation
in nature, and that Nemesis operated to restore the balance
1
-,vhen it v'as threatened 'oy man. i^Ien would seek an overbalance
because of the universal urge of desire which they possessed.
The lav: of desire v;as that it demanded fulfillment; but the
gods imposed a limit upon the amount of fulfillment (or happi-
ness). VHien men exceeded the limit, they V70uld be punished
in order that an overall balance might be restored. Thus the
stru5;£:le betv/een C-reece and Persia became a supreme working
example of this principle.
"To Herodotus, the nemesis which overtook
the great king serves to restore an equi-
librium which had been threatened as never
before by the accumulation of such vast
human and material resources in the hands
of a single man."^
The religious element in herodotus is exemplified in part
by the recurrence of Neme sis and in part by the many references
to oracles. One scholar has given point to this reliance upon
the supernatural by listing, in Herodotus' account of Croesus,
twelve prodigies, upv/ards of twenty oracles, and four prophetic
dreams; in Book VI, v/here the battle of Marathon is described,
nine prodigies, three dreams, and eleven oracles; and in Book
VIII, which contains the account of the Battle of Salami s, four
1. Ibid.
, pp. 460-467
2. Ibid.
, p. 467.
4I
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1
teen prodigies and twelve oracles. The historian plainly puts
his faith in the prophetic povrers of the oracular priestess;
and it may vrell be that Delchi is mentioned more often than any
other single place in the history.
Of a quasi- scientific nature are what have been called
Herodotus' "anthro-oological conceotions of the course of human
2
affairs." Cne of these he expresses in the very last para-
graph of his history when he reports Cyrus as having said that
soft countries breed soft men, whereas vigorous climates breed
vigorous men. (IX, 122) Another such view is the derivation of
the Greek religion from Egyptian sources, which Herodotus main-
tains, contrary to customary Greek Drejudice, in the second
3
Book. There is a seeming conflict here betv^esn the historian'
a-oparent religiosity and his tracing of the origin of his re-
ligion - a conflict v/hich is in no way resolved by his asser-
tion that Homer and Hesiod in effect created the gods and their
respective offices for the benefit of the Greeks. (11,53) A
third aspect of the quasi- scientific nature of the history may
1. Mure, OX) . cit
.
, pp. 365-366.
2. R.V7. I'.acan, "Herodotus and Thucydides," The C ambr i dp:e An-
cient History , Ne-.- York, 192? (Macraillan) ;vol .V, p . 408.
3. John Burnet, Early Greek Philosophy , 3rd edition, London,
1920 (A.& C. Black, Ltd.), says that Herodotus believed in
"the Egyptian origin of Greek religion and civilization ."
(p. 15). (The underlining is mine.)
4. See Ibid.
, p . 6.
(
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be summed up as "encyclopedic." Thomas DeQunicey said of Hero-
dotus, on this account, that he "...deserves to be rated as the
leader among philosophical 'polyhistors' ; which is the nearest
designation to that of ' encyclooaedist ' current in the C-reek
1
literature." This characteristic is of course reflected in
the prolific descriptions of various peoples, their religious
and social practices, of the methods of trade and commerce, of
climate, and of animals, birds, plants, rivers, and mountains.
V/ithin the limits of the story-teller and traveller, Herodotus
is indeed much more than a historian; besides being an anthro-
pologist, he is archaeologist, geographer, sociologist, biolo-
gist, ethnologist, trader, and - above all - philosopher.
Cne final view of history v.hich Herodotus seems to have
held indicates that he probably did not believe in the basic
goodness of men. He asserts that he knov/s this to be true,
"
- that if every nation v.-ere to bring all
its evil deeds to a given place, in order
to make an exchange with some other nation,
v^hen they had all looked carefully at their
neighbours' faults, they would be truly clad
to carry their o\m back again." (VII, 1527
Such an attitude may be the basis of the need for the compensa-
ting factor of Nemesis , or it may be a postulate for the guid-
ance of statesmen. Perhaps it is both.
1. Thomas DeQuincey, "Philosophy of Herodotus," in The Collected
/."ritings of Thomas DeQuincey , 6 volumes, edited by :Oavid
^ L'asson, London, 1897 (A.& C. Black, Ltd . ) ;vol .VI ,r)p .96-97
.
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Chapter III
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF THUGYDIDES
"Thucydides, and Athenian, v/rote the his-
tory of the war in v/hich the Peloponnesians
and the Athenians fought aaainst one another.
He began to write when they first took up
arms, believing that it would be great and
memorable above any previous war. For he
argued that both states were then at the full
height of their military power, and he sav.-
the rest of the Hellenes either siding or in-
tending to side with one or other of them.
No movement ever stirred Hellas more deeply
than this; it v/as shared by many of the Bar-
barians, and might be said even to affect
the world at large.... "1
1. The Philosophy of Empire
Amid the v;ealth of political thinking in the history of
Thucydides, it is impossible to choose one topic of thought
which stands out clearlv emphasized above all others. It is
therefore convenience alone vrhich indicates consideration first
of the philosophy engendered by the Athenian empire - although
the fact of Spartan fear of the empire as the Drincipal cause
of the Peloponnesian war may v.'-ell provide a more substantial
justification for the choice.
Athens had been the chief Hellenic state in the war against
the Persians; and she carried her predominance into leadership
of the Confederacy of Delos, a league of mutual defense against
1. Thucydides, Peloponnesian '.-Jar
. 1,1 (opening sentences).
rc
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any further Persian aggression. Directing the military forces
of the Confederacy, ana assessing the tribute necessary to
maintain those forces, Athens was in a position to convert the
defensive alliance into a military and economic empire. This
she did, the transformation being completed by the transference
1
of the league's treasury from Delos to Athens in 454/453 B.C.
The natural tendency v/as, of course, to extend the empire in
order to increase the sources of tribute; and punitive measures
were inevitably employed, wherever necessary, to enforce Day-
ment of the amount assessed. Cut of the wealth which flowed
into her treasury Athens built a great navy, beautified herself
with new buildings and monuments, and payed her citizens for
2
participating in the government. V/hile she acquired a taste
for prestige and power v.^hich she would not willingly surrender,
her involuntary allies naturally sought opportunities to es-
cape the burden of financing that taste. And those states
which v;ere not yet privileged to wear the yoke of empire, chief
among them Sparta, foresaw the time when the -.-hole Hellenic
T-^orld v;ould have surrendered its diversity - and a co-nsiderable
portion of its annual income - to the unity of the Athenian
1, Bury, H istory of G-reece
, p. 325.
2. At the outbreak of the Peloponnesian V/ar, Athens was get-
ting an average of 600 talents annually from her tribute
paying allies. Internal revenue probably totalled 400
tale-nts annually, i'larcus N. Tod, "Economic Background,"
Cambridge Ancient History , vol. V, pp. 28-29.
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empire.
Thucydides was under no illusion concerning either the
manner in which the empire developed, or the measures v-hich were
necessary to maintain it - or its widespread unpopularity among
the Greeks. In the first Book of the history, he has the Athen-
ian envoys say before the Spartan assembly:
"/The/ empire was not acquired by force; but
you would not stay and make an end of the
Barbarian, and the allies came of their own
accord e.nd asked us to be their leaders. The
subsequent development of our power was origi-
nally forced upon us by circumstances; fear
v:as our first motive; afterwards ambition,
and then interest stepped in. And when we
had incurred the hatred of most of our allies...,
hovr could v/e without great riskjrelax our hold?"
(1,75)
Hers are the motives: fear, ambition, interest. First, fear of
the Persians; then, ambition - the desire to create an empire
for the enrichment of Athens; finally, interest - a vested in-
terest, so to speak: an interest in maintaining sources of
wealth already established. This might be termed the universal
progress of empire; it was assuredl.]^ the core of the philosophy
of the Athenian empire. Again ana again these motives are set
forth by Thucydides - sometimes in the speeches of men he seems
to admire, sometim.es in the spesc2.es of men he seems to despise,
sometimes in his ovm comments in the narrative.
In the Funeral Cration, Pericles proposes to set forth the
internal principles and ideals v/hich have created the po-.-er of
Athens. It is significant that he tekss for granted a ceneral
knowledge "of the military exploits by v/hich our various posses-
sions v.-ere acquired...." (II, 36) The subject states are
<
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"•DOssessions" of Athens; the empire is a thing: inherited from con-
quering fathers and requires no moral justification. That it
was also a thing to be added to upon occasion was the basis of
the fears of all free Greeks. Of the Athenian intervention in
Sicily a decade after the death of Pericles, Thucydides makes
this comment:
"They virtuously professed that they were
going to assist their own kinsmen and their
newly acquired allies, but the simple truth
was that thev aspired to the empire of Si-
cily." (VI, 6)
In a speech to the Syracusans, Euphemus, the Athenian en-
voy, is presented as Justifying the empire on the grounds of
the Athenian leadership against Persia and of the need for
strength against the Spartan a^llies. We m.ay doubt his profession
of freedom for Sicily, but we cannot discredit the chief motive
which he attributes to Athens to justify her intervention in
Sicilian affairs. Ke says that "fear makes us maintain our em-
pire at home; and... a like fear brings us to -'Our shores." (VI,
83) In the same speech he sets forth the interest motive:
"We rule over the cities of Hellas in order
to maintain our independence, and we emanci-
pate the cities of Sicily that they may not
be sued against us. And ve are compelled to
adopt a policy of interference because we
have many interests to guard." (VI, 8?)
There seem to stem from the Thucydidean treatment of the
philosophy of empire tv;o principal factors, to both of which a
degree of inevitability attaches. The first is the hatred in-
^ curred among subjects and among those \rho are fearful of becom-
ing subjects; the second is the implication of vengeful reaction,
i
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with the inherent assumption that one state - necessarily a
strong one - will always seek dominion over other states. The
view of Thucydides is anything; but static; he recognizes the
urge to power as a fact of nature; and the expression of pov/er
is dynamic. Thus Pericles is made to say, in reminding the
Athenians that their greatness may some day diminish, that
"...all thinp-'s have their times of growth and decay...." (II,
64) And he adds that "to be hateful and offensive has ever
been at the time the fate of those v;ho have aspired to empire."
(11,64) This might v/ell be an ansv/er to those Athenians who
had early asked of the Spartans, "...Do we deserve to be so
bitterly hated by the other Hellenes merely because we have an
empire?" (1,75) Certainly it v/as exemplified by the Corinthians
v/ho called Athens "the tyrant city" and urced the Peloponnesians
to make war upon it: "Let us attack and subdue her, that we may
ourselves live safely for the future and deliver the Hellenes
whom she has enslaved," (1,124) The elements of hatred and of
reaction are both present in the admission of the Athenians
during the harshly realistic Melian Dialogue. They may perhaps
also be setting forth the real aim of Athens in the v:ar when they
adjnit that the Athenians are fighting "not so much against the
Lacedaemonians, as against our own subjects who may some day
rise up and overcome their former masters." (V,91)
The implicit assumption of an ever im.m.inent re&ction
against Athenian imperial rule is brought out repeatedly in the
history. The most complete statement of it is by Pericles, in

the speech v;hich Thucydides attributes to him during the terrible
plague at Athens:
"...do not imagine that you are fighting
about a simple issue, freedom or slavery;
you have an empire to lose, and there is
the danger to which the hatred of your im-
perial rule has exposed you. Neither can
you resign your power.... For by this time
your empire has becom^e a tyranny which in
the opinion of mankind may have been unjust-
ly ff:ained, but which cannot be safely surren-
dered." (11,63)
This is the thesis of Cleon in his arg-ment in favor of a severe
punishment for the Llytilenaeans
:
"You should remember that your empire is a
despotism exercised over unv.alling subjects,
who are always conspiring, against you; they
do not obey in return for any kindness which
you do them to your ov/n injury...; they have
no love of you, but they are held down by
force." (111,37)
Reminding the Athenian assembly that if the revolt of Mytilene
was right, then the empire is v/rong, he tells them that having
resolved to rule, they must forget considerations of right and
wrong, "otherwise you must give up your empire, and, when
virtue is no longer dangerous, you may be as virtuous as you
please." (111,40) Alcibiades later presents the sa.me argument
to the assembly when he urges the fateful expedition against
Sicily:
"We cannot cut dovm an empire as v/e might a
household; but having once gained our present
position, we must keep a firm hold upon some,
and contrive occasion against others; for if
we are not rulers vre shall be subjects." (VI, 18)
That this much of the philosophy of empire v;as based upon
the facts of the time is amply demonstrated throughout the his-
tory. Granting the nianifest Athenian desire to rule, and elimi-
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nating all considerations except those of pov/er, we must acknow-
ledge the keen perception of political reality in the pronounce-
ments quoted - 7/hether they emanated from the speakers or, what
is far likelier, from the analytical mind of Thucydides. That
hatred of the empire was widespread among the Greeks, and that
reaction aj-ainst it v/as everywhere contemplated, could as easily
be proved in the speeches of the Spartans and their allies as in
the speeches of Athenians and in the comments of the historian.
The conclusive proof lies of course in the readiness with which
city after city went over to the Spartan side vzhen it appeared
safe to do so. Athens' exercise of empire v/as unpopular; and
her subjects were, for the most part, as willing to revolt as
the independent states were to avoid subjection. The general
attitude tov/ard Athens w8-s put concisely by "^ermocrates, the
Syracusan:
"It -vas not for the liberties of Hellas
that Athens, or for her own liberty that
Kellas, fought against the Persian; they
fought, the Athenians that they might en-
slave Kellas to themselves instead of him,
the rest of the Hellenes that they might
get a new master, v/ho may be cleverer,
but certainlv makes a more dishonest use
of his wits.^' (VI, 76)
•'.Triat Thucydides himself thought of the policy and philosophy
of empire is veiled in his general impartiality and in the Soph-
istic argujnent and coujiterargument of the speeches. Some prob-
able vievrooint may emerge from the v/hole ino_uiry into the his-
tory; but precisely it m.ay here be necessary to conclude, with
Gomme, that "we shall never know v/hether Thucydides condemned the
c4
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imperialist policy of Athens or agreed vrith Pericles that the
1
ideal Athens 'vas worth the risk." The interesting but unten-
able suggestion has been made that Thucydides was at heart a
believer in geopolitics and hence would feel no need to pass
moral Judgments on the progress of empire. In this viev/, the
historian's analyses v/ere essentially geopolitical; he "v:as
well aware that power balance v/as a prerogative of the Great
Powers" ; and he recognized the theory "that successful wars
2
should be carried on in other peoples' territory...." This
idea suffers from the weakness common to all theories which
attempt to a^ply the standards and enthusiasms of our civiliza-
tion to come other civilization in the distant past.
2 . Expediency vs. Justice
A factor in the history which is principally and inextric-
ably associated with the philosophy of empire is that of expedi
ency . Its repeated appearance as the sanction for actions of
the Athenians is evidence in part of the inroads of Sophism and
in part of the gulf v^hich separated democratic ideals from the
realities of empire. Only by implication can it be made to re-
1. A.W. Gomme, Essays in Greek History and Literature
,
Oxford,
1957 (Basil Bla'ckwell) ; p. 189.
2. Henry Montgomery, "Thucydides and Geopolitics," The Classi-
cal Journal
, Cedar Rapids, Iowa (The Torch Press) , vol,
XXIII, No. 4, January, 1928; pp. 94 -95-
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fleet any ethical judgment on the part of the historian - as,
for instance, by contending that the juxtaposition of the Mel-
ian Dialogue and the disastrous Sicilian expedition represents
1
a deliberate device of moral criticism. T'^Jhat must be accepted
is that expediency predominated in Athenian considerations of
empire and hence in the political thought of Thucydides' history.
The constant choice of expediency over justice by the Athenian
assembly and by Athenian generals was nothing more than a true
reflection of what Mure calls "the political and military fero-
2
city" of the times.
The direction v;hich Athens v/ill take is strongly indicated
before the war has begun in a speech of the Corinthians on the
occasion of a proposed Athenian alliance v/ith Corcyra, a G-reek
state at v;-ar with Corinth. Referring to the recognition of past
favors, the Corinthians advise, "Do not say to yourselves that
this is just, but that in the event of war something else is
expedient; for the true path of expediency is the path of right."
(1,42) The Athenian assembly emphatically rejects the advice
by concluding a defensive alliance v;ith the Corcyraeans. Later,
at Sparta, certain Athenian envoys make even more clear the path
1. This is implied for example by Bernard ^.'7. -enderson, The
C-reat .'.ar Between Athens and Sparta
,
London, 192? (Mac-
raillan), p. 338, and by William Chass Greene, The Achieve-
ment of G-reece
,
Ca:nbridge (Mass.), 1923, Harvard Univ .Press,
p. 52f. Bury, Greek Historians , pp. 139-1^0, specifically
denies the poscibility of any such implication.
2. Mure, OP . cit
.
, vol. V, p. 68ff.
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v/hich Athens will follow. They cement the union of power and
expediency which is to become the leitmotif of Athenian action
in these v/ords:
"We are not the first who have aspired to
rule; the world has ever held that the v/eak-
er must be kept down by the stronger....
Lid justice ever deter anyone from taking
by force v/hatever he could? Men who in-
dulge the natural ambition of empire de-
serve credit if they are in any degree more
careful of justice than they need be under
the G ircujn stances ." (1,76)
Here, then, is justice specifically rejected in favor of
power - of the natural a-o^etite for empire. This needs to be
em-ohasized as one of the major elements in the political thought
of the history. There are fev: exceptions to it on the Athenian
side. In the one outstanding instance of Athens granting mercy
to a subject state v/hich has revolted against her control, jus-
tice is pointedly set aside in the very speech •:hich convinces
the assembly to act leniently. Diodotus does not refute the
harsh proposal of Cleon on ethical grounds, but recommends clem-
ency for the Mytilenaeans on the grounds that it would be inex-
pedient to put them to death. He says:
"T'Then Cleon insists that the infliction of
death will be expedient and will secure you
against revolt in time to com.e, I, like him
takin?;; the ground of future expediency,
stoutiv maintain the contrary Dosition. . . ."
(111,44)
80 it is vfith Euphemus, the Athenian envoy, v/ho tells the Syra-
cusans, "Nov; to a tyrant or to an imperial city nothing is in-
consistent which is expedient, and no man is a kinsman who can-

not be trusted." (VI, 85)
The central idea of expediency as applied to the power
politics of empire is that which Thrasymachus sets forth in
Plato's Republic : "...justice is nothing else than that which
1
is advantag-eous to the stronger." In other words, might is
right. The most brutal expression of this doctrine, as most
commentators on Thucydides are careful to observe, is in the
Melian Dialogue - a debate occasioned by the descent of an
Athenian force upon the island-city of Melos, v:hich has commit
ted the sin of remaining neutral in the war between Athens and
Sparta. The Athenians demand unconditional surrender and ab-
sorption of Melos into the empire. Early in the debate they
say:
"...we both alike know that into the dis-
cussion of human affairs the question of
Justice only enters v/here the pressure of
necessity is equal, and that the pov;erful
exact what they can, and the weak grant
what they must." (V,89)
The advantage to Athens in the present instance is frankly put
"...your subjection v/ill give us an increase of security, as
v;ell as extension of empire." (V,97)
The direction of the argument, recognized from the first
by the hapless Melians, is acknov/ledged in these words:
"...since you drive us from the plea of jus-
tice 8.nd press upon us your doctrine of ex-
pediency, we must shov/ you v:hat is for our
interest, and, if it be for yours also, we
1. Plato, Republic
. Bk. I, 338
V
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may hope to convince you...." (V,98)
The Melians remind the Athenians of the danger of making enemies
of other neutrals; they express the hope of receiving aid from
Sparta; and they call upon the favor of the gods. To all of
which the Athenians make this terse reply:
"Cf the 5-,ods v.'-e believe, and of men we knov.',
that by a law of their nature wherever they
can rule they will. This law was not made
by us, and we are not the first v^ho have act-
ed upon it; we did but inherit it, and shall
bequeath it to all time, and v.-e know that
you and all mankind, if you were as strong
as we are, would do as we do." (V,105)
They then ask the nslians, "...do you not see that the path of
expediency is safe, v/hereas justice and honour involve danger
in practice...?" (V,107) And they conclude the debate with
this significant maxim of expediency: "To maintain our rights
against equals, to be politic with superiors, and to be moderate
toward inferiors is the path of safety." (V,lll) The Melians
are promised moderation according to this formula if they will
submit to Athens; their failure to do so results in the reduc-
tion of their city, the slaughter of all the adult males, and
the enslavement of the remainder of the population.
Synonymous with the expediency doctrine in pov/er politics
is the idea of reason of state . Bury v/isely holds that it is
"not justice but reason of state" which guides the actions of
1
cities in the history of Thucydides; and Cochrane asserts that
1. Bury, Greek Historians
, p. l40.
cc
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from this noint of viev,'- the history "constitutes a monumental
1
chapter in the ideology of Machtpolitik ." It is on this account,
among others, that Thucydides is frequently compared to Llachia-
velli; and this sim.ilarity vail be considered elsewhere in this
chapter. For the moment we may comment on the fact that Thucy-
dides provides what is probably the earliest statement of the
expediency doctrine and of its corollary that might makes right.
The historian presents the doctrine as an historical fact con-
cerning Athens; half a century later, Plato was to present it
in the Republic , which v;as in one sense an argument against the
realities of the same fact.
3. Democracy vs. Oligarchy
After expediency, the next major element inseparable from
the progress of empire, in the second half of the Fifth Century
B.C., was the conflict between democracy and oligarchy. There
is considerable basis in the history of Thucydides for the be-
lief that
"Greek politics of the Peloponnesian war per-
iod involve two definite conflicts, one be-
tv/een a conservative oligarchy and a radical
democracy, the other between a military im-
perialism and an aggressive commercial imper-
ialism. "2
1. Cochrane, op . cit
.
, p. 472,
2. Godolphin, The G-resk Historians , vol. I, p. XXV.
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1
It is certainly erroneous to assert, as Gornford does, that the
conflict of the t-'O forms of ^^overnment in no v/ay comprised a
primary cause of the war. Cn the other hand, it may be reading
too much into Thucydides' account of the vrar to maintain that
the struggle became "...increasingly a contest betv^een two types
of civilization, between lonians and aemocracies on the one
2
hand, and Dorians and oligarchies on the other hand." Assured-
ly there were elements of an ideological conflict, but on the
large canvas of v:ar the colors of empire covered the greater
area. It is a fact that the subjects and allies of Athens were
in the main democracies, \%'hile those of Sparta were generally
oligarchies; but it does not follow that this situation v:as
either the principal cause of the war or the outstanding issue
as the war developed. Yet the opposition of the tv/o forms of
government, mainly at the level of individual cities, bulks
too large in the history to allow its importance to be minimized.
Many of the cities which went over to Athens, by consent or by
force, did so through the immediate agency of connivance be-
tween Athenians and the democratic parties v/ithin the cities;
1. Francis MacDonald Gornford, Thucydides Mythistoricus
,
London,
1907 (Edward Arnold, publ.); p. 58. For a slavish adherence
to Gornford, see also T.S. Duncan, "Thucydides and the Caus-
es of the Peloponnesian War," Studies in Honor of Frederick
Shipley
,
'Washington Univ. Studies, St. Louis (Mo
. ) , 1942
;
p. 52. T.B.L. Webster, op. cit ., p. 71, also denies any
importance in the ODposition of the tv/o ideologies.
2. Greene, op . cit
.
, p. 51
•
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and in such cases Athens undoubtedly gave all assistance in the
1
establislunent of popular governments. Similarly oligarchical
parties in the many cities of Hellas - including Athens herself
sought alliance v.'ith Sparta. From this v/e may fairly conclude
that to the extent that democratic revolutions within indivi-
dual cities increased the strength of the Athenian empire, and
to the extent that oligarchical Sparta and her allies took alarm
at any such increase of strength, the conflict betv/een democracy
and oligarchy v;as a cause of the war. ''e must certainly admit
that the larger volume of Spartan victories as the v/ar progress-
ed brought into pov/er the oligarchical parties in many of the
cities v/hich had formerly enjoyed a kind of subject democracy
under the Athenian empire.
The multitude of examr)les v;hich crowd the history are ample
testimony of the great prevalence, in both space and time, of
this conflict. Athenians sailed to Samos and there "established
a democracy" (1,115); later they did the same for the Colophon-
ians (1,3^). Cn the other side, a victory for Sparta assured
the success of an extreme oligarchy in Megara (IV, 74). These
same I-Iegarians and the Boeotians refused to join the Argive
league, "...for they Vv'ere well av.'are that the Lacedaem6nian con-
1. See A.V7. Gomme, A Hi storics.l Commentary on Thucydides , Ox-
ford, 1945 (Clarendon Press) vol. I, p. 380. Also H. C-rant
Robinson, "Democracy and Oligarchy under the Athenian Em-
pire," Classical Philology
,
Chicago (Univ. of Chicago Press)
vol. XXVIII, No. 1, January, 1933, pp. 50-53.
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stitution was far more congenial to their ov.ti oligarchical form
of government that the Argive democracy." (V,3l) Cleon, the
Athenian demagogue, inveighed against the Mytilsnasans because
they had cast their lot with the oligarchs (111,39), and Dio-
dotus, arguing against him, v/arned of playing onto the hands of
the oligarchs "by being too severe. (111,47) The Argives turned
tov/ard the city of Athens because "...like their o;vn it was
governed by a democracy," (V,44)
The existence of piarty strife within individual cities
appears repeatedly as the determining factor in battles and in
the military and naval moves of Athens and the Spartan allies.
Thus in Corcyra, v;here even the women joined in the battle
a-;ainst the oligarchs, contributing to the victory of the popu-
lar Darty and warranting the inteirvention of a large Athenian
force. (111,70-81) So also in Megara, vhere popular leaders
conspired v;ith the Athenians (IV, 66); in Siphae, vjhere the demo-
cratic party plotted to deliver the city over to Athens (IV, 76);
in Thessaly, where the favor of the common people for Athens
rendered hazardous the passage through the country of the Spar-
tan, Brasidas (IV, 78); in Hende, where the Athenian assault on
the city was assisted by the attack of the democrats within
upon the members of the oligarchical party (IV, 130); in Argos,
where the popular party overthrew the oligarchs and then en-
listed Athenian aid in strengthening their fortifications (V,82)
and in Epidaurus, where the oligarchs sought a Spartan alliance
as a means of defeating the democratic faction. (V,76) Nicias,

104.
In warning the Athenians against the proposed Sicilian expedi-
tion, tells them that "...the real question is how we can make
ourselves secure against the designs of an insidious oligarchy,"
(VI, 11); and Athenagoras, the popular leader of the Syracusans,
belittles the possibility of an Athenian attack as a clever
fabrication of the oligarchs v;ho are conspiring to subvert
Syracusan democracy. (VI, 39) Thucydides had good reason to ob-
serve that
"...the whole Hellenic world was in commotion;
in every city the chiefs of the democracy and
of the oligarchy v:ere struggling, the one to
bring in the Athenians, the other the Lacedae-
monians." (111,82)
The eighth Book, which recounts the period imioediately
after the unparalleled disaster of the Athenian venture into
Sicily, provides examples of oli.^ archical factions in subject
states of the empire seizing the occasion of Athenian defeat
to depose the ruling democrats. The method is usually - be-
cause necessarily - alliance with Sparta. The attempt is seldom
successful; but the conflict of political factions is there
nevertheless. The outstanding example is of course that of
Athens herself, where oligarchy, in the persons of the Four Hun-
dred, takes over the government from the democrats. The clever
but unscrupulous Alciblades has convinced the Athenians that he
can bring victory to their cause by winning the support of the
Persian satrap, Tissaphernes - but only if they abolish the
"villainous democracy" which banished him from Athens. (VIII,
47-48) After the inevitable machinations at home and with the
[
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army at Samos, the transference of power Is accomplished, (VIII,
65-70) and Athens is ruled briefly by the Four Hundred - until
they are deposed (in the same year) by the assembly. (VIII, 97)
Speaking of the short-lived goverrjnent which succeeded the Four
Hundred, Thucydides says:
"Oligarchy and Democracy were duly attempered.
And thus after the miserable state into v/hich
she had fallen, the city was again able to
raise her head." (VI I I, 97)
In respect to the conflict bet-reen the two forms of govem-
m.ent, the historian seems to adopt the moderate position of com-
promise .
4. The Role of Law
Before proceeding to a consideration of the Thucydidean
view of the state, it is necessary to inquire into the part play
ed by lav; in the history - not Vjecause a discussion of law
necessarily precedes a discussion of the state, but because in
Thucydides it seems to occupy a connecting position between the
empire, Hellas, or the universe on the one hand, and the individ
ual Hellenic state on the other hand. Consideration of the role
of law at this point, after the subject matter of empire, follow
logically, since in the history of Thucydides it relates more
appropriately to the international than to the national society.
If the Roman classification of lav/ ma.y be used for the mom-
ent, to clarify by the use of a roughly valid parallel, ius
civile will be found to play the smallest part in Thucydides;
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lus gentium will be seen to be invoked on a few occasions; and a
peculiarly Thucydidean ius naturale will definitely predominate.
Law in the general sense v/ill be observed always to be subordin-
ated to considerations of war, conspiracy, party conflict, and
mob action.
The one outstanding reference to the status and effect of
local, intra- state law occurs in the Funeral Oration of Pericles.
It does not necessarily reflect the belief of Thucydides; it does
tell us what was a principal view of the role of law among those
who visualized an ideal Athenian democracy:
"it is true that we are called a democracy,
for the administration is in the hands of
the many and not of the few. But while the
law secures equal Justice to all alike in
their private disputes, the claim of excell-
ence is also recognized; and when a citizen
is in any way distinguished, he is preferred
to the public service, not as a matter of
privilege, but as the reward of merit....
/^'e/ are prevented from doing wrong by res-
pect for authority and for the lav^s, having
an especial regard to those which are ordain-
ed for the protection of the injured as well
as to those unwritten laws which bring upon
the transgressor of them the re|>robation of
the general sentiment." (11,37)
The elements of law in the Periclean view are these, then: (1)
it secures equal justice; (2) it recognizes superior ability;
(3) it inherently comimands the respect of Athenians; (4) it es-
pecially protects those who have been v;ronged; and (5) it exists
in part as the force of public opinion.
There is another kind of lav; in "hucydides, one which has
been likened to the Roman ius gentium . It is a body of law
common to all Hellenes and apparently limited to them. Refer-
ences to it are brief and very general; but we are left in no
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doubt of the belief in its existence. The Corinthians speak of
"grounds of right" before the Athenian assembly, saying, that
''they are sufficient according to Hellenic lav/." (1, 41) In his
account of the Athenian reduction of Naxos, many years before
the outbreak of the Peloponnesian 77ar, Thucydides says: "This
was the first of the allied cities v;hich v/as enslaved contrary
to Hellenic law...." (1,98) More specifically, the Plataeans
remind their Spartan conquerors that "the custom of Hellas does
not allov; the suppliant to be put to death." (111,58) The
Thebans oppose this same Plataean argument with a plea to "...
the co-imion Hellenic law which they have outraged...." (111,67);
and here the reference is to a past occasion when the Plataeans
had slain certain war prisoners contrary to their own solemn
promise. Thus the common Hellenic law seems to be based on re-
ligious customs, on the rules of warfare, and on alliances and
other inter- state agreements.
Somewhat broader than Hellenic law, but still apparently
based on custom and usage,, is a kind of universal law which is
appealed to on occasion. The Plataeans say that "we righteously
and in accordance with universal lav: defended ourselves and
punished the aggressor...." (111,56); and in Sicily the leaders
of the forces opposed to the invading Athenians express the
same ooinion: "We should remember .. .that men are doing a most
lav/ful act when they take vengeance upon an enemy and an aggres-
sor...." (VII, 68) Elsewhere the historian, at the close of a
dissertation on the excesses of revolution, says that, "...when
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men are retaliating upon others, they are reckless of the future^
and do not hesitate to annul those common laws of humanity to
v/hich every individual trusts for his ovm hope of deliverance
should he ever be overtaken by calamity...." (111,84)
A third kind of law, the most prevalent and the most signi-
ficant in the narrative of Thucydides, partakes as much of the
scientific - and especially the psychological - as of the poli-
tical. But its relation to crucial political and military ac-
tions in the history is so intimate that it may properly be con-
sidered here. It is concerned with human nature; and it is the
equivalent of natural law in Thucydides, representing as it
does the humanism of the Sophists and one of the conclusions
of a severely analytical historian.
The first indication of the historian's belief in laws of
hijman nature appears in his statement of purpose early in the
first Book. He admits that his history "may be disappointing
to the ear," and continues:
"But if he who desires to have before his
eyes a true picture of the events which have
hapiiened, and of the like events vjhich may be
expected to happen hereafter in the order of
human things , shall pronounce what I have
written to be useful, then I shall be satis-
fied." (1,22)1
We are given to understand that human nature will always react
in a like manner to like circumstances. Thus, under the condi-
tions of a great plague, men in desperation V7ill always lose
1. The underlining is mine.
(
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respect for the conventions of better times and lapse into the
v;orst forms of lawlessness. (11,53) What they happen to remember
will be determined by their ov.rn sufferings. (11,5^) Diodotus
tells the Athenian assembly that "...it is impossible, and simply
absurd to suppose, that human nature when bent upon some favour-
ite project can be restrained either by the power of lav; or by
any other terror." (111,45)
The special signifacance of the concept of laws of human
nature in the history is that it plainly represents Thucyaides'
ovm belief. Almost all of the numerous references to it occur
as expressions of opinion in the narrative proper, and not in
the speeches. Kence, we can say v;ith assurance that this is
the historian's theory, not merely an expression of the thought
of his time. Those examples of it v/hich refer directly to the
operations of extreme democracy will be reserved for another
section; here we shall mention only three additional passages
v/hich are especially pertinent. One is the disquisition on
revolution, in which Thucydides comments that this extrem.e of
party strife has " . . .brought upon the cities of Hellas many terr-
ible calamities, such as have been and always will be while human
nature remains the same, but v±iich are more or less aggravted
and differ in character with every new combination of circum-
stances." (111,82) Elsewhere Heraocrates, the Syracusan, says:
"The same human nature which is always ready to domineer ovei'- the
subservient, bids us defend ourselves against the aggressor."
{Vf ,61) Finally, Thucydides has this to say of the under-esti-
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raation of Athenian pov/er by ths cities v/hich \-jent over to Brasi-
das:
"...they judgeii rather by their ovm elusive
vjishes than by the unerring rule of prudence.
For such is the manner of men; v/hat they like
is always seen by the;:p. in the light of unre-
flecting hope, what the3'- dislike they peremp-
torily set aside by an arbitrary conclusion."
(IV, 108)
Zimmern has coTmnented upon the typically C^reek mixing of
osychology and oolitics which Thucydides reDresents in this re-
1
gard. "...His knowledge of men... is felt behind every line...."
Finley maintains that the concept of lavs of human nature - "the
idea of uniform responses to given conditions" - was for Thucydi-
des "an ideal medium for conveying the Drognostic teachings of
2
history," v^hile Jaeger has pointed out the element of compulsion
in the concept: power, for example, in the Thucydidean view, is
"...compelled to develop, by the immutable laws of human nature."
The characteristic reactions of mankind to these laws have been
held by Cochrane to include principally "...fear {po^os), the
dread of poverty {i^^^i^fJ^ clTla) 9 weakness (a^-d/v^t- a) , ^-nd distress
(afT^ttf*) which involves a corresoonding demand for peace, se-
curity, and well-being...."
1. A.E. Zimmern, "Political Thought," The Legacy of Greece , R. ¥.
Livingstone, ed., Oxford, 1922 (Clarendon Press); p. 537.
2. John H. Finley, Jr., Thucydides
,
Cambridge (Mass.), 19-^2
(Harvard University Press) ; p . 294.
3. Cochrane, op . cit
.
. p. 471.
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5. The State and Its Problems
The justly famous Funeral Cration of Pericles in the sec-
ond Book contains the only clearly positive exposition of the
nature of the state in the entire history. Except for a few
scattered references to its nature and to the duty of its offi-
cers in other speeches, there is otherwise only that negative
or critical description V7hich misht be exioected in an atraos-
1
phere of v^ar and defeat. In setting forth the principles of
the Funeral Cration, hov-ever, it is necessary to define the
limits of their apolicability . In the first place, they are
the expression of an ideal, not of a reality - of Athens as the
Periclean circle v:ould like to have it, not the Athens v.h.ich
the other evidence of the history sug&;ests. Secondly, the ideal
v/as strictly Athenian; it was not universal or even Pan-Hell-
enic. Athens alone \ra.s to be the "school of Hellas"; and much
of the speech comprises a lasting contrast of the Athenian
with the Spartan ideal. Finally, it is fair to assert that
while Thucydides undoubtedly admired most of the principles of
the ideal, he was not proselytizing on their behalf.
Ws have already seen what part lav/ played in the ideal.
The supremacy of the state over the individual is reflected in
1. •.h.ether positively or negatively described, the state and
its problems bulk large in the history; and Jaecer' s asser-
tion, that Thucydides' central problem is the nature of the
state, has much to recommend it. Co . cit
.
, p. 581.
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(1) the spirit of reverence which is to pervade public acts;
(2) the belief that the man v;ho takes no part in public affairs
is not merely a harmless but "a useless character"; and (3)
the role assigned to Athens as the educator of her citizens
and of all Hellas. Highly significant is the requirement of
active participation in the government:
"The great impediment to action is.. .not
discussion, but the want of that knov.rledge
v/hich is gained by discussion preDaratory
to action." (II, 4C)
The Athenian citizen "does not neglect the state because he
takes care of his ov/n household...."
The men of Athens are not burdened v/ith a Spartan system
of military training. Their courage is gained by habit and not
enforced by law.
"For we are lovers of the beautiful, yet
with economy, and we cultivate the mind with-
out loss of manliness, -//ealth we employ,
not for talk and ostentation, but when there
is a real use for it. To avow poverty with
us is no disgrace; the true disgrace is in
doing nothing to avoid it." (II,40)1
Not the least significant among the characteristics of the
Athenians and of their democracy, in this ideal view, is that
1. The role of public opinion in all of this needs to be em-
phasized. On this point, Zim.nern says that "...to Thucy-
dides shame is the last sanction and safeguard of a whole
system of personal and political morality. It is the
foujidation on which Pericles bases his whole Fujieral Speech'
Alfred S. Zimmem, The Greek Commonwealth
,
Oxford, 1911
(Clarendon Press) ; p. 11?.
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of the recognition of excellence. All men are not equal, and
those who have the greater ability are given the higher posi-
tions in the service of the state, 'fe may be reasonably sure
from his criticisms of demagoguery and mob democracy that Thu-
cydides especially approved of this element in the Periclean
ideal
.
In a few other speeches, there are references which fill
out somev/hat this positive picture of the state. In a later
speech, Pericles expresses the opinion that "'it would be
better for individuals themselves that the citizens should
suffer and the state flourish than that the citizens should
flourish and the state suffer.'" (11,60) He bases this on the
belief that the private citizen, vrhatever the success of his
personal dealings, "'if his country perish is involved in her
destruction.'" There is a reassertion of the belief that the
private is subordinate to the public interest in his statement
that "'states can bear the misfortunes of individuals, but
individuals cannot bear the misfortunes of the state....'"
(11,60) Nicias tells the Athenians that "'the sense of a man's
ovm interest will quicken his interest in the prosperity of
the state'" (VI, 9); and he concludes his advice against the
proposed Sicilian expedition with this sentence: "'The first
duty of the good ma^gistrate is to do the very best which he
can for his country, or, at least, to do her no harm v;hich he
can avoid.'" (VI, 14) This is the argument of the peaceful man.
It is countered at once in the speech of the youthful Alcibia-

des, who seeks fame and fortune as a conquering general. These
are his words:
"'The state , if at rest, like everything
else will wear herself out by internal fric-
tion. Every pursuit which requires skill
will bear the impress of decay, v/hereas by
conflict fresh experience is always being
gained, and the city learns to defend her-
self, not in theory but in practice. My
opinion in short is, that a state used to
activity will quickly be|ruined by the
change to inaction....'" (VI, 18)
Athens took the advice of Alcibiades, and a great force embarked
for Sicily. The expedition went from bad to v/orse ; and just be-
fore the retreating Athenians began to be slaughtered in droves,
it was the sa.e peaceable, pious, cautious leader, Niclas, who
spoke to them a few final words of encouragement, concluding
v^ith the comment that "'men, and not walls or ships in -.hich
are no men, constitute a state.'" (VII, 77)
Concerning the external aspect of the state, apart from
considerations of emoire, little is said. The Corinthians are
presented as suggesting that a community of interests is "'the
surest ground of strength bcth to individuals and to states....'"
(1,124) Pericles seems to refute this directly in a speech to
the Athenians. He points out that in a confederacy of equals,
each seeks his ov;n interest and so hampers the interest of all.
Neither can a confederacy execute its plans with speed and de-
cision; and nothing is ever done properly.
"'Every one fancies that his o\m neglect will
do no harm, but that it is somebody else's
business to keep a look-out for him, and this
idea, cherished alike by each, is the secret
ruin of all.'" (I,l4l)
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Referring specifically to the position of inferiors in alliances
the Mytilenaeans maintain that "'mutual fear is the only solid
basis of alliance; for he nho would break faith is deterred
from aggression by the consciousness of inferiority.'" (111,11)
This of course borders on the subject of empire; but it is sig-
1
nifleant for the philosophy of alliances generally.
Most of the material on the state comes from the speeches.
The remainder, concentrated in one passage, is of negative criti
cal nature; and it is interesting to note that it occurs not in
one of the speeches but In the narrative itself. Beyond quest-
ion it represents the opinion of the historian. The occasion
is the excursive but highly pertinent essay on the nature of
revolution, in the third Book. At the bottom of the revolutions
which swept Kellas, beginning, as Thucydides says, in Corcyra,
was the internecine strife between democratic and oligarchical
factions within many of the city-states. The extent and im-
portance of this conflict has already been considered. Here
v;e shall examine briefly its effects on the stability of the
state ana on the character of its citizens.
At Corcyra, v^here the popular party won a bloody victory
over the oligarchs, the democrats took advantage of their suc-
cess by "slaughtering those of their fellow-citizens whom they
1. T.B.L. Webster attributes to Thucydides the belief that
conduct in office and in foreign policy was based on pri-
vate interest and private ambitions: "the ethics of grab."
Op . cit
.
, p. 77.

deemed enemies;
"they professed to punish them for their de-
signs against the democracy, but in fact some
v.'ere killed from motives of personal enmity,
and some because money was owing to them, by
the hands of their debtors.... The father
slew the son, and the suppliants were torn
from the Temples and slain near them..,."
(111,81)
The judgment against contending parties is a severe one. The
whole passage is a condemnation of their very existence with-
in the state. Observing that, in Gorcyra, "the tie of party
\-ras stronger than the tie of blood, because a partisan v/as
more ready to dare without asking why," Thucydides makes this
parenthetical comment on the existence of political parties:
"...party associations are not based upon
any established law, nor do they seek the
public good; they are formed in defiance
of the laws and from self-interest." (111,82)
To this the historian shortly adds this elaboration on the
nature of parties:
"The cause of all these evils was the love
of pov^er, originating in avarice and ambition,
and the party-spirit which is engendered by
them when men are fairly embarked in a con-
test. For the leaders on either side used
specious names, the one party professing to
uphold the constitutional equality of the
many, the other the v^isdom of an aristocracy,
while they made the public interests, to which
in name they \iere devoted, in reality their
prize." (111,82)
Thucydides provides adequate grounds for his assertion
that " . . .revolution gave birth to every form of wickedness in
Hellas," (111,83) The merits of a noble nature were laughed
to scorn; a feeling of perfidious antagonism prevailed; no one
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could be trusted and eac-" man looked to his ov.m safety; Inferior
intellects came into power; force and treachery ruled the city.
And at the bottom of it all lay the lawless narty strife v;hich
1
the historian condemned.
6. Freedom vs
.
Tyranny
In the history of Thucydides there is none of that drama-
tic and epic opposition of freedom and tyranny which occupies
so large a place in the history of his great predecessor.
Thucydides' is the dispassionate, generally impartial, and
coldly analytical approach of the Sophist and scientific his-
torian. There is no clear presentation of two ooposing sys-
tems, pointing an obvious moral, or at least the historian's
opinion, to the reader. He is seldom on one side or the other
in regard to a particular issue. Yet the evidence is sufficient
that he considered the framev^ork of freedom generally prefer-
8/Dle to that of tyranny. In any event, he makes it apparent
that such v/as the prevailing viev/ in the Hellenic v/orld of
his time. The goal of freedom v;as then, as it remains today,
the prevailing political myth; and the historian subscribed to
it with those reservations which will be noted subsequently.
1. Bernard vr. Henderson concludes from the history that party
faction was the cause of the fall of Athens and that "this
is the final and mature Judgment of Thucydides himself."
^fhe C-reat yar Between Athens and g-parta
,
London, 1927
(Macmillan) ; p .450.
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The myth-value of freedom to the Greeks is illustrated
by the somewhat anachronistic role oligarcrical Sparta occupied
as the liberator of Greece. Y/hoever would free the subject
states of the Athenian empire would be a champion to the Greek
ideal; and the position fell to Sparta. Thucydides says:
"The feeling, of mankind was strongly on the
side of the Lacedaemonians; for they profess-
ed to be the liberators of Kellas. Cities
and individuals were ea^er to assist them to
the utmost.... For the general indignation
against the Athenians was intense; some were
longing to be delievered from them, others
fearful of fallinr under their sway." (11,8)
The Plataeans, on trial for their lives, plead with the Spar-
tans: "'You are liberating the other Hellenes; do not destroy
us.'" (111,59); and Brasidas, the Spartan general, tells city
after city that his army and his nation are "'going to fight
against the Athenians for the liberties of Kellas.'" (IV, 85)
If this sometimes degenerates into the cruel double-talk of
enforced liberation as v/hen Brasidas tells the Acanthians that
he cannot alio- exceptions to concurrence in his offers of
liberation (IV, 87), this does not detract from the validity
of the myth but only from the method of its application.
Athens, tyrant to her subjects and to all who feared even-
tual incorporation into the empire, v/as of course at home the
prime proponent of freedom. Athens and freedom have been synony
mous for two and a half millenia. The Funeral Cration of Peri-
cles describes that freedom as an ideal - how it allov.^s the indi
vidual to develop according to his oim ability, subject only
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to the requirement that he participate in the government; how
its citizens are able to live at ease and not under a military
regime; hov.^ its cultural ideals have produced great men, great
1
art, and the most beautiful city in Greece. Pericles tells
his audience that they have inherited from their forefathers
"a free state;" and he speaks of the "confidence of freedom."
(II,36,4C) In another speech, during the plague, he tells the
Athenians not to lose hope:
"
' . . .you may be sure that if we cling to our
freedom and preserve that, we shall soon enough
recover all the rest. But, if v;e are the ser-
vants of others, v/e shall be sure to lose not
only freedom, but all that freedom gives.'"
(11,62)
Diodotus tells another Athenian audience three years later that
"'a free people under a strong government will always revolt
in the hope of independence'" - and thus he seems to justify
the revolt of the Mytilenaeans against Athenian rule. (111,46)
The same spirit animates the Judgment of the historian on the
attitude of the revolted cities of the empire, caught between
1. So attractive is this picture of a free society that Grundy
has been led to affirm - what can hardly be proved - that
the Funeral Cration shows that Thucydides himself regarded
the Periclean democratic society "...as the nearest approach
to an ideal which man could attain in government...."
G.B. Grundy, Thucydides and the History of His Ap;e , 2 vols.,
vol. I published in London, 1911, by John Murray, vol. II
at Oxford, 1948, by Basil Blackwell ; vol. II, p. 17. C.H.
Mcllwain, The Grov;th of Political Thoufcht in the ^'Jest , Ne\ir
York, 1932 (Hacmillan), pp. 94-95, also makes Thucydides
admire the "regime" which Pericles portrays.
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the forces of Athens and those of Sparta. He says that "the
form of government v:as Indifferent to them if they could only
be free, but they did not v/ant to bs in subjection either to
an oligarchy or a democracy." (VIII, 48)
The other side of the medal is the description of tyranny;
and the find the Thebans speaking of power in the hands of a
fev;, of vrhich they say that "'...nothing is m.ore opposed to
law or to true political order, or more nearly ressembles a
tyranny.'" (111,62) Athenagoras of Syracuse inveighs against
the "'tyrants'" and the "'narrow and wicked oligarchies'" which
from time to time have ruled his city. (VI, 38) In connection
with the profanation of the mysteries at Athens, Thucydides
observes that the Athenians became suspicious and savage in
their search for the offenders because " . . .the vrhole affair
seemed to them to indicate some conspiracy aiming at oligarchy
or tyranny." (VI, 60) The hold of freedom upon the majority
of Athenians is reflected also in the comment of Thucydides
upon the seizure of power by the oligarchical Four Hundred.
He says that "an easy thing it certainly was not, 100 years
after the fall of the tyrants, to destroy the liberties of the
Athenians...." (VIII, 68) That his convictions v/ere on the side
of freedom is suggested by his choice of v;ords in the descrip-
tion of the first major battle of the Athenian invasion of
Sicily:
"The two armies advanced; the Syracusans
to fight for their country, anc every man
for life now, and liberty hereafter; on the
opposite side the Athenians to gain a new

country, and to save the old from defeat
and ruin. . . ." (VI, 69)
In one place only does Thucydides give a favorable estimate
of tvranny, and that of the rule of HiiDpias, son and successor
1
of Pisistratus. In a prolonged digression, the historian is
at some pains to correct the prevailing impressions of the
murder of Hipparchus, brother of Kippias; and in the process
he comments that " . . .no tyrants ever displayed greater merit
or capacity than these....
"/TheY/ improved and adorned the city, and
carried on successful wars; they were also
in the habit of sacrificing in the temples.
The city meanwhile was permitted to retain
her ancient laws/..." (VI, 54)
This last was the same praise which Herodotus bestowed on Pisis-
tratus. The extended favorable comm.ent of Thucydides does no
more to suggest a support of tyranny on his part than on the
part of the older historian.
Concerning democracy as the institutional embodiment of
freedom, it is certain that Thucydides knew intimately its con-
tent and its justification. Sir Ernest Barker has said that
"no reader of Thucydides can fail to be struck by the conscious
grasD of principle vjhich democratic SDeakers are made to shov/
2
in his pages...." This has already been amply demonstrated
1. See Gru.ndy, op . cit
.
, vol, II, p. 64.
2. Barker, op . cit
.
.
p. 4.
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in references to the Funeral Oration. Tt is also positively
stated by Athenagoras to the Syracusans; and the passage, ante-
dating Plato by at least three decades, may be quoted in its
entirety
:
"'I shall be told that democracy is neither
a wise nor a just thing, and that those v;ho
have the money are most likely to govern well.
To which I ansv/er, first of all that the
people is the name of the whole, the oligarchy
of a part; secondly, that the rich are the
best guardians of the public purse, the wise
the best counsellors, and the many, when they
have heard a matter discussed, the best Judges;
and that each and all of these classes have in
a denocracy equal privileges, ^fnereas, an oli-
garchy, while giving the people the full share
of danger, not merely takes too much of the
£2:ood thiniss, but absolutely monopolizes them."
rvi,39)
It is tempting to draw from this passage, from the disastrous
defeat of the Athenians by the dem.ocratic Syracusans, and from
the Funeral Oration the conclusion that Thucydldes v;ished to
point up the strength of democracy. Anc in fact he does com-
ment upon the paradox of the opoosition of the Athenians and
the Sicilians, each "enjoying the same democratic institutions
and strong in ships, cavalry, and population." (VII, 55) But
the other evidence of the history, and in particular the sorry
record of Athens, will not justify such a conclusion.
7. Criticisms of Democracy
7,Tiile it may be maintained that the historian favored
democracy over tyranny, and probably also over oligarchy, it
does not follow that he favored it absolutely. His precise
<
position cannot be established, of course; he covers his tracks
too well for that. But the direction of his preference can be
deteinnined, it is submitted, by combining his views on freedom
and tyranny with his criticisms of democracy, and then examin-
ing them in the light of his critical estimate of some of the
leading figures in the history.
The criticisms of democracy are numerous; and all of them
are directed at the follies of the mob. Macan has wisely ob-
served that " . . .Thucydides is a master, if not the author, of
1
mob-psychology...." Rostovtzeff calls it the "psychology of
the herd" and rip;htly maintains that Thucydides was well aware
2
of the part it has played in history. An early example of
the historian' s understanding of democratic mobs occurs in the
SDeech of Pericles berating the Athenians for their accusations
against him during the dreadful plague. (11,60-64) Of the
mob' s reaction to the speech, Thucydides says:
"The popular indignation was not pacified
until they had fined Pericles; but, soon
afterv^ards, v/ith the usual fickleness of
the multitude, they elected him general and
committed all their affairs to his charge."
(11,65)
Nor v^as Pericles alone in his experience of the fickle mob -
nor alone in telling the Athenians about it. Nicias says in
his letter to the assembly, writing from the ba.ttlefield in
1. C-Q . cit
.
,
Cambridge Ancient History , vol. V, p. 406.
2. C^^ cit
, p. 304.
<:
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Sicily: '"...I know your disrjositions ; you like to hear pleas-
ant things, but afterwards lay the fault on those vfho tell you
them if they are falsified by the event (VII, 14) Con-
cerning the advice of Nicias to withdrav: from Sicily while there
was still time, Thucydides voices a similar opinion v;hen he
observes that "...many or most of the very soldiers v.ho were
novj crying out that their case v;as desperate would raise the
opposite cry when they reached home, and would say that the
generals were traitors, and had been bribed to depart...."
(VII, 48) The justification for the opinions of Nicias and the
historian came v.hen the nev^s of the invasion's utter failure
reached Athens, where the citizens "v/ere furious witli the ora-
tors v;ho had joined them in promoting the expedition...." (VIII,
1)
The mob, historically and in the Thucydidean viev/, must
have its victim. Diodotus tells the Athenians so:
"'...whenever you meet v/ith a reverse, led
av/ay by the passion of the moment you punish
the individual who is your adviser for his
error of judgment, and your own error you condone,
if the judgments of many concurred in it.'"
(111,43)
Sometimes the mob's victim is not the orator vdio gave poor ad-
vice but the innocent private citizen falsely accused of a
crime for vrhich revenge must be had. In the case of the profan-
ation of the mysteries and mutilation of the Hermae, on the
eve of the Sicilian expedition, Thucydides writes of the angry
Athenians:
"They did not investigate the character
1
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of the informers, but in their suspicious
mood listened to all manner of statements,
and seized and imprisoned some of the m.ost
respectable citizens on the evidence of
wretches...." (VI, 53)
Suspecting a plot against the democracy, the Athenians eagerly
accepted the testimony of an informer of questionable chara^cter
gave him his freedom, and seize, and executed as many of those
he had named as could be found. (VI, 50)
There seems to be another sort of criticism in the his-
torian' s mention of the action of the common people in M^'^til-
ene, v/ho, when they had received aras for the defense of their
city, vvould no longer obey their leaders but gathered into
knots and demanded that the nobles bring out the com and let
all share alike. (111,27) There is assuredly a strong criti-
cism in the SDeech of Cleon, a demagogue lecturing the Athen-
1
ians on their susceptibility to demagoguery. He tells them
that they '''estimate the possibility of future enterprises
from the eloquence of an orator;'" and he voices a criticism
which is undoubtedly the opinion of the historian himself:
"
'You are always hankering after an ideal
state, but you do not give your minds even
to v/hat is straight before you. In a word,
you are at the mercy of your ov.ti ears....'"
(111,38)
1. C.E. Robinson, Hellas;A Short History of Ancient Greece
,
New York, 19^8 (Pantheon), p. Ill, says that Cleon "employ
ed all the most cynical arguments of pure self-interest,
and played up shamelessly to the v;orst instincts of the
mob." See also G-rundy, op. cit. , vol. II, p. 42.
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We cannot be sure to what extent Thucydides shared the
opinions voiced by Alcibiades at Sparta, vrhen he had deserted
the Athenian side; but the passage exists as a paragraph from
contemporary political thought. The traitorous Alcibiades
excuses his Athenian adherence to democracy by saying that
"'any power adverse to despotism is called democracy'" and
that his family have alv;ays been opposed to tyrants. The fam-
ily of Alcibiades had tried to observe political moderation
amid the prevailing license, but the demagogues had succeeded
in leading the people into evil ways. "'Of course, like all
sensible men,'" says Alcibiades, " ' v/e knew only too well what
democracy is..,. The follies of democracy are universally ad-
mitted....'" (VI, 89)
In the face of this criticism of Athenian democracy, es-
pecially in vievr of the knowledge of the great achievements
of the "C-olden Age" under Pericles, it may be v/ell to reviev;
the principal factors involved. Lest we be pushed prematurely
into the conclusion that Thucydides " . . .had no great admiration
1
for the democratic constitution of Athens," vre must recall
that the height of Pericles' ascendancy had been passed by the
time of the outbreak of the Peloponnesian /ar, and that he died
shortly after the v;ar began. Thereafter Athens fell under the
leadership of demagogues and of its o-.^ti unreasoning desires.
Finley has good reason for asserting Thucydides' belief that,
1. G-omme, Essay s, p. 189.
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"...fundamental as democracy v/as to the grov;th and pov/er of
Athens, it nroved IncaDable after Pericles' death of a tem-oer-
1
ate policy or consistent leadership...." The appetite created
by empire vras a strong factor in undermining the restraint of
the democracy; and the spread of Sophism undoubtedly contrib-
uted to the eventual ascendancy of the demagogues. But there
was still another key factor; and that xvas the r>art played by
2
what Grundy calls the "indigent ultra-democrat", the profes-
sions-1 citizen, so to speak, whose livelihood depended on his
income from jury- service , attendance in the assembly, and par-
ticipation in other publicly financed activities. "He looked
to the tribute as his main means of support in the -oublic ser-
vice." Thus individual, pecuniary self-interest played its
part in the decisions of the assembly.
A major effect of all this, the one perhaps most abhorrent
to the historian, v/as the hampering of effective action at
crucial points by the fickleness of the self-seeking Athenian
mob. Cne aspect of it v^as a continuing jealousy of its most
capable leaders. "It preferred that mediocrity whose mental
workings it could understand, to a higher capacity whose breadth
1. Gd . cit
.
, p. 304. Finley criticizes Thucydides for assioming
that the singularly mistable form of democracy that he
knew v^as the final and necessary form of democracy." Pp.
304, 319.
2. Cd . cit , vol. I, p. 329.
4
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1
of viev/ it could not grasp and therefore suspected." Another
aspect was the weakening of Athenian strategy in the field
by excessive control at home. "The Sicilian Expedition v/as
2
lost, not by Nikias, but by the Athenian assembly...." The
recall of Alcibiades deprived the Athenian army of its most
capable general, impelling him to choose treason in preference
to death. The sorry record of Athens, during that major part
of the Peloponnesian '-.ar which the history of Thucydides des-
cribes, v;-ill in fact allow the conclusion that the assembly,
acting as a mob, was chief among the causes of the ultimate
defeat of the once-proud city.
8. The Opinions of Thucydides
Proceeding from the material thus far examined to the his-
torian' s estimates of outstanding personages in the history,
we may hope to reach allowable conclusions concerning the direc
tion of his political opinions. For Thucydides is not as com-
pletely impartial as a long tradition of scholarship would
make him. It is true that a reliance on the speeches alone
will permit a variety of interpretations as to what the histor-
ian did or did not think; and in the last analysis it would be
1. Ibid. , vol. I, p. 5.
2. Gilbert Murray, op . cit
.
, p. 197.

necessary, on the basis of no other evidence, to conclude that
there is much of the political thought of his age in the his-
tory of Thucydides but none identifiable as his own. However,
as v;e have observed repeatedly, and especially in reference to
the follies of the democratic mob, he does intrude comments
into the narrative proper v/hich, as expressions of opinion,
are departures from his legendary impartiality and provide,
in toto
,
strong indications of his general position. More than
this, at crucial points in the narrative he inserts brief esti-
mates of the orincipal characters, once or twice at the con-
clusion of a particular episode, usually at the point where
the person in question is making his exit from the historical
scene. It is from these that we get the clearest idea of Thu-
cydides' o;m political inclinations.
Although in time he is very much outside the scope of an
accoiint of the Peloponnesian V'ar, Themistocles appears with
some prominence in the first Book of the history. Thucydides
has no coinnient to make on the personal qualities of the Athen-
ian leader at Salamis; but his remark on the man's political
astuteness is undeniably a gesture of praise. The remark is
directed at Themistocles' "native acuteness" , his ability both
to act wisely in a sudden emergency and to foresee v;hat would
happen in the distant future.
"Vv'hatever he had in hand he had the -poi-ier of
explaining to others, and even >fhere he had
no experience he v/as quite competent to form
a sufficient judgment; no one could foresee
with equal clearness the good or evil event
which was hidden in the future."
T
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1
(1,138)
Here is one quality , then, whicli Thucydides would have in his
ideal statesman: fore sij^ht »
In addition to this essential quality of foresight, another
characteristic is praised in the estimate of Pericles. That is
the ability to lead the multitude rather than be led by it.
Pericles had that power; he had it because of his convincing
ability and his "transparent integrity." He vms able to con-
trol the multitude because, "...not seeking povrer by dishonest
arts, he had no need to say pleasant things, but, on the strength
of his o\m high character, could venture to oppose and even to
anger them." (11,65) ^Tien he saw them becoming arrogant or un-
necessarily elated over some passing success, he proceeded to
humble them; v.^hen they v^ere discomforted, he employed the magic
of his oratory to renew their confidence. In fact, although
still in name a democracy, Athens was actually ruled by her
leading citizen - by Pericles. Plutarch, depending mainly on
Thucydides, says that after the death of Pericles, " . . .that
invidious arbitrary power, to which formerly they /the partisan
critics of the great state smai^ gave the name of monarchy and
tyranny, did then appear to have been the chief bulwark of pub-
1. G-omme says: "The whole excursus on Themistocles is irrele-
vant to the narrative...." Op . cit
.
, pp. 446-44?. The
criticism is a valid one; and the passage suggests a di-
gression introduced for a purpose - in the case of the con-
cluding estimate, to express an opinion.
iT
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1
lie safety."
The third significant character estimate in the history
is of a ne^vative nature; but it has its place in the developing
picture of Thucydidean political thought, all the s3,me. It
involves the demagogue Cleon, for whom Thucydides seems to have
entertained a dislike v;-hich his intended impartiality could
2
ill conceal. '•,'hen he first introduces him, he calls him "the
most violent of the citizens." (111,36) He then represents the
demagogue playing up to the worst instincts of the mob as he
urges the slaughter of the Mytilenaeans . Later he refers to
the "mad promise of Cleon" (rv,39) to capture the Spartans
marooned on the island of Sphacteria - a promise which Cleon,
albeit with the aid of Demosthenes, vms able to fulfill. The
final judgment on Cleon describes him as one of the two greatest
enemies of peace, "...because he fancied that in quiet times
his rogueries would be more transparent and his sla.nders less
credible...." (V,16) Here is a man as opposite to Pericles
as Thucydides can conceive - a man of the lower class, lacking
in nobility of character, employing dishonest methods for per-
1. Plutarch, Lives
, p. 212.
2. Theodor G-omperz, Greek Thinkers , translated by Laurie Magnus,
4 vols., London, 1920 (John Murray), vol. I, p. 517, says
that it is precisely in respect to Cleon that the histor-
ian's impartiality is "most justifiably attacked." Corn-
ford, op
. cit
.
, p. 126, holds that Thucydides treats Cleon
as a type and that he tells about him only those things
which illustrate the type.
V
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sonal ends, agitating, for the continuation of a v/ar which would
draw attention away from his own dishonorable actions. The
lesson from Cleon is a negative one: the good statesman v/ill
not be a demagogue, and he will not promote v/ar for his ovm
benefit
.
Coupled v:ith Cleon by the historian, for purposes of con-
trast only, is Nicias, the fourth personage of importance upon
whom Judgment is passed. Nicias was the outstanding advocate
of peace in Athens. He v;as the most fortunate general of his
day, and he desired to preserve the reputation which he had
won, to ::ive Athens a rest, "...to leave beh:nd him to other
ages the name of a man who in all his life had never brought
disaster on the city." (V,16) But the way of Nicias, the peace-
ful and religious man, was not the way of the Athenian assembly,
which preferred to listen to Cleon and then to Alcibiades.
Nicias it was who, quite against his own wishes, was chosen to
lead the ill-fated Sicilian expedition. Cf his execution by
the Syracusans, Thucydides says: "No one of the Hellenes in my
time was less deserving of so miserable an end; for he lived
in the practice of every customary virtue." (VII, 86) This
seems clearly to indicate a third positive characteristic of
the ideal statesman, the practice of virtue . --Tiether the his-
torian advocated also Nicias' constantly- emphasized will to
peace is not so clear, since we cannot be sure of his (the his-
torian's) initial attitude tov/ard the Sicilian venture.
It is fair to assume that Thucydides disapr^roved of the
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personal characteristics of Alcibiades, who is next to be con-
sidered; but he v/as othervrise impressed by his pov.-ers as a leader.
The "lav/less self-indulgence" of Alcibiades led the Athenians to
suspect him of aiming at tyranny, and they set themselves against
him. "And therefore", says Thucydides,
"although his talents as a military commander
v/ere unrivalled, they entrusted the adjninistra-
tion of the v;ar to others, because they person-
ally objected to his private life; and so they
speedily shipv/recked "the state." (VI, 15)
This favorable judgment must assuredly be confined to Alcibia-
des' ability as a military leader. Although not a demagogue,
he admittedly acted from motives of sheer self-interest; in his
private and public life alike he v;as anything but virtuous or
religious; and Thucydides labels as correct the opinion that
he "cared no more for oligarchy than he did for dem.ocracy . . . ."
(VIII, 48) The only quality v±iich we may add from the estimate
of Alcibiades, then, is that of be ing a capable military leader -
and this includes within it the military aspect of the quality
of foresight.
There is a passing estimate of Antiphon, the Sophist rhetor-
ician, v/hom Thucydides describes as a man "possessed of remarkable
powers of thought and gifts of speech." (VIII, 68) His special
significance is that he v:as the heart of the oligarchical revo-
lution in Athens, one of the Four Hundred who seized control of
the city; yet he merits the relatively extended praise of the
historian. The multitude had always disliked him and were suspi-
cious of his abilities; but no man could present a better case
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in the courts or before the assembly. VJhy is he singled out
for praise? Perhaps the historian owed hirrja debt of gratitude.
Perhaps he simply admired the factor of superior ability in
the man. Gilbert Murray and J.B. Bury see in the passage a
similarity to Machiavelli ' s praise of Cesare Borgia. "AntiDhon
Ct^^'fl^ vms perhaps rather like Borgia's virtu ." It would seem
that the praise must be aimed at the genius and foresight v;hich
Antiphon displayed in all his actions; it cannot be directed
toward the offences of the oligarch.
One estimate remains, e.nd that is not of an Individual
but of a political regime. It is in many ways the most signi-
ficant, for our purposes, in the history. Concerning, the re-
gime \\rhich succeeded the overthrow of the Four Hundred, Thucy-
dides has this to say:
"This government during its early days was
the best which the Athenians ever enjioyed
within my memory. Oligarchy and Democracy
were duly attempered. 2 And thus after the
miserable state into which she had fallen,
the city was again able to raise her head."
(VIII, 97)
The only details provided concerning the nature of this govern-
ment tell us that it v;as in the hands of the Five Thousand,
1. Murray, op
. cit
.
, p. 198. See Bury, Greek Historians , pD
.
144-U 5.
2. Grundy bases Thucydides' praise on the belief of the histor
ian that this government "...approximated to that doctrine
of concession of the stronger to the weaker which the soph
ists had put forward...." Op . cit
.
, vol. II, p. 11.
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that number to include all who could furnish themselves with
arms. "No one v/as to receive pay for holding any office, on pain
of falling under a curse." (VIII, 97) The criticisms embodied
in the opinion are not likely to be disputed. The words "miser-
able state" refer certainly to the immediately preceding rule
of the Four Hundred and probably also to the decadent democracy
which preceded that. The reference to oligarchy and democracy
as being now " attem.pered" plainly implies a criticism of each
of them separately as Athens had lately knovm them. Thucydides
does not like the excesses of either form; he seem.s to believe
that a combination of the good points in each will produce the
best form of government. Thus he proposes a mixed government;
and he may then be described as a moderate democrat, or perhaps
as a moderate oligarch.
"Thucydides ideal constitution seems to have
been a moderate democ^racy with a hoplite fran-
chise, the ideal of the Middle Party in Athen-
ian politics. "1
Finley expresses the opinion that the historian was a con-
vinced democrat in his youth but that "his persone.l misfortunes,
as v/ell as the natural tendencies of age, made him more conser-
2
vative as he grew older." Mure says of Thucydides, as he says
of Herodotus in an earlier volume, that "like every other great
writer of antiquity, he was opposed to pure democratic govem-
1. Grundy, op . cit
.
, vol. II, p. 41.
2. Finley, op . cit
, p. 32.
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nent;" but he grants that Thucydides gave unqualified admira-
tion to Periclean democracy.
It is perhaps precisely upon the issue of the Periclean
democra.cy that v/e find the key to the Thucydidean viev.- of gov-
ernment, for the historian, as v/e have seen, "makes no secret
2
of his admiration for the political wisdom of Pericles." It
is not the extremes of the democracy itself for which Thucydides
has praise; nor is it the free existence of contending parties
within the state, since that is elsewhere specifically con-
demned; nor the payment for public office, since non-payment
is a characteristic of the only government which is singled
out for approbation. Grundy is right vihen he says that the
passage in which the accolade is bestowed on Pericles (11,65)
shov:s the historian's "distrust of ultra-democracy when not
3
controlled by a master-mind." It is for the capable leader
that Thucydides has praise - the leader, above all, who has
foresight
.
"...to Thucydides the supreme requisite of a
politician is his T^^yy^cj^o^ - his ability to
foresee . . . ,"^
This was the great merit of Themistocles, of Pericles, of Alci-
1. Mure, op . cit
.
,
vol.V, p. 62. On Herodotus, see vol .IV, p .455
.
2. Bury, History of G-reece
, p. 381.
3. Grundy, op . cit
.
, vol. II, p. 42.
4. Finley, op . cit
, p. 50*
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blades, of Antlphon. Its absence left Nicias a good man but
not a great one and condemned Cleon utterly. Pericles vas the
greatest of leaders because, in addition to the rare gift of fore-
sight, he had the ability to lead the multitude rather than be-
ing led by it, and the further quality of a noble and virtuous
nature v.-hich would not use the DOVv^ers of state in a dishonest
1
manner.
Of the essence of Peri clean democracy was the Athenian em-
pire; and whether or not Thucydldes was a thoroughgoing imper-
ialist cannot be positively stated. If the assujnption is correct
that he was a moderate democrat, it may follov; that he v/as also
2
a moderate imperialist. In any event, it is certain that the
Athenian Thucydides did not v/ish the strength of Athens to be
greatly diminished; and the material strength of the city lay
in the em^pire. The evidence of the history suggests that any
criticism which he may have harbored concerning a particular
military enterprise was directed at lack of foresight or of
operational efficiency rather than at ethical factors involved.
Thucydides does not condemn the sanction of expediency. The
favorable estimates which he accords the principal leaders unani-
1. It is presumably the outstanding example of Pericles, but the
preference for noble and farsighted leadership generally,
which leads Ziramern to conclude that for Thucydides the
basis and justification of politics was "an exaltation of
the spirit to its highest power." Essay in The Legacy of
Greece
, p. 3^6.
2. See Grundy, o-p . cit
.
, vol. II, pp. 64-65
(/
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mously shovj' that he placed above all else the quality of beins
able to foresee what action v/ould be necessary for the safety
and continued well-being of the state.
"...the whole innuendo of the Thucydidean
treatment of history agrees with the funda-
mental postulate of Machiavelli, the suprem-
acy of the reason of state. "1
Eoilogue
A. Fortune or Chance
A recurrent factor in human events in the Thucydidean viev:,
and one v/hich is closely related to the political thought of
the history'", lies outsiie the bounds of reason. '"Jhat Herodotus
would attribute to divine intervention, Thucydides, who rarely
admitted gods or women into his history, attributed to chance.
In a highly rational and analytical interpretation of events,
this is the one incalculable and unpredictable element which
the historian is forced to admit. Its presence has provided
a principal support for the major thesis of Cornford, who maizes
of Fortune a divine -oower, and has the gods moving behind the
2
scenes in Thucydides much more than they did in Herodotus.
"Man, isolated from, and opoosed to. Nature,
moves along a narrov/ path, unrelated to v^hat
1
. Bury , G-reek Historians, p . 143
.
2. Cornford, op . pit
.
,
also denies that Thucydides had any proper
understanding of economic factors.
V
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lies beyond, .. .except that, novr and again,
out of the surrounding darkness come the
blinding strokes of Fortune, unaccountable
and unfore seen."
1
In this novel if not wholly tenable view, there is a tragic re-
ligiosity in Thucydides, comparable to that of Aeschylus, ^-:hich
makes Herodotus a sophisticated sceptic hj comparison. The
future is not merely unknown, it is undetermined, "and... human
design cannot be sure of completely controlling human events,
because other unknown and incalculable agencies may at a/ny mo-
2
ment intervene." The theory of Cornford rejects that very
element of predictability in human affairs which the historian
specifically sets forth as a reason for his writing the history,
and seems to spring from an implied criticism of Thucydides*
failure to interpret the Peloponnesian War in terms of twentieth
century economics.
Cornford is in part refuted by the speech which Thucydides
puts in the mouth of Pericles, admonishing the Athenians for
their readiness to blame him for misfortunes arising out of
the plague. "'Anything v/hich is sudden and unexpected and utter-
ly beyond calculation,'" he says, "'such a disaster for instance
as this plague coming upon other misfortunes, coivs the spirit
of man.'" (11,61) Such a thing as the plague may be unpredictable
may cause great loss and suffering, but men must rise above it
in the service of the state. "'You should lose the sense of your
1- Ibid.
, p. 70.
e
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private sorrows and lay fast hold of the coiTi'ion good.'" (II, 61)
Thucyaides plainly keeps the issues very much on this earth.
Even in the speech of Kermocrates, v/arning the Sicilians
of Athenian plans for aggression, a disputable meaning must be
given to the words to impute religiosity to them. In one place
Hermocrates says: "'The inscrutable future is the controller
of events, and, being the most treacherous of all things, is
also the most benificent . . . . (IV, 62) Again he remarks that
he is not so foolish as to imagine that, because he is master
of hi
s
own will , he can also control fortune, of which he is
not master. (IV, 64) The important point seems to be that he
is master of his ov,ti will; chance i£ an unpredictable element
which he acknov/ledges but does not attribute to divine inter-
vention .
Elsewhere chance is presented as operating in a particular
way. To the factors of desire and hope, Diodotus adds that of
fortune as a cause of the unvrise actions of states. "'Fortune...
often presents herself unexpectedly, and induces states as vfell
as individuals to run into peril, hov?'ever inadequate their
means.'" (111,45) And Thucydides speaks of "those unaccountable
panics to which great armies are liable" (IV, 125) and of the
"chance mishaps" of one's enemies which should not be a cause
of premature elation. (VI, 11) The gods are as little behind
the scenes in such observations as they are in our present-day
references to "good luck" and "bad luck" . There is certainly no
element of divine pimishment implied v/hen the hapless Plataeans
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remind their Spartan captors of "'the uncertainty of fortune,
v/hich may strike anyone however innocent.'" (111,59); nor even
in the vmrning of Nicias against the Sicilian venture: "'We
shall have much need of prudence; still more of good-fortune
(and who can guarantee this to mortals?).'" (VI, 23) The paren-
thetical implication of immortal gods still does not support
the divine-intervention theory; and Nicias, \re must remember,
v:as the one admittedly religious person in the history. (VII,
77)
In one place Thucydides seems to attribute too m.uch to
chance. That is in the account of the Athenian occupation of
Pylos in Book IV. Here everything, seems entirely too accidental
"it so happened" that a storm drove the Athenian ship ashore
at the place; the soldiers, standing about idle, were "seized
with a desire" to fortify the place; the whole affair v;as "a
singular turn of fortune." (IV, 3,4, 12) The Spartans are made
to refer to the "unusual good fortune" of the Athenians in their
victory (rv,17); and the historian says later of the Spartans
that " fortune .. .v,'as against them," (IV, 55) Cornford, of course,
is careful to observe this presentation of the Pylos episode
as "the most casual thing in the v;orld" ; and he asserts that it
is precisely at this point that the deified Fortune takes over
1
in the history. The unjustifiability of such a claim is per-
haps best demonstrated by the statistical fact that the opera-
1. Ibid.
, p. 90
I
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tion of chance is directly referred to only twice after the end
of Book IV, in which the account of Pylos anpears.
Without excusing the undue emphasis placed upon it con-
cerning Pylos, \-ie may conclude, with Godolphin, that the element
of chance in Thucydides refers to "...the contingent or accident
1
al, never the abstract pov;er. Fortune or Providence...." It
is a factor, 8-s economics is a factor, which must be given its
proper place in a scientific presentation of history.
B. Sophist Influence
The influence of the methods of the Sophists in both the
form and the political substance of Thucydides' gres-t work is
too pronounced to be overlooked. In this connection, v/hile
see^'-ing a proper perspective, vre must unburden ourselves of a
prevailing moralistic misconception of Sophism. Plato has be-
come the principal basis for an unfavorable view of the Sophists
and it is necessary to shake off the Platonic prejudice and to
recognize that basically Sophism was an educational method.
Jaeger has capably pointed out this fact: that "the strength of
the Soohists lay in the brilliant new system of education v;hich
2
they invented." Within this system, individual Sophists taught
1. G-odolphin, ed., op . cit
.
, p. xxiv.
2. Gt) . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 328. See also G-eorge Grote, op . cit
.
,
vol. VIII, pp. 151-204.
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a wide variety of subjects and differed v^idely in the amount
of moral consideration which they v;ould allow in their several
philosophies. If V7e are to condemn Thrasymachus for being a
Sophist, we must condemn Socrates also, for he too v;as a Soph-
i st
.
Thucydides " . . .was obviously dominated by the formal art
of the sophists, in the very details of his oratorical tech-
nique, his sentence-structure, and even his grammatical use of
1
words...." The speeches are the outstanding examples of Soph-
ist technique in the smallest details of their composition,
but principally as employing the device of argument and counter-
argument. A speech of the Corinthia^ns sets forth to the Spartans
the v^eaknesses of the Athenians; without any aoparent knowledge
of the speech, Pericles presents the opposite argument to the
Athenians, point by point. Cleon argues for harsh treatment
of the Mytilenaeans on grounds of expediancy; Diodotus op-ooses
the argument v/ith a speech just as cynically based on e:cped-
iency. Hermocrates uses one kind of argument to try to convince
the Syracusans that the Athenians are coming; Athenagoras uses
another kind to prove that they are not coming.
Another device, older than the Sophists but carried to ex-
tremes by them, and in Thucydides appearing usually within the
speeches, is the ooposition of words and deeds. Men are safe
v/hile they are thinking but lose their presence of mind when
1, Jaeger, op . cit , vol. I, p. 313.
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the time comes for action (1,120); they should be less inclined
to "'seek out fair v.^ords in order to excuse foul deeds'" (III,
67); even the Spartans may be un-Laconic where "'v;ords are the
ministers of action"* (IV, 17); military preparations include
those of v/ord and act (rv,67); the v:orthy man not only advises
others how to fight, but fights himself (V,9) ; and the unv:orthy
are then those "'v/ho find it expedient only to contribute words
and let others fight their battles'" (VI, 12).
So much of the Sophist flavor of Thucydides is in the
speeches that it v/ill be v/ell to conclude with a consideration
of their purpose and their characteristics. Concerning them,
Thucydides himself has this to say at the outset:
"As to the speeches which were made either be-
fore or during the war, it was hard for me, and
for others who reported them to me, to recoll-
ect the exact v^ords. I have therefore put into
the mouth of each speaker the sentiments proper
to the occasion, expressed as I thought he
would be likely to express them, while at the
same time I endeavoured, as nearly as I could,
to give the general puroort of what v/as actually
said." (1,22)
Grundy has compiled a chart listing eleven speeches which
Thucydides certainly did not hear himself, five which he prob-
ablv did not hear, and eight which he may have heard (the
1
speeches made at Athens prior to his exile in 424 B.C.). All
of the speeches have in common the Thucydidean-Sophist style
which plainly indicates their true authorship. So distinctly
1. Op . cit
.
, vol. I, pp. 20-21.
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do they vary in flavor from the narrative proper that the two
must be distinguished v;hen cited as evidence. An opinion ex-
pressed in the narrative may be accepted as the historia-n' s
;
an opinion expressed in one of the speeches is that of the speak-
er, and may or may not be shared by the historian. Some modem
scholars see the political philosophy of Thucydides in virtually
all of the speeches. Thus Godolphin holds that the speeches,
in many ways, serve to distinguish Thucydides the oolitical
1
philosopher from Thucydides the historian; and Mure considers
2
them to be the speculative element in the history. But the
majority of scholars attribute to the speeches what is probably
their real purpose: that of setting forth the motives of the
individual, or party, or state, represented by the speaker.
3
Comford is emphatic on this point, as is G-rundy, who sees in
the speeches "the psychological element in the history of the
4
time." G-ilbert Murray says that "...the politice.l situation
4
is put in the form of a speech or speeches...;" and Collins
holds that they are essays on the political questions of the
1 . Op » cit
.
,
vol . I
, p . xxvi
.
2. _Cp_. cit. , vol. V, pp. 151-152.
3. Op . cit
, p. 138.
4. Op . cit , vol. I, p. 435.
5. G-ilbert Murray, od . cit., p. 186.
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times." The important fact is that the speeches are a mine
of political thought, whether of Thucydides or of the men of
his time.
The speeches seem, to serve tv/o additional fimctions: that
of character portrayal, and the further artistic purpose of
providing pauses in the action. Bury believes that the speeches
"introduce the variety which Herodotus secured by digressions...
and he also sees in them the function of character portrayal,
3
as does Mure. Much of the impression which we have of Peri-
cles may certainly be said to spring from the speeches which
Thucydides attributed to him; and the stereotype of Athens has,
for many generations of historians and commentators, been
summed up in the justly famous Funeral Oration.
Sophism and the speeches are as inseparable from_ each
other as from the history of Thucydides. All three emphasize
the superiority of reason over faith or ethics or any other
ultimate sanction. The rationalistic approach of obser^vation
and investigation which v:as the essence of Sophism became,
albeit without any academic theorizing, the essence of the
Thucydidean approach to history. Allowing to fortune or chance
1. Od . cit
.
, D. 187. See also Bury, G-reek Historians , dtd.
116-117.
2. Bury, op . cit
.
, p. 112.
3. Ibid. , pp. 116-117. Mure, od,^ cit. , vol. V, p. 147 ff
.
r
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its due, the actions of men and of sts^tes follow certain natural
lav7s of economics, politics, and psychology; and they can be
recorded for the guidance of other men and other states who
find themselves in similar situations. Men of intelligence
should rely, "'not on hope, which is the strength of helpless-
ness, but on that surer foresight v;hich is given by reason and
observation of facts.'" (11,62) These words of Pericles are
the essence of the Thucydidean, as of the Sophist, approach
to history.
c
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Chapter IV
COMPARISON, EVALUATION, CONCLUSION
"The Athenian democracy, like the emanci-
pation from all authority v/hich came from
Ionia, is a first condition for the appear-
ance of Herodotus and Thucydides."l
1 . Background of the Greek City-State
2
" Only the state has a history ." That simple fact at
once explains and justifies the intimate alliance of political
thouglit and historical actuality. It is the leaders of states
the kings and emperors and generals - v/ho build the great
cities and the highv/ays and bridges; who construct navies and
lead great armies to war; who give to commerce and art and
religion and education the support and protection without
which they could exist in only the most rudimentary form; who
establish the lav/s by which their separate states shall live;
vrho alone have the power to enforce those laws; and who are
symbols, each in his ovm state, of comm-on customs, common tra-
ditions, a.nd coramon interests - to be, above all others, loved
or hated by the people they command. Further, it is the rebels
against states - the dissatisfied nobles, the leaders of minor-
1. Ulrich von V'ilamov/itz-Moellendorff , C-reek Historical T'Jriting,
translated by Gilbert Murray, Oxford, lp08 (Clarendon
Press)
; p . 17
2. R.yf. Macan, op. cit.
, p. 399.
rc
ity parties, the power-hungry captains, the prophets and re-
formers - who give expression to opposing ideas; who reflect
reaction to prevailing excesses or definciencies; v;ho are the
instigators of heroic acts of violence and daring; and v;ho
alter or replace the government of the state, or die in the
attempt. History is neither made nor recorded by common men
or by primitive and anarchical societies; history i_s made and
i
s
recorded by uncommon m.en and by the organized states of
which they are the leaders and the surviving symbols.
This, then, is the initial promise of success in the
search for political thought in the vrritten histories of Fero-
dotus and Thucydides. The preceding two chapters must stand
as the ultimate measure of that success. It remains now to
compare the findings, to indicate an evaluation in reference
to comparable elements, and to suggest such a conclusion as
the findings v/ill require and the facts allow. Essential to
this procedure is a brief examination of the outstanding fea-
ture in the general backgroujnd of the two histories, namely,
the Greek city-state. "For Herodotus and Thucydides, as for
Plato and Aristotle, men who are not living under City Ftate
1
conditions are the exceptions, not the rule."
In an are of great industrial nation- states, adorned,
blessed, and rendered wise by the manifold gifts of science,
it is customary to point a knowing finger at the city-state
1. Zimmem, G-reek C ommonv/ealth
, p. 63.

concept and to say, "There is the weak link in the chain of
Greek political ideals." In respect to the danger from larger
power combinations, to modem concepts of economic interde-
pendence and economic centralization, and to that philosophy
of bigness (as comm.on to western democracy as to Oriental em-
pire) v/hich places quantity above quality, this judgment can-
not be disputed. Its principal proofs lie in the conquests
of Alexander, in the extent of the Roman EmDire, and in the
rise of Catholic Christianity. Yet something is missing. The
city-state, or city-state conditions, have produced the out-
standing political, intellectual, and artistic accomplishments
in all of history. In contrast to fifth-century Athens, the
achievements of Alexander appear as nothing more than violence
and sudden decay; the Roman Empire is reduced to fruitless
emulation and widespread mediocrity; while Catholic Christian-
ity thrives on darkness, superstition, and the fear of life.
And Vvhat is most significant, each of these has been super-
seded by other foirms. and other ideas.
Is not the real weakness of the city-state concept the
belief that it can be for all t ime the institutional embodiment
of a people's political ideals? 77e know that the Greek city-
state disappeared, as later did the Italian city-state. Ye
knov7 also that the Roman Empire disappeared, and after it the
Holy Roman Empire, and the Ottoman Empire, and now, gradually,
the British Empire. It is not the city-state limitation per
se but the city-state idea rendered permanent which was the
-c
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principal weakness of Greek political thought. On this point,
it is pertinent to observe that Herodotus, although not trans-
cending the city-state in scope, seems plainl3^ to recognize
its delimitation in time; and he states at the outset that he
is v/riting "in the hope of thereby preserving from decay the
remembrance of v/hat men have done," Institutions and men's
memories are alike subject to decay. The mors scientific his-
torian, having chosen to glorify his o\m age above all others,
is the less historical in respect to the city-state.
"
. . .Thucydides, who all but anticipates Aris-
totle' s inquest on the polis
,
apparently
shares that philosopher s belief in the per-
manent possibility of the city-state, and
fails to draw from hi story . . . it s one lesson,
the rel8.tivity, the instability, the imperm-
anence, of all human institutions...."!
It is not our purpose here to trace the origin, the prin-
cipal examples, or the ramifications of the Greek city-idea.
Cur concern is exclusively with its place in the tv.^o histories
under consideration and in the attitude of the tv/o historians.
It ha-s been suggested that the major weakness of the idea lay
in time rather than in content or scope; now it remains only
to propose a further v/eakness, one which it has had in common
v/ith certain later and larger political frameworks. That is
the weakness of mob democracy. Its importance in shaping the
political opinions of the two historians can hardly be over-
estimated .
<
Athens was pre'^ininently the embodiment and example of
the city-state concept; and Athens, in two very different
ways, provided the inspiration for Herodotus and Thucydides.
It the great city-state of Athens which led Kellas to a
heroic resistance against Persian domination and which became
the symbol of the victory of freedom; it was the same Athens
which, half a century later, had placed much of Hellas in
subjection and had become a symbol of tyranny. The desire
for power and wealth alone does not explain either the change
in symbols or the humiliating collapse of the city before the
end of the century. Much of the cause lay in the deteriora-
tion of a leadership democracy to a mob democracy. Immediately
after the ousting of the tyrants, the Athenian democracy ha^d
been of that moderate and realistic type which recognizes
capable leadership. Men of the stamp of Cleisthenes, Themis-
tocles, Cimon, and Pericles would be outstanding in any age.
But with increased concessions of pay for public service,
v/ith key offices opened to lower classes of citizens, and
v/ith the bad habits produced by dependence on tribute from
the emoire, the Athenian government became increasingly the
1
voice of the mob. The best men were executed or exiled to
1. C.E. Robinson, Hellas
, p. 66, says:
"After Salami s, .. .things could never be quite
the same again; first the mass-evacuation, in
itself a great leveller, a breaker-up of tra-
ditions as v/ell as of homes, and then the
(continued next page)
I
satisfy the momentary whims of an assembly which ignored its
best citizens, preferring instead to be swayed by demagogues
like Cleon. 7fe ov/e the history of the Peloponnesian ^-.-ar to
the fact that Thucydides v/as exiled from Athens for twenty
years
.
"The equality of all citizens was a princi-
ple of /the/ democracy; and where it did not
exist forcible measures were taken for re-
ducing all alike to the average standard, if
not to the standard of the lovrest citizens."^
The passing of the Greek city-state, as exemplified by
Athens, was hastened by the downv:ard development of its gov-
ernment into mob rule. Precisely v^here the fault for that
lay it is not a part of our purpose to discuss. Tv;o points
need to be made: first, that the fact of mob rule contributed
largely to the decline of Athens in ^articular; and second,
that Thucydides, at least, seems to have believed that the
city's greatness (and her empire) might have been preserved
indefinitely under a more moderate democracy possessing a
farsighted leadership. The unity of Kellas which some two
1. (continued from preceding page)
victory in which every man equally had played
a part.... The tv/ofold experience v/as bound
to breed a sense of social and political equal-
ity."
Zimmem, op . cit
.
,
points out the influence of the Delphic
Oracle's influence before the Persian '.'ars (p. 113). Its
precepts v/ere Know yourself and 3e moderate. But the
"disgraceful neutrality" of the oracle during the Persian
wars v/as the"de8.th blow" to the national influence of
Apollo (p. 177).
1. Rostovtzeff, on . cit
.
, p. 317.
<:
himdred and fifty city-states vrould not separately allow, and
which the modern historian believes to have been essential
to the prolongation of the Golden Age of Greece, could have
been realized for a considerable period of time under strong
Athenian leadership. Thucydides had a mind keen enough to
realize that; and the shameful decline of Athens must have
reasted heavily on him.
There exists an analysis of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of the city-state concept of government, based on the
experience of ancient Greece, which may explain the paradox
of the meteoric rise and fall of Athens. The advantages are
three in nujnber:
(1) higher political development of the individual citizen
(2) most intense patriotism
(3) fullest scope to human genius in the a-rts
There is an equal nijimber of disadvantages:
(1) its glory is short-lived
(2) it engages in constant v/arfare 1
(3) civil strife and partisan hatreds are intensified
The s.nalysis might add th8.t, although the most brilliant per-
iod of Athens might necessarily have been ultimately limited
in duratio^L, her ind-ependence and the glory of empire might
have been considerably extended if it had not been for the
deterioration of her government into mob democracy.
Herodotus had seen Athens at the virtual peak of Peri-
1. E.A. Freeman, A History of Federal Government in Greece and
Italy
.
2nd edition, London, 1893 (Macmillan) ;pp .29-49
(C-
4
clean democracy; but the sesds of degeneration had already been
sown, and the decline to mob rule was probably clearly indi-
cated before he had finished his history. Thucydides lived
most of his adult life during the decline, and he left a re-
lebtlessly candid analysis of it, insofar as it applied to
the Peloponnesian 'far.
2 . The Principal Differences
The outstanding difference bstv/een Herodotus and Thucy-
dides lies in the amount of scientific analysis which each
employed. Herodotus was likely to err in the simple arith-
metic totalling of his oim figures; he seems to take at their
face value the improbable tales of Egyptian priests; he attri-
butes great prescience to the pronouncements of the oracles;
he most certainly exaggerates the size of the Persian host
which Xerxes led into Greece; he presents fables on a -oar with
facts; he shows little understanding of military and naval
maneuvers - and hardly more of political institutions; he
seems to have favored an Alcmaeonid version of the history of
Athens; and he is ever willing to leave the narrative proper
in order to recount a pleasant story. Thuc^'^dides , on the other
hand, sets forth early in his history his criteria for accur-
acy:
"Of the events of the war I have not ventur-
ed to speak from any chance information, nor
according to any notion of ray ov/n; I have des-
cribed nothing but what I either sav7 myself,
or learned from others of whom I made the
most careful and particular enquiry." (1,22)

156.
Ke then goes on to observe that such faithfulness to accuracy
has been a difficult task, "because eye-v/itne sses of the same
occurrences .cave different accounts of them, as they remembered
or vere interested in the actions of one side or the other."
(1,22) We are warned that the resulting narrative may be
disappointing to the ear - and so, except for tre speeches
and a fev; other oassages, it is. Thucydides repeats no word
of gossip, no scandal, no pleasing fable. >'e know his chief
figures only in their speeches , in their military actions,
and, occasionally, in the brief estimates 7/hich the historian
condescends to provide, iiverything vrhich is admitted into the
history proper must be completely factual, must pertain dir-
ectlv to the war, and must follow the chronology of successive
1
summers and winters. If the result is artistically less
satisfying than the history of Herodotus, it is more scientif-
ic, cohesive, and analytical.
"Herodotus tells what he can and will;
what he tells and hovj he tells it, depends
upon his personality. Thucydides reviev.-s
the mass of events and chooses by his ovm.
insight the part that is v/orthy of recital. "2
Thus, from the point of view of historical method, the
two historians were centuries aoart, although less than thirty
1. Exceptions are the digressions on Themistocles and on the
tyranny of Hiooias and the murder of Hipparchus.
4-'- 2. '.-Jilamowitz-Moellendorff
,
op. cit.
, pp. 7-8.
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years separated the a-o-oearance of their v/orks. "Herodotus
creates throughout an entirely old-fashioned impression; Thu-
1
cydides is a modern of the modems." Herodotus reflects the
old Ionian C-reek epic tradition; Thucydides aooears as a prin-
cipal exponent of the most advanced thinking of his time,
that of the Sophists.
The second major difference betv/een the tv/O men is that
of scope . It is a difference which is too seldom acknowledged
and one which arises from the initial inspiration of each of
the historians. Thucydides, as v/e ha,ve noted previously, vr&s
exclusively concerned with the Peloponnesian V/ar, which he
believed \vould be great and memorable above all previous wars.
In view of the relatively small area v/hich that v/ar occupied,
of the small number of men involved, and of the skirmish- scale
of most of the engagements, his problem was clearly limited;
and he limited it further by excluding any account of customs,
lav:s, or internal history of the states involved.
"Thucydides never went out of the immediate
G-reek world; but for his fortunate exile, he
might never have gone out of the dominion of
Athens; his reading was necessarily small; he
spoke only one language ; he knew only one
form of political and civilized life. "2
1. Theoaor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers
,
translated by Laurie Mag-
nus, 4. vols., London, 1920 (John Murray, publ
. ) ; vol. I,
p. 503. See also Benn, op . cit
.
, p. 64, and Mure, op
.
cit
.
, vol. V, Dp. 57-58.
2. Freeman, op . cit
.
, p. 176.
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Herodotus, however, had been inspired by the great strui^gle
between Greece and the forces of Persia. Ke set no observable
limit to the permissable subject-matter of his work, and vran-
dered freely over most of the ancient v.'orld. I'Je may be sure
that he knew Halicarnassus and Sardis and the Valley of the
Nile as v/ell as he knew Athens. ¥e may further be sure that,
had he written of the Peloponnesian '-'ar, he would have reduced
it to its proper size - or, if his account of the Battle of
Marathon be ta'^ien as the appropriate example, to less than
its proper size. The history of Herodotus dv/arfs the history
of Thucydides in the proportions of its elements: it is greater
in time, in s-oace, in nations and races and cultures, in num-
bers of men, in size of armaments, in gold and silver expended,
and in the issues involved. It is a simple matter to enumerate
the inaccuracies of Herodotus. "The field he covers is so
wide, and the chances of error in observation so great, that
1
it is impossible he should not often be found v/rong." It
seems not to have been so simDle a matter to recognize the far
greater scope of his history.
The superior scope of Herodotus was m.atched by his super-
ior tolerance. In this respect, he was far in advance of his
fellow historian. Thucydides, like Plato, did not think of
humanity as a vrhole ; he "thought of it as sharply divided into
two sections, G-reeks and Barbarians, and of the 3-reek v/orld
1
. Mahaffy , Problems in Greek History , p . 105
.
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as a small oasis of intelligence." Herodotus was Deculiarly
2
free from this customary Greek contempt for non-G-reeks. Him-
self a product of Orientalized Ionian Greek civilization, he
had enjoyed a lone; first-hand experience v/ith Carians and
Lydians, Medes and Persians, which developed in him a greater
tolerance tovrard the diverse nations of the earth than the
proud parochialism of Athens could have engendered. He could
praise the honesty of the Persians and the great merit of
their educational system; he could set forth the customs of
many nations, awarding- favorable comment where he thought it
v/as deserved; he could trace Greek religion and much of Greek
civilization to Egyptian sources; and he could set forth Croe-
sus and Darius as more real and more human thah Miltiades and
Themistocles . Just as this is a measure of his greater toler-
ance and of his cultural impartiality, so is it appropriate
to the greater scope of his work.
The third difference which needs to be noted is that of
the criteria or basic assumptions involved. '"Je have already
discussed the religious element in Herodotus and the Sophist
1. Zimmern, in The Legacy of Greece
, p. 327.
2. Joseph Wells, Studies in Herodotus
, p. 182, believes that
certain allusions to Herodotus in the plays of Aristo-
phanes "illustrate strikingly the contrast betvjeen -'ero-
detus' cosmopolitan interest and the narrow Hellenism
of Periclean Athens." See also Hov; and ¥ells, Commentary
,
vol. I, p. 37.
1
1^
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element in Thuc^/dides ; but the implications for political
thought of these very different elements need to be re-empha^
sized
.
"In morals, as in religion and in science,
Herodotus is not a member of the Periclean
circle; he is a sixth-century Greek, with
the interests of an Ionic philosopher, not
of an Athenian sophist. "2
The figure of Nemesis stalks behind the scenes of his history.
Sometimes men are punished for succumbing to the tragic se-
sin of prosperity - but they are punished. The moral element
is ever-Dresent ; its ultimate reference is to the gods, v/ho
enforce the morality of Herodotus. The earlier historian v/as
susceptible to fits of scepticism, but "basically he acceoted
3
the gods and the belief in their intervention...."
In the pages of Thucydides, we have entered a new world.
The oracles are derided; the gods are barely mentioned; legend
and fable are omitted; and only Gornford can see Nemesis be-
hind the scenes, 'fen have learned "to despise the mythical
glories of their ancestors, to exalt the present at the expense
of the past, to fix their attention exclusively on immediate
sometimes for the single
1.
2
.
3.
Chapters TI and III above.
Joseph ';.'ells, op . c it
.
. p. 197.
G-omperz, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 265.
i
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human interests." This is the essence of humanism, of Soph-
ism, and of Thucydides. Causes do not lie in heaven or in
the abstract ether; they lie on this earth and in th^ actions
of men; they may be determined by observation and investiga-
tion. Thus the philosophy of Thucydides is not based on re-
ligion or morality or ideals; it is limited to the observable
facts of human nature and of political society - hov/ever bru-
tal and repellant to ethical sensibilities those facts may on
2
occasion prove to be. The general difference in basic assump-
tions is between the religious morality of Herodotus and the
Machiavellian expediency of Thucydides.
This suggests a fourth, and final, ma lor point of differ-
ence bet'-reen the two historians: the great gulf between their
understanding of political institutions. If Herodotus does
not take up the problem of the origin of the Greek city-state,
neither does he explain the offices of government in Egypt
or the administrative organization of the Persian empire.
Assuredly he had. the opportunity to observe a number of actual
governments in their operation. That he says nothing of their
1. Benn, op . cit
.
, p. 76.
2. See Grundy, op. cit. , vol. II, pp.42-A8, 8.nd Godolphin, ed
.
,
op. cit. , vol. I, p.xxiii. Cornford is the outstanding ex-
ception to the general vie\r of the religiosity of Herodo-
tus and the scepticism of Thucydides. He says, op . cit
.
,
p. 237, "If either of the two men is to be called relig-
ious, it is Thucydides; if either is sceptical, it is Hero-
dotus...; something closely akin to cynicism and flippancy
is common enough in Herodotus; there is not a trace of
either in Thucydides."
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development or of the functions of their separate parts -plalnlj
indicates a lack of interest in the generally prosaic problems
of government. His interest in political institutions was
limited to a recognition of the differences betv;een Oriental
empire, which symbolized tyranny in his master-plan, and the
1
Greek city-state, which symbolized freedom.
Neither does Thucydides give any adequate oicture of the
development and operation of the internal political institu-
tions of Athens or Sparta. But his political interest is
everywhere in his work keenly felt; and the speeches in par-
ticular are singular m.asterpieces in the realm of political
thought. The ideal of the Funeral Oration contrasts strikingly
with the historical reality of Athenian decline; yet both are
expressions of the same problems of political society. In
the need for a leader possessing foresight and a certain noble
restraint the historian finds the key to the central problem
of democracy: that of necessary authority. In the Athenian
empire he recognizes the ultimate sanction of political ac-
tion: that of ex-oediency, or reason of state. "Thucydides'
history is a confession of faith by the nov- thoroughly rational
2
ized state...." It is, in fact, essentially a political his-
tory and only secondarily a history of the v/ar, for Thucydides
1. See Denton J. Snider, op . clt
.
,
Intro,, p. xxxviii
.
2. Jaeger, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 338.
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could not fail to observe that war is fundamentally a politi-
cal problem.
3 . The Princiipal Similarities
Equally as important as the differences are the similari-
ties betv/een the tv/o historians. They lived only a generation
apart, they were both Greeks, they both showed a strong prefer-
ence for freedom over tj'^ranny, and each, in his own way, was
a lover of Athens. There were at least four main points of
similarity between them which directly influenced, or gave
outright expression to, their political opinions.
The first was their common recognition of the unpopularity
of the Athenian empire. We may be almost certain that Hero-
dotus was no apologist on this account; he "undoubtedlj'- did
not like Athens' claim to mastery of the seas and domination
1
over other G-reek states." His recognition of the empire's
\mpopularity is indicated when, as a preface to his high praise
of Athens' leadership in the vital struggle against Persia,
he is forced to say: "...I feel constrained to deliver an opin-
ion which most m.en, I know, will dislike...." (VII, 139)
are rem.inded that he was v/riting at a time v/hen Athens' earlier
reputation as the champion of freedom had declined to a reputa-
tion for imperial tyranny. The v:hole evidence of Herodotus'
history is opposed to his possible approval of that tyranny.
1. Gilbert Murray, op . cit
.
. p. 179.
c
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Nor was Thucydides in his v.'ork attempting to excuse the
excesses of empire and of internal deterioration at Athens.
The implication is strong that he, quite unlike Kercdotus,
approved the empire to the full extent of its compatibility
with the best interests of Athens; and he did not "set out to
condemn the imperialistic policy of Perikles . . .any more than
to compose an apologia." His complete recognition of the
bad repute in which freedom-loving Hellenes held the em.pire
has been discussed in the preceding chapter.
The two historians show their second outstanding similar-
ity in the belief that it is the nature of pov:er to expand;
and this lavr of history has its ultimate expression, of course,
in the appetite for empire. It is a lav/ which each historian
might be expected to develop and describe according to his ovm
particular criteria. Thus Herodotus expresses it in terms of
the gods - but also in terms of human passions. The Nemesis
sequence which recurs repeatedly in his history is the chosen
vehicle of expression. The individual ruler reaches a state
of satiety ( tfo/Cj)^ which represents all of the pov/er and
1. Gornme, Essays
, p. 124. Powell, op . cit
.
, p. 86, takes the
opposite view of both historians. He says, referring to
Athens
:
"Both men were her apologists. Thucydides after
her dovmfall took up his pen once more to illumin-
ate and justify rationally her imperial policy;
Herodotus in a time of bitterness and suspicion
was determined that the immortal merit of Athens
as the champion of Greek freedom should not be
forgotten."
1

prestige and enjoyment of v/orldly goods v/hich the gods v;ill
freely vouchsafe him; but hs is not content - the desire for
more impels him to exceed satiety. He believes that he can
be greater than the gods have allowed; he becomes the victim
of pride Nov; there is no turning back. Blinded by
self-infatuation (^M ) , he rushes into new conquests, en-
slaves free people, violates sacred laws and even religious
shrines, and cuts dovm whatever stands in the v;ay of the satis-
faction of his insatiable apiDetite. Then suddenly the gods
strike. 7.Tiether out of Jealousy or of moral indignation, -
Herodotus is not always careful to say v/hich, - they mete out
a punishment in proportion to the offense against divine law.
The key to the whole process, in all of the many examples of
its operation, is that human desire is limitless. Cnce it
has begun to be satisfied, its nature is to demand more and
more satisfaction. Deioces, Cyrus, Gambyses, Darius, Xerxes -
all are examples of this power-hunger vrhich leads to eventual
punishment in Herodotean history. Thus the expansion drive
of Xerxes made the conflict with Hellas inevitable, since
"...the one thing needed to complete the mastery of the v;orld
i
was the subjugation of Hellas."
In Thucydides, the v:hole history of the Peloponnesian
War comprises a lesson against pov/er expansion beyond the
point of necessity. The moral is pointed, for those who wish
1. Cochrane, op . cit
.
, p. 467. See also, p. 466.
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to find it there, of the power-appetite of a democratic mob
which exceeded its capacity to consume and led a great imperial
state to ruin in the process. But the criteria of Thucydldes
are not moral ones, and he describes the expansion urge in
terms of lax^s of human nature. And he seems to make a distinc-
tion in this respect. The tendency of ruling mobs, as of the
demagogues who fan the flames of their aD^etites, is, and in
Thucydides always will be, to v/ant more. The more pay they
get, the more they will demand; the more leisure they are
granted, the more they will seek; the greater the comforts
made possible by empire tribute, the more that tribute must
be increased. Cn the other hand, there are a fev.r vT-ise states-
men, possessing the rare gift of foresight, who know when to
stop. Cf these, Pericles, the empire-builder, v:as the fore-
most. ''Tiile he lived Athens prospered; after his death, Athens
leaderless, fell victim to her ovti insatiable a^Detite for
povier and vj-ealth and lost everything.
"Athens' triumphant career of empire build-
ing ended in ruin. Ker immensely rich sea
empire had seemed for a long time the exem-
plar of successful power politics. In reality
she had grovm too powerful. She acted in the
Invariable way with the invariable result;
she abused her power and she was overwhelm-
ingly defeated. So far Thucydides saw."l
Kerodotus would have traced the dovmfall of Athens in terms
of the doctrine of Nemesis; Thucydides rationalized it in
1. Edith Hamilton, otd . cit
.
. pp. 104-105,

terms of human nature and the absence of capable leadership.
We are lead from this to examine the role of reason in
the two histories, for a third and somewhat surprising similar-
ity emerges on that score. The cool, Sophistic reasoning of
Thucydides contrasts at most points with the religiosity,
oracular faith and fable propensity of his predecessor; yet
the limitations on reason which the Herodotean criteria impose
are in certain respects matched by the limitations of tv/o
elements in Thucydides: namely, his concept of laws of human
nature and the factor of fortune or chance.
In Herodotus, man' s fate may bs predetermined by such an
accident as his being the fifth in line of descent from an
erring ancestor, as in the case of Croesus. Cr repeated good
fortune, over which he has no control, may bring another under
the wrath of the gods, as v/ith Polycrates. In the great pro-
cess of history, the role of the mind is "that of a passive
SDectator, utterly without DOwer to influence the course of
1
events." The gods and the fates determ.ine the good or bad
fortune of the individual, v.^o thus becomes a helpless part
of the overall pattern of history.
There is room for a greater play of reason in the Thucy-
didean concept; and the ideal leader may in a large degree
affect the course of events by the proper application of his
intellect. But the leaders are all too few, as Thucydides
1. Cochrane, op . cit
.
, p. 468.
i
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painfully observed. The history of the Peloponnesian War was
largely, from the Athenian point of view, the history of mob
rule, or of Qemagogue rule; and it v/as to the mob and to the
demagogues that Thucydides in every instance applied his refer-
ences to lav's of human nature. The implication is inescapable
that these laws place a limit on human reason, since they assert
that under certain conditions human beings v^ill act in certain
foreseeable ways. In the absence of a superior controlling
reason, the mass of ordinary minds will react as mobs react,
according to patterns long established. Furthermore, they
will usually react in the direction of unreason. The excesses
and tardy reuentances of the Athenian mob suggest nothing so
much as that unreason is the proper attribute of the mob.
The second factor in Thucydides' history v/hich severely
limits the play of reason is the element of chance. Key events
in the history - such as the plague and the occupation of Py-
los - are represented as due entirely to chance, to the un-
foreseeable and unpredictable. The whole course of humc-n
events is subject to the shocks of fortune, which no man and
no mind can possibly avert; these shocks originate outside of
the Thucydidean-Sophistic system of reason. In the case of
Athens their effect, and the effects of the mob's unreason,
^^ere cumulative and led to the city's demise.
"From this point of viev; the 'inquiry' of Thu-
cydides assumes a character hardly less dis-
concerting than that of Herodotus. For the
story he has to tell is that of human reason
defeated and crushed by the forces of irration-
ality. These forces manifest themselves in

1
T«:artime Athens."
There is in Thucydides a suggestion of inevitability
v;hich is 8, further, though overlapping, expression of the
limitations on reason vrhich his history suggests. It folloi-;s
clearly from the concept of lav/s of human nature and from the
apoarent belief that it is the nature of pov/er to expand.
G-iven a certain set of circumstances, in the Thucydidean view,
a certain result must inevitably follow - inevitably, that is,
except for unexpected fortune, v;hich further circumscribes
reason. Jae&er has asserted that Athenian power, in the pres-
entation of Thucydides, was "comDelled to develop, by the
2
immutable lavrs of human nature;" and he points out the belief
that Sparta was coimpelled by fear of Athens to declare war.
Finley refers to the basic assumption of a considerable degree
of inevitability in Thucydides, which "...in some ways resem-
bles Plato's and Aristotel's idea of the freedom of the will:
namely, that one is originally free to make a choice but,
4
having made it, is thereafter committed." If there is one
lesson which the history teaches it is that shortsighted poli-
tical and military leadership results inevitably in disaster.
1. Ibid.
, p. 473.
2. Jaeger, oo . cit
.
, vol. I, pp. 393-394.
3. Ibid.
, p. 394.
4. Finley, oo . cit
, pp. 308-309.
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A fourth similarity follows from the material of the tv/o
immediately preceding. It involves the general view of his-
tory which the two historians held. Each of them seems plainly
to have entertained a dynamic, cyclical interpretation of
events. Both were aware that human institutions eventually
decay and must be replaced by others - even though neither
envisioned any successor to the city-state. 3oth recognized
the existence of apoetites in the individual and in the mob
which would lead to unreason, to excess, to destruction, and
hence to the need for replacement of institutions. Both realiz
ed that wars effect great changes, rendering great powers weak
and v/eak powers great. Herodotus employed the gods to right
the balance after each nev/ cycle of satiety, pride, and blind-
ness; Thucydides postulated laws of human nature which vrould
come into play at specified stages in any cycle of events.
Neither of the historians was in s.nj major sense, except that
of tacit, permanent acceptance of the city-state, a believer
in static societies: both were generally cyclical in their
outlook - cyclical in the sense of belief in recurrent patterns
of human political behavior. Herodotus erred from the cyclical
vie^TOOint in his evolutionary view of Greek religion and of
customs generally, and Thucydides erred from it in respect to
the sole static element in his v;ork: the attribution of exclu-
sive imtDortance to the Pslo-oonnesian ''JB.r,

4. Conclusion
The history of Herodotus represents in many v/ays the
culmination of the centuries-old tradition of the Homeric
epic and its combination with the geography of Hecataeus,
the researches of the lop;o.G;ra-ohoi , the accomplishments of
Thales, and the new spirit of scientific curiosity generally.
Bordering at times on the methods of the Sophist and on the
scepticism of the scientific observer, it nevertheless has
its roots too much in the Ionian epic and in the m.orality of
G-reek religion to become truly objective. In Thuc3''dides,
however, the intellectual revolution is complete. History
is no longer a prose rendition of the epic spirit, with the
gods keeping close watch upon the excesses of men. Politics
is no longer incidental to the greater subject of history.
The history of Thucydides is the embodiment of the victory
of Sophism and of the central importance of political think-
ing: "historical v^riting had not become political, but iDoliti
1
cal thinking had become historical."
Separated by at least half a century in their subject
matter and by a full century in the dominant traditions which
they represented, Herodotus and Thucydides nevertheless lived
not more than a generation apart and shared in common the in-
fluence, inspiration, and example of Athens. The distillate
1. "Jaeger, op . cit
.
, vol. I, p. 381.
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of oolitical thought in their two histories reveals a common
dislike of the excesses of democracy; and here both were un-
doubtedly principally influenced by the example of Athens
during the second half of the Fifth Century - Thucydides getting
much the v:orse of it in the period which he described. Both
emerge as moderate democrats with aristocratic propensities -
"like most other sound and impartial Greek political thinkers...'
Both of them express a positive and outright almiration for
the constitution of Sparta and hence align themselves, with
Plato, in support of the law-giver concept. Herodotus, whose
nature and preference do not allov/ him to indicate a definite
institutional corrective for the excesses of mob democracy,
contrasts with Thucydides, who is plainly and consciously
a political thinker, and who proposes strongly the need for a
leader: a man of foresight, of virtue, of noble character,
with supreme political and military ability. Here is the key
to the difference between the two historians in respect to
their political thought. Basically they favor the same form
of government; but one goes beyond the other in suggesting
the solution to the chief difficulty of that government.
Thus Herodotus' great merit was
"to have realized and presented in inescapable
terms the conflict of two conceptions of man's
relation to the state betv.'een v/hich man must
1. Mure, op
. cit
.
, vol. IV, p. 455. See also vol. V, p. 62
r
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still choose, -
namely, freedom and servitude. But having chosen freedom, and
having indicated for it the framev/ork of a constitutional
government, he does not go on to suggest the remedy for the
perversions of freedom which democratic mobs inflict and which
he specifically criticizes. It was undoubtedly no part of
his purpose to do so; and the observation is made only to point
up the contrast with Thucydides on this issue.
Thucydides, who expressed a preference for a government
in which democracy and oligarchy would be "duly attempered"
,
had thought the problem through. He v^anted democracy limited
to those citizens who could provide themselves vfith arms; he
wanted quality to be recognized in the state along with quan-
tity; and he believed deeply in the urgent need for enlightened
but powerful leadership, to guide the ship of state and to
keep in order its diverse elements. "For him the state, based
on a division of fujictions and upon the accumulation and pru-
dent expenditure of car)ital..., /was/ a creation of wisdom
2
"
coupled with power."
For Herodotus, the state was based on the rule of force
in Persia and on the rule of law in Greece; and he strongly
preferred the Greek model. \-^!e may impute to him, on the evi-
dence of his history, the ideal of a state v/hich would cora-
1. Godolphin, ed
.
,
op . clt
.
, vol. I, p. xxiii.
2. Cochrane, op . cit
.
. p. 472.
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bine the intellectual and physical freedom of Athens v;ith the
stability and restraint of Sparta.
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Abstract
of
Master' s Thesis
THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF
HERODOTUS AND THUCYDIDES
by
John >/hitten
I
180.
The field of political thought in the history of Herodotus
seems, prior to the present study, to have remained unexplored
in any great detail; and although much material exists on the
more analytical history of Thucydides, only a small percentage
of it deals in any adequate degree v^ith the element of political
thought in the history, and no single volume in English treats
exclusively of the subject.
This essay finds that the r^rincipal political conviction
of Herodotus was his positive preference for freedom over ty-
ranny . The classical account of the tyrant's progress may be
read time and again in his history: in the careers of Pisistratus,
Polycrates, Periander, Cypselus, Miltiades, Histiaeus, and many
others. Furthermore, we find in his pages a debate, in ho^.-r-
ever artificial a setting, on the relative merits of the three
basic forms of government - monarchy, oligarchy, end demo-
cracy, ^"'e may not conclude, concerning the historian's prefer-
ences among the three forms, that because he preferred freedom
he therefore stands as an early champion of democracy. He
plainly criticized the excesses and weaknesses of democracy
in more than a score of places; and we can fairly attribute
to him, on the basis of the history, no more extreme status
than that of a moderate democrat. Most of the political
thinking of Herodotus must be deduced or inferred, since he
was not consciously, for the most part, a political essayist.
The case is quite the o-oposite with Thucydides, v;ho ranked
with the best of the Sophists and in the company of Plato and
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Aristotle as a political observer of his age - and of all
history. Lucidly and in detail he set forth vrhat inust "be
termed the classic philosophy of empire. Impartially he set
expediency against justice and found the latter in the v/eaker
position in the affairs of states and of empires. The I'elian
Dialogue stands as a monument to the greater power of exped-
iency. Thucydides, mainly concerned with the external re-
lations of Athens and Sparta and their allies, nevertheless
gives us an insight into the vrorkings of democracy on the one
hand and of oligarchy on the other. The importance of the
conflict betv;een the two ODposing systems of government he
makes amply clear. He treats in places of the role of law and
of the state and its problems; and it can be convincingly dem-
onstrated that he, like Herodotus, preferred freedom to tyranny
His criticisms of democracy are even more extensive and more
penetrating than those of Herodotus; and he states, in one
place only, that his government of preference is one in v.hich
democracy and oligarchy are "duly attempered"
.
To Thucydides, who has been compared to Machiavelli in
his outlook, the principal Droblem of the state is that of
leadership . Thus he departs from his customary impartiality
to bestow praise upon Pericles and, in an excursus, upon Themis
tocles, and to speak approvingly of such Borgia-esque individ-
uals as Alcibiades and Antiphon. For him, foresight is the
greatest quality which any statesman can have. With it, Peri-
cles was able to lead the mob rather than being led by it; with
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out it, men of the stamp of Cleon led the mob and Athens to
ruin.
Essential to the histories of Herodotus and Thuoydides,
as to any history of Fifth Century Greece, is the prevalence
and influence of the city-state form of political society.
Neither of the tv/o historians in his thinking escaped the limi-
tations of the city-state concept. In this respect, they were
similar in the bases of their political thought. They had much
in common also in their mutual recognition of the unpopularity
of the Athenian empire; in their belief that it is the nature
of power to expand; in the limitations -.^lich each placed on
the role of reason in human affairs; ana in a generally dynamic
and cyclical viev; of history.
The differences in the political thinking of Herodotus
and Thucydides are typified by their very different approaches
to history, the one being the teller of pleasant tales; the
other, the coolly analytical, scientific observer of the pro-
gress of v;ar and of empire. They differ also in the scope of
their material: Herodotus dealt v/ith centuries and --.'ith the
whole of the ancient world ; Thucydides limited himself to
twenty-one years of the Peloponne sian War and to European Hella
In Herodotus, the doctrine of Nemesis, or jealousy of the gods,
vies with the prophecies of oracles in the description of his-
tory; in Thucydides, the gods are conspicuous only by their
absence, and v/e are confronted instead by the cool reason of
Sophism. Finally, the older historian presents no analysis of
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political probleras and evinces little interest in political
institutions; while the work of Thucydides, with its great
number of carefully contrived speeches, has justly been called
a political history.
Although they lived and wr6te a generation a.part, the two
historians shared in common the influence and example of Athens
Each, observing the growing excesses of the Athenian populace,
v/as highly critical of mob democracy. Both seem to heve been
moderate democrats with aristocratic propensities. Thucydides
made it clear that he favored a form of government v/hich v/ould
combine the best features of democracy and of oligarchy. Hero-
dotus, in his passionate preference for freedom over tyranny,
seems to have favored a government combining the intellectual
and physical freedom of Athens with the stability and restraint
of Sparta.



